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The Times
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOL. I.

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The Times DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOLUME I.

DIPLOMATIC—PART 1



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INTRODUCTION

"THE TIMES" DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR is a collection of documents concerning the War in all its aspects, so arranged as to record the events of the great struggle in which the Nations are now involved, and the circumstances which led up to them.

It consists of documents issued officially or recognised by the various belligerents, such as diplomatic correspondence, proclamations, ultimatums, military orders, reports, despatches, messages from monarchs to their peoples, etc., together with public statements by responsible Ministers and Correspondence in the Press of an authoritative character; the whole collated, classified, indexed, and where necessary cross-referenced and annotated.

The documents are left to speak for themselves, except where brief unbiased notes are needed to elucidate them. These are placed within square brackets, to distinguish them from the notes in the originals.

The Times, with its network of Correspondents in all parts of the world, is in a particularly favourable position to obtain information, and, having at its service an experienced staff, is able to reach sources not generally accessible to others.

As the large mass of documents involved in the collection has been systematically classified and arranged from the commencement of the War, it has been found possible to issue to the public simultaneously a representative series of volumes.

INTRODUCTION

A survey of the constantly accumulating material would appear to indicate that *The Times* DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR will be grouped into at least five main divisions :—

I. DIPLOMATIC.

II. NAVAL.

III. MILITARY.

IV. OVERSEAS, comprising documents dealing with events in the Dominions and Possessions Overseas and in enemy territories not included in the first three divisions.

V. INTERNATIONAL LAW, including documents relating to the Laws of War, the Proceedings of Prize Courts, etc.

Each division will appear in its own distinct set of volumes.

PREFACE

THE first and second Diplomatic volumes deal with the outbreak of the War and embrace the documentary records of events, negotiations, correspondence, and important public utterances emanating from Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Japan, and in one instance Italy. Foreign documents are given in English and as far as possible in official translations. In a few cases of exceptional importance the original French or German text is added.

The whole of the first volume and more than half the second are filled by the British Blue-book and the official translations of the French Yellow-book, the Russian Orange-book, the Belgian Grey-book, the Serbian Blue-book, the German White-book, and the Austro-Hungarian Red-book, which contain the despatches published by the various belligerent Powers to justify or explain their proceedings during the critical period that led up to the War.

The papers in the remainder of the second volume are miscellaneous in character. To take them in their order, they include certain Japanese documents—among these an important speech delivered by Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister, in the Imperial Diet at Tokyo, for the translation of which we are indebted to the courtesy of the Marquis Inouyé, late Japanese Ambassador at St. James's; the published correspondence of King George V. with the President of the French Republic and with the Tsar; the British

notifications of a State of War ; a series of German controversial documents regarding Anglo-Belgian relations, together with the British and Belgian replies ; a similar series bearing on the action of Germany before the War ; Signor Giolitti's notable speech of December 5, 1914, in the Italian Chamber, throwing light upon the attitude of Italy in separating herself from her allies ; the considered utterances of responsible British statesmen, including Sir Edward Grey's important speech on the origin and main issue of the War, delivered at the Bechstein Hall in March, 1915 ; certain Foreign Addresses, Proclamations and Messages ; and, finally, the text, in whole or in part, of Treaties mentioned in the course of the Correspondence.

In order to facilitate the cross-references to the " Blue-books " of the different nations, each has been distinguished by a letter of the alphabet, as shown in the list appended (p. ix). At the outer top corner of every page devoted to one of these seven books the index letter of that book is printed in bold type, together with the number of the first (or last) despatch below.

The British Blue-book and the official English translations of the French Yellow-book and the Belgian Grey-book are provided with Tables of Contents in the originals and these are reproduced. The official English translations of the other four books have none. For the Russian, Serbian, and Austro-Hungarian books this omission has here been made good by the Editor, as is noted in each case. The German book is different in character and requires no table of contents.

The " Blue-books " of the seven European belligerents have been given in full, in the official English versions, as they stand, except that superfluous formal words of address and signatures have been omitted. The material that occupies the latter portion of Part 2, from p. 295 to the end, has been re-arranged in order to avoid unnecessary repetition and confusion. It includes the fresh contents of a second German White-

book, " Aktenstücke zum Kriegsausbruch," which was published in the early part of 1915. This second White-book reproduced the entire contents of the first, together with much additional matter, and, like its predecessor, was accompanied by a translation into English, published officially in Berlin.* This added matter, on its original appearance in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, had given rise to a good deal of controversy and had drawn replies from both Great Britain and Belgium. The whole has here been classified according to subject, origin and date, under the headings " Anglo-Belgian Relations " and " The Action of Germany."

The " Pages d'Histoire " and the official Belgian " La Neutralité de la Belgique," from which a few proclamations are translated, are published by MM. Berger-Levrault, Paris, who have kindly allowed the use of documents. " Der Kriegsausbruch, 1914," is published by Carl Heymann, Berlin.

The following letters and abbreviations are used to indicate the publications placed against them :—

B = The British Blue-book.
G = The Belgian Grey-book (official translation).
O = The Russian Orange-book (official translation).
R = The Austro-Hungarian Red-book (official translation).
S = The Serbian Blue-book (official translation).
W = The German White-book (" only authorised translation," published by Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin).
Y = The French Yellow-book (official translation).

* It is a curious fact that this English translation of the second White-book does not adopt and incorporate the " authorised " English translation of the first, but substitutes a version differently worded. The earlier and better known English text has been followed here, with changes in the spelling of a few proper names and designations, mostly Russian.

C.D.D. = "Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War. London: Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office by Harrison & Sons, Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty. 1915."

D.O.W. = "Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War. Published by the Imperial German Foreign Office." (An English translation of the second German White-book, "Aktenstücke zum Kriegsausbruch. Herausgegeben vom Auswärtigen Amte." Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin.)

OTHER ABBREVIATIONS.

app. = appendix.
encl. = enclosure, enclosed.
Eng. tr. = Official English Translation.
exh. = exhibit.
F.O. = British Foreign Office.
intro. = introduction.

NOTE.—In the marginal cross-references the seven "blue-books" are distinguished by their index letters (*see* list above), and the individual despatches by their numbers. A number standing alone, without an index letter, refers to a despatch in the same book in which the cross-reference itself appears.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS AT THAT TIME.

1. GREAT BRITAIN.

Prime Minister and Secretary of State for War	Mr. Asquith.
Secretary of State for War (succeeded Mr. Asquith, Aug. 6, 1914)	Earl Kitchener of Khartoum.
Lord High Chancellor	Viscount Haldane.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	Sir Edward Grey.
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	Sir A. Nicolson.
French Ambassador	M. Paul Cambon.
	M. de Fleuriau (*Chargé d'Affaires*).
Russian Ambassador	Count Benckendorff.
	M. de Etter (*Counsellor of Embassy*).
German Ambassador	Prince Lichnowsky.
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador ..	Count Mensdorff.
Italian Ambassador	Marquis Imperiali.
Belgian Minister	Count de Lalaing.
Serbian Minister	M. Boshkovitch.

2. FRANCE.

President of the Republic	M. Poincaré.
President of the Council	M. René Viviani.
Ministers for Foreign Affairs ..	1. M. Jonnart. 2. M. Stéphen Pichon. 3. M. René Viviani. 4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (*Acting*). 5. M. Doumergue. 6. M. Delcassé.
Political Director	M. de Margerie.
Political Director (*Acting*)	M. Berthelot.
British Ambassador	Sir Francis Bertie.
Russian Ambassador	M. Isvolsky.
	M. Sevastopoulo (*Chargé d'Affaires*).
German Ambassador	Baron von Schoen.
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador ..	Count Szécsen.
Belgian Minister	Baron Guillaume.
Serbian Minister	M. Vesnitch.

3. RUSSIA.

Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	M. Sazonof.
Minister for War	M. Suchomlinof.
British Ambassador	Sir George Buchanan.
French Ambassador	M. Paléologue.
German Ambassador	Count Pourtalès.
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador ..	Count Szápáry. Count Czernin (*Chargé d'Affaires*).
Serbian Minister	Dr. M. Spalaikovitch.
Belgian Chargé d'Affaires	M. de l'Escaille.

4. GERMANY.

Imperial Chancellor	Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg.
Secretary of State	Herr von Jagow.
Under-Secretary of State	Herr von Zimmermann.
British Ambassador	Sir Edward Goschen. Sir Horace Rumbold (*Counsellor of Embassy*).
French Ambassador	M. Jules Cambon. M. de Manneville (*Chargé d'Affaires*).
Russian Ambassador	M. Swerbeiev. M. Broniewsky (or Bronewsky) (*Chargé d'Affaires*).
American Ambassador	Mr. Gerard.
Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors ..	1. Count Szögyény. 2. Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst.
Belgian Minister	Baron Beyens.
Japanese Chargé d'Affaires ..	Baron Funakoshi.
Serbian Chargé d'Affaires	Dr. M. Yovanovitch.
French Minister at Munich ..	M. Allizé.
French Consul-General at Frankfort	M. Ronssin.

5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	Count Berchtold.
Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs	Baron Macchio. Count Forgach.
President of the Ministry of Austria	Count Stürgkh.
President of the Ministry of Hungary	Count Tisza.
British Ambassador	Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
French Ambassador	M. Dumaine.
Russian Ambassador	M. Schébéko.
Russian Chargé d'Affaires	Prince Kudachef (Koudacheff).
American Ambassador	Mr. Penfield.
German Ambassador	Herr von Tschirschky (or von Tschirsky).
Italian Ambassador	Duke d'Avarna.

5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY—*continued.*

Belgian Minister	Count Errembault de Dudzeele.
Serbian Minister	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch (or Jovanovich).
French Consul-General at Budapest	M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin.
Russian Consul-General at Fiume .	M. Salviati.
Acting Russian Consul at Prague ..	M. Kazansky.

6. TURKEY.

British Chargé d'Affaires	Mr. Beaumont.
French Ambassador	M. Bompard.
Serbian Chargé d'Affaires	M. M. Georgevitch.
Austrian Consul-General	Herr Jehlitschka.

7. BELGIUM.

Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	M. Davignon.
	Baron van der Elst (*Secretary-General*).
Colonial Minister	M. Renkin.
Vice-Governor of the Katanga ..	M. Tombeur.
British Minister	Sir Francis Villiers.
French Minister	M. Klobukowski.
American Minister	Mr. Brand Whitlock.
German Minister	Herr von Below Saleske.
Austro-Hungarian Minister ..	Count Clary.
Dutch Minister	M. de Weede.

8. SERBIA.

Prime Minister	M. Pashitch.
Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs	Dr. Laza Patchou.
British Minister	Mr. des Graz.
	Mr. Crackanthorpe (*First Secretary*).
French Minister	M. Boppe.
Russian Chargé d'Affaires	M. de Strandtman.
German Secretary of Legation ..	Herr von Storck.
Austro-Hungarian Minister ..	Baron Giesl von Gieslingen.
Belgian Minister	M. de Welle.
Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent at Nish	Herr Hoflehner.

9. ITALY.

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior	Signor Salandra.
Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	Marquis di San Giuliano.
British Ambassador	Sir Rennell Rodd.
French Ambassador	M. Barrère.
German Ambassador	Herr von Flotow.
Serbian Minister	M. Ljub Michailovitch.

10. JAPAN.
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador .. Freiherr von Müller.

11. SPAIN.
Belgian Minister .. .. .. Baron Grenier.

12. DENMARK.
French Minister .. .. .. M. Bapst.

13. HOLLAND.
Minister for Foreign Affairs .. M. Loudon.
French Minister .. .. .. M. Pellet.
Belgian Minister .. .. .. Baron Fallon.

14. LUXEMBURG.
Minister of State and President of the Government .. .. Dr. Eyschen.
French Minister .. .. .. M. Mollard.
M. d'Annoville (*Chargé d'Affaires*).
German Minister .. .. .. Herr von Buch.

15. NORWAY.
French Minister .. .. .. M. Chevalley.

16. SWEDEN.
French Minister .. .. .. M. Thiébaut.

17. SWITZERLAND.
French Consul-General at Basle .. M. Farges.

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THE KING'S SPEECH AT THE PROROGATION OF PARLIAMENT.

September 18th, 1914.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

I ADDRESS you in circumstances that call for action rather than for speech.

After every endeavour had been made by My Government to preserve the peace of the world, I was compelled, in the assertion of treaty obligations deliberately set at nought, and for the protection of the public law of Europe and the vital interests of My Empire, to go to war.

My Navy and Army have, with unceasing vigilance, courage, and skill, sustained, in association with gallant and faithful Allies, a just and righteous cause.

From every part of My Empire there has been a spontaneous and enthusiastic rally to our common flag.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I thank you for the liberality with which you have met a great emergency.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

We are fighting for a worthy purpose, and we shall not lay down our arms until that purpose has been fully achieved.

I rely with confidence upon the loyal and united efforts of all My subjects, and I pray that Almighty God may give us His blessing.

PREFACE TO "COLLECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE EUROPEAN WAR."*

(EXTRACTS.) †

AS historical sources these documents [the official correspondence published by the various European Governments relating to the outbreak of the war] are of the first importance. Taken separately, they are interesting; but taken together and compared, they constitute a body of evidence of quite exceptional value. . . .

For purposes of comparison, the documents may be divided into three periods:

1. The state of European politics previous to the events of last summer [1914].

This, the prefatory period, is only illustrated by a few documents, namely, the first chapter of the French Yellow-book (pp. 259–285), Signor Giolitti's speech (vol. II., p. 394), the Austrian Statement as to the past activities of the Pan-Serb movement (vol. II., pp. 200 *et seq.*), the exchange of notes between Sir E. Grey and M. Cambon in November, 1912 (pp. 170–172), and the original documents in the appendix to the Belgian Grey-book (vol. II., pp. 327–350). These documents do not, of course, pretend to give any general history of the causes which produced the crisis of 1914; they merely throw light on certain definite points immediately connected with that crisis itself. . . .

2. The period between the murder of the Archduke and the presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia.

For this period we have Chapter II. of the French Yellow-book (pp. 286–297), the first six numbers of the Austrian

* Printed under the authority of H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1915. [The whole of these "Collected Diplomatic Documents" are included in Vols. I. and II. of "*The Times* Documentary History of the War."]

† [These extracts reproduce everything in the Preface save a few passages of no permanent interest, chiefly explaining the nature of the compilation in which the Preface appeared.]

Red-book (vol. II., pp. 182–188), Nos. 1, 2 and 161 of the British Blue-book, and Nos. 1 to 31 of the Serbian Book (vol. II., pp. 83–106). This period is dealt with in the next section.

3. The period between the presentation of the Austrian Note and the outbreak of war. The bulk of all the correspondence, except in the case of the Serbian Book, is concerned with this period. The Books vary, however, a good deal in the point up to which they carry the story of events. The Serbian Book ends with the declaration of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia on July 28th. The German, Austrian and Russian Books practically end with the declaration of war between Germany and Russia on August 1st, though the Russian Book adds the formal declaration of war with Austria-Hungary on August 6th, and the Austrian Book adds twelve documents illustrating the formal steps as the result of which Austria-Hungary found herself at war with the other allied countries. The British and French Books carry the story down to the declaration of war between England and Germany at midnight on August 4th, and the French Book adds the Declaration signed at London on September 4th [September 5th. *See* vol. II., p. 506], binding England, France and Russia not to negotiate or conclude peace separately. The Belgian Book carries the story down to August 5th when Belgium finally found herself at war with Germany and was assured of the armed support of the other signatories of the Treaty of 1839, but it then proceeds to reproduce a series of documents illustrating subsequent events down to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Belgium on August 28th. Of these twenty-six papers, the two last[1] record the formal rupture between Belgium and Austria-Hungary. Six deal with miscellaneous subjects: the neutrality of Holland, the navigation of the Scheldt, the taking over of German interests in Belgium by the United States, and the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg. Seven relate to the extension of the war to the possessions of the belligerents in Africa. The remaining eleven papers illustrate the renewed offer made by Germany to Belgium on August 9th and its rejection on August 12th.

[1] [G. 77, 78, are the two referred to.]

As a whole, therefore, the correspondence in this volume ["Collected Diplomatic Documents"] is a minute record of

the events of ten days from July 23rd to August 1st. The subject is the Serbian Question. On August 1st the scene shifts; the light is switched from Serbia to Belgium and the French frontier. For the next four days, August 2nd to 5th, we have a record, equally minute, of the attitude of England, France and Belgium on the brink of war and of the communications received by them from the German Government. But we have practically nothing from the other side. There is the speech of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag (vol. II., pp. 353–357); there is the Note handed in at Paris by Baron von Schoen on August 2nd (French Book, No. 133) and the telegram to Prince Lichnowsky of August 4th (British Book, No. 157); there is the conversation with Herr von Below Saleske at the Belgian Foreign Office, at 1.30 a.m. on August 3rd (Belgian Book, No. 21); there are finally the five telegrams semi-officially published in the German Press (vol. II., pp. 358–362). That is all. "Very early" in the morning of August 2nd the German troops appear on the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich in Luxemburg (p. 201); later on the same day they are reported to be across the French frontier at Ciry and near Longwy (p. 395); on August 3rd their advance guard is at Gemmenich in Belgium (vol. II., p. 36). Behind this screen of troops Berlin is almost silent. At London, Paris and Brussels decisions are still being formed. Deliberations continue; telegrams are exchanged. But at Berlin the direction of events has already passed from the Foreign Office to the General Staff, which does not talk and which publishes no records.

There is one other gap in the correspondence which must be noted. We know practically nothing of anything which passed between Vienna and Berlin during this whole period. In the German Book there is only one communication between the two capitals (No. 16); in the Austrian Book there are only eight (Nos. 33, 35, 38, 42, 43, 46, 48 and 57). The earliest of these is dated July 27th (No. 33). There is, indeed, as we shall see, no doubt as to the general relations between the two Governments, but from the historian's point of view this is not enough. We are dealing with a diplomatic episode; ten days of feverish activity when new proposals and new developments followed each other hour by hour. The only real interest of such a crisis is to estimate

how a general attitude responds to each new factor in the situation and thereby to gain an impression of the spirit behind the attitude. Here the German correspondence fails us. This very failure may not be without value as a guide to the historian. It has been perhaps the secret alike of Germany's predominance and of the strain under which Europe has lived for a decade, that Germany has always shown the world her power, but has never taken it into her confidence.

The Period between the Murder of the Archduke and the Presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia, June 28–July 23.

First, as to the attitude of the German Government. This may be dismissed in a few words. The German Book states, "We permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations" (vol. II., p. 125). All the Books agree that the German Government professed to have no previous knowledge of the terms of the ultimatum. How much they did know can only be inferred from such documents as French Book, Nos. 9 and 21, British Book, No. 1, Serbian Book, No. 26. On the question, what part Herr von Tschirschky played personally in the counsels of the Austro-Hungarian Government during this period, we know only the common belief of the representatives of the Powers at Vienna as revealed in British Book, Nos. 32, 95 and 161, 2nd para.; Serbian Book, No. 52, 4th, 12th and 20th paras.; Russian Book, No. 41; and French Book, No. 18.

Second, the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. This is the vital point. After all that has been said and written lately on the subject it is not necessary to discuss the Pan-Serb movement. There may be a question as to the trustworthiness of the police reports on Serbian propaganda contained in No. 19 of the Austrian Book. But the broad fact is not in doubt. Serbia had nationalist ambitions incompatible with the recently established sovereignty of Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those ambitions are practically admitted in British Book, No. 30, they are presupposed in the advice given to Serbia as recorded in that document and in French Book, No. 26, they were evident in the attitude of the Serbian Press. The only question for Austria-Hungary was whether by her dramatic

annexation of the two Provinces in 1908, she had finally closed against herself the door of peaceful settlement. Whether Serbia or Austria had tried to keep that door open in the five years since 1909 is not a question which can be dealt with here—we can only refer to the different accounts of those years given in Austrian Book, No. 8, and Serbian Book, Nos. 5 and 30, para. 10. Be that as it may, Austria decided in July that the door was closed. Probably, as indicated in Signor Giolitti's speech (vol. II., p. 394), she had taken the same decision long before. Now, at all events, she made up her mind that war was inevitable and immediate war desirable (Austrian Book, No. 6).

It was on this issue that Austria made war. The question of Serbian guilt in the murder of the Archduke could not have given rise to the Austrian ultimatum. Whatever may be the value of the evidence on this particular question contained in Austrian Book, No. 19, few people would be found to say that this evidence involved the Serbian Government itself in a way that a jury could consider for a moment, and no one will say that it could have justified an ultimatum with a forty-eight hours' time limit. Whatever may be the value of the statement in Austrian Book, No. 9, paras. 2 and 3, as to the failure of the Serbian Government to investigate the murder, on the one hand, and on the other hand the assurances given by the Serbian Government of readiness to conduct such investigations (Serbian Book, Nos. 5 and 30, para. 5; Russian Book, No. 6; British Book, No. 30; French Book, No. 15), it is obvious that, in regard to the murder itself, the Serbian Government had at any rate committed no flagrant breach of the duty of a neighbouring State to assist in the apprehension of criminals. It is the general account of Serbian propaganda in Austrian Book, No. 19, which constitutes Austria's real case against Serbia. The distinction is well stated in Nos. 17 and 25 of the Serbian Book. It was a question of a fundamental antagonism of aims and ideals and a long-nursed sense of wrong.

Such cases are very difficult, but they are not new. It was not the first time that Austria-Hungary had deliberately placed herself across the path of a nationalist movement. In comparing the feverish atmosphere of the Austrian and Serbian Books a calm view of the issues may perhaps best

be attained by reference to a correspondence which has now passed into history. From 1817 to 1848, Metternich was writing of the policy of the Piedmontese Government in its relation to Italian nationalism and Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venetia, in the same strain as Count Berchtold writes of Serbia. The same epithets are applied to the leaders of Italian nationalism; they are "poisoners," "highway robbers," "pickpockets." Take a few sentences at random. "The scheming policy of the Turin Cabinet." "There is no doubt that the Turin Cabinet cherishes ambitious projects which can only be carried out at the expense of Austria." "The causes (of complaint against Austrian administration in Italy), even had they been a hundred times more serious than they are, would not have justified the least of the plots hatched by the Piedmontese conspirator. In reality, in the struggle in which we are engaged, it is not a question of our administrative faults, but of the attacks which faction directs against the existence of Austrian power." "The King seeks to mask under the veil of assistance rendered to the 'independence of the Italian nation' the blow which he strikes at respect for the sacredness of treaties and the manner in which he thus attacks at its base the maintenance of general peace and of all international relations." "The word 'nationality' and the words 'Respect due to nationalities' as applied to the Italian Peninsula are words devoid of practical sense." History has given its judgment on this correspondence; it is not for us to give one on the present controversy. The Serbian question is only a rehearsal of an old drama; it is enough that we recognise the plot.

The intention of Austria under these circumstances is undisputed. It is stated in the preface and in No. 6 of the Austrian Book precisely as it was stated by M. Jules Cambon on July 24th (French Book, No. 30), and by Sir M. de Bunsen on July 27th (British Book, No. 41). War was to be made inevitable; all means of retreat were to be cut off.

There is one further point to notice. The British Book, the French Book, and the Serbian Book agree in the picture they draw of the mystery surrounding the Foreign Office at Vienna during this period. On the whole the German and Austrian Books bear out this impression. It seems that

the deliberate intention was to take both Serbia and Europe by surprise.

Events subsequent to the Presentation of the Austrian Note.

We have no space to deal with the complex negotiations which fill the bulk of the Books. We can only consider three points as illustrations of the way the Books may be compared.

1. The character of the negotiations with Russia immediately following on the rupture with Serbia.

2. The view of the negotiations implied by the title of the German Book: "How Russia betrayed Germany's confidence."

3. The question of Belgian neutrality.

It will be observed that we omit any direct treatment of the position of Great Britain and France in relation to the outbreak of the war. The case for these two Powers has been often stated and is now before the world. A re-statement could carry no added conviction. On the other hand, of the above three points the first two have received no adequate treatment from the historical point of view, partly because the Austrian Book has only recently been published; while the third point touches so nearly the heart of the present struggle that a brief statement on it may not be out of place.

The Character of the Negotiations with Russia, immediately following the Rupture with Serbia.

Austria knew, at the time when she presented her Note to Serbia, that she was risking a conflict with Russia. The fact is stated in so many words in Austrian Book, No. 26. Indeed, it was one of the commonplaces of European diplomacy, and witness is borne to it throughout all the Books without exception. There is no sign in the Austrian correspondence that Austria was under any illusion as to the danger of Russian intervention. But to judge from Count Pourtalès' airy words to the Serbian Minister at Petrograd on July 24th (Serbian Book, No. 36), and Herr von Tschirschky's equally confident remarks to Sir M. de Bunsen at Vienna on July 26th (British Book, No. 32), Germany was counting on Russian weakness or timidity to avert this danger. No such illusion,

however, even if it was originally genuine, could have survived the events which immediately followed.

The point on which all the Books show striking unanimity is the absolute openness of Russia's attitude from the beginning. The steady consistency of that attitude gives the Russian Book its unity and its force. M. Sazonof's conversations on July 24th with the German Ambassador (German Book, No. 4; Austrian Book, No. 16; French Book, No. 38), and with the Austrian Ambassador (Austrian Book, No. 14; Russian Book, No. 25); his instructions to M. Kudachef on the same day (British Book, No. 13), and the official announcement in the Russian Press on July 25th (Russian Book, No. 10), were calculated to remove any possible doubt in the mind of the German and Austrian Governments.

The way in which Austria met this open attitude is curious. If there is one point on which the German and Austrian Books lay extraordinary emphasis it is the assurances given by Austria that she contemplated no attack on the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Serbia. But the nature of her communications to Russia on the subject is worth examining. On July 24th Count Berchtold says Austria wants nothing but the maintenance of the *status quo* (Austrian Book, No. 18); on July 25th he mentions an indemnity (No. 20); on the same day he declares that neither the territorial integrity nor the sovereignty of Serbia will be touched, *but* "we will proceed to extreme measures for the enforcement of our demands" (No. 26); on July 27th the assurance that no territorial demands will be made on Serbia is made conditional on the "localisation" of the war (No. 32). Clearly, this method of defining policy was not calculated to allay the apprehension frankly declared by M. Sazonof on July 24th (Austrian Book, No. 14): "You will always be wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead Europe!" The general impression produced by Austria's assurances in this matter, whether that impression was just or unjust, may be seen from the doubt expressed in British Book, No. 79, whether she would consent to convert those assurances into "a binding engagement to Europe."

There is another point which indicates the distrust awakened, not unnaturally, in the mind of Russian statesmen by Austria's steps after her rupture with Serbia. Points

5 and 6 of the Austrian demands on Serbia relate to the participation of Austrian officials in one form or another in the measures to be taken by the Serbian Government against the anti-Austrian propaganda on Serbian territory, and against those implicated in the actual plot for the murder of the Archduke. In the annotations on the Serbian reply published both in the German and Austrian Books, the following commentary is made on the Serbian reply to these demands: "If the Serbian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between *enquête judiciare* and simple *recherches* must be familiar to them" (vol. II., p. 263). Now, the Serbian Government were not the only people who misunderstood these demands, for they raised the immediate apprehensions of M. Sazonof, Sir E. Grey and M. Bienvenu-Martin (Austrian Book, No. 14; British Book, No. 5; French Book, No. 25; and Austrian Book, No. 11). Such general misapprehensions are always possible, but the strange thing is that Count Berchtold, as early as July 25th, found it necessary to offer a special explanation on this very point to the Russian Government (Austrian Book, No. 27). This explanation was given to the Russian Government "in strict confidence." In other words, Russia is informed in confidence of a point on which the Serbian Government certainly had a right to a full explanation. Austria might perhaps reasonably have considered it incompatible with her dignity to make the explanation to Serbia direct, but it could have easily been made indirectly through Russia. As a matter of fact it was made too late to influence the Serbian reply and under the seal of secrecy; and, moreover, both the explanation itself and the annotation on the Serbian reply are hard to reconcile with the statement about "supervision" made by Herr von Jagow on July 29th (French Book, No. 92). The whole circumstance appears to require explanation, especially as it is duplicated by a similar "confidence" in the case of Great Britain, which may also be noticed.

On July 24th Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff in London that the Note to Serbia was not an ultimatum but a "*démarche* with a time limit" (Austrian Book, No. 17), and that this fact should be communicated to Sir E. Grey. Sir E. Grey received this information (British Book, No. 14)

and telegraphed it to Paris and Petrograd. It was conveyed to M. Sazonof on the morning of July 25th (British Book, No. 17). He replied that this did not tally with the information which came to him from Germany. We know from German Book, No. 1, French Book, No. 28, and British Book, No. 9, what kind of language the German Ambassadors at the capitals of the Entente Powers were holding on July 24th. The reassuring communication thus made to Great Britain can therefore only be explained, in the light of the other communications sent to Sir E. Grey from Vienna on July 23rd (Austrian Book, No. 9) and on July 28th (No. 39), as an attempt to keep Great Britain quiet. Any reassurance designed really to preserve peace should clearly have been made at Petrograd. But while Count Berchtold was doing his best to reassure Sir E. Grey by urgent telegrams on July 23rd and 24th, he contented himself with writing a despatch (for such it appears to be) to Petrograd on July 25th, containing arguments for the education of M. Sazonof (Austrian Book, No. 26). Again it must be said that these proceedings were not calculated to promote a frank exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd.

The real inference from this correspondence seems to be —and it lies very near the heart of the calamities from which Europe is now suffering—that Austria proceeded throughout on the principle that it is better not to enter into discussions with the person with whom you have a difference of opinion. Hence the mystery reigning at Vienna for the first three weeks of July, and hence also the confidences as to Austria's moderate intentions carefully imparted on July 24th and 25th to the Powers not the most directly concerned with those intentions.

We have here laboured perhaps a rather minor point, and have not considered the course of those "conversations" between Vienna and Petrograd and Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation by the four disinterested Powers, which formed the main features of the three days between July 25th and 28th. But these main features have already been exhaustively discussed and commented on in public during the last few months, and the minor points dealt with above are raised because they seem comparatively new and because for that reason they throw additional light on the grounds for

M. Sazonof's remark on July 28th, recorded in French Book, No. 82 : " Certainly Austria is unwilling to converse." This distrust may usefully be compared with the impression made on M. Bienvenu-Martin by Herr von Schoen's communications at Paris on July 24th to 26th (French Book, No. 61), and with the character of M. Jules Cambon's conversations with Herr von Jagow on July 24th and 27th (French Book, Nos. 30 and 74). Silence and a show of power were the weapons on which Germany and Austria relied.

The View of the Negotiations implied by the Title of the German Book : " How Russia Betrayed Germany's Confidence."

The ground of the charge thus made by Germany against Russia is a little difficult to fix. As we have seen, Russia's attitude was entirely open throughout the negotiations, and the German Chancellor's telegrams to the German Ambassadors at London, Paris and Petrograd of July 26th (German Book, Nos. 10, 10A, and 10B) show that, on the day following the rupture between Austria and Serbia, that attitude was already clearly understood in Germany. In fact, there is not a sign in the whole correspondence that any statesman in the whole of Europe ever doubted that Russia would regard an actual armed attack on Serbia under the circumstances as an attack upon herself. We are forced to the conclusion that if Count Pourtalès at Petrograd continued to under-estimate the danger of war until his conversation with M. Sazonof at 2 a.m. on the night of July 29th to 30th (British Book, No. 97 ; Russian Book, No. 60 ; French Book, No. 103), at which he " completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable," his under-estimate must have been based on a doubt, not as to Russia's policy, but as to her courage ; and this is borne out by the attitude both of the German Ambassador at Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin (British Book, Nos. 32 and 71). Russia was not " in a position to make war."

But, so far as can be understood, the gravamen of the German charge against Russia is that the German military attaché at Petrograd characterised the assurances of the Russian General Staff on July 29th, as " an attempt to mislead us " (vol. II., p. 131), and that the Tsar's telegram to the German

Emperor, of July 31st (vol. II., p. 132), was despatched at the moment when the general mobilisation of the Russian Army was being ordered. That is to say, the German case is that :—

1. In the period between July 28th and July 31st, during which the Russian Government assured the German Government that mobilisation was only proceeding to meet Austrian preparations in Galicia, the Russian Army was in reality being at least partially mobilised in Warsaw, Vilna and other districts against Germany. Russia was therefore taking advantage of Germany's attitude as stated to Sir E. Goschen by Herr von Jagow on July 27th (British Book, No. 43) that " if Russia only mobilised in the south, Germany would not mobilise."

2. The Russian mobilisation occurred at a moment when Germany was making a special effort at peaceful mediation, and at a moment when the Tsar was actually encouraging those efforts by pacific assurances.

We will take these two points separately.

1. Russian mobilisation measures between July 28th and July 31st.

The German Book rests almost its whole case on the priority of mobilisation measures. The way in which that case was carefully built up during the negotiations is shown by British Book, No. 71, where the German Chancellor declares on July 28th that the Russian mobilisation in the south endangered the efforts of the German Government to encourage direct communications between Vienna and Petrograd. Compare this with British Book, Nos. 70, 74, 93 (1) and (3) ; Russian Book, No. 47 ; Austrian Book, Nos. 40, 42 and 48 ; German Book, No. 16. It will be seen that at the moment the Chancellor was speaking, Austria had already refused both direct discussions with Petrograd and Sir E. Grey's mediation proposals, *before* she heard of the Russian mobilisation, and on the sole ground that she had herself declared war on Serbia. It was *after* she heard of the Russian preparations that she resumed conversations on July 29th–30th. It will be observed that on July 28th Russia believed that the general Austrian mobilisation had been ordered. As a matter of fact, in sifting any case based on mobilisation reports there are several points to be remembered.

Mobilisation measures as preliminaries to war are a German

tradition. If anyone will refer to the account of the negotiations between Prussia and Austria from March 31st to May 8th, 1866, before the Prusso-Austrian war, given in Sybel's "Foundation of the German Empire," Book 16, Chapter 1, he will see the example in this line set by Bismarck. But a case based on priority of mobilisation measures is never a strong one for several reasons.

First, it is difficult enough to tell "who began it" when the negotiations are spread over months, but it is practically impossible to do so when, as here, it is a question of hours. Take the German telegram of July 26th to Petrograd (vol. II., p. 128), given in the body of the German narrative, and the conversation between M. Sazonof and Count Pourtalès on July 29th, recorded in No. 58 of the Russian Book. The actual mobilisation measures are taken in the midst of a cloud of accusations and threats, and it is impossible to separate cause from effect, in the hurried hours which we have to study.

Secondly, in any attempt to state the facts, the minor accusations and innuendoes must be discarded as of slight importance, except as a guide to the psychology of the moment. Such minor points are German Book, Nos. 6 and 9; Serbian Book, No. 52; French Book, No. 89; Austrian Book, No. 47, penultimate para., last sentence, and a dozen other similar reports. The same may be said of rumours of violations of frontier (Austrian Book, No. 40; German narrative, vol. II., p. 135; British Book, No. 144; French Book, No. 106; British Book, No. 105). They have their value, but to put them forward, as does the German and Austrian correspondence, as the actual ground for the commencement of hostilities is to assume the impossible position that the fate of nations is subject to the reported action of a roving patrol. Frankly, a marked insistence on such reports, as in the German Book, shows a poor appreciation of the value of the evidence.

Thirdly, mobilisation "orders" are not mobilisation. The mobilisation systems of different countries are radically different; the precise nature of those systems, the lines of the railways and a hundred other points must be taken into consideration in judging mobilisation measures, and any statement which ignores these factors is a mere bid for uninformed public opinion. We cannot enter into a consideration of all these factors here, but a few indications may be

given. No. 3 of the French Book contains an allusion to the well-known fact of the secrecy of the first stages of German mobilisation, and M. Jules Cambon believed that this first stage was set on foot as early as July 21st (French Book, No. 15 ; see also No. 59). It is unnecessary to estimate the accuracy of the various reports of German preparations in the French Book, interesting as they are. The hard fact that though Germany only proclaimed " Kriegsgefahr-zustand " on July 31st and mobilisation on August 1st, to take effect on August 2nd, the German troops were across the Luxemburg frontier at dawn on August 2nd, will probably be judged to be historical evidence of far more value than any isolated reports received during the crisis. As to Russian mobilisation, British Book, Nos. 43 and 121 show that it was fully realised in Germany that the Russian system was so complicated as to make it difficult to distinguish the localities really affected by mobilisation. Germany accuses Russia of mobilising against Germany, not Austria, because she is reported to be mobilising at Vilna and Warsaw, but both those towns are nearer to the Galician frontier than Prague is to the Serbian frontier, and Austria was reported to be mobilising at Prague four days before she declared to Russia that she was only mobilising against Serbia (Russian Book, No. 24 ; French Book, No. 90 ; Austrian Book, No. 50 ; German Book, No. 23). The bare facts are of very slight value as evidence without a knowledge of the points already mentioned.

If the charges as to the priority of Russian mobilisation are examined in the light of these considerations, it will be admitted that the evidence for those charges is remarkably slight, and that, given the admitted extreme slowness of Russian, and the extreme rapidity of German, mobilisation, a fact which is frequently alluded to in the correspondence, there is no indication in favour of, and an overwhelming presumption against, the theory that the Russian measures were further advanced than the German when war was declared on August 1st.

2. The charge that the Tsar's telegram of July 31st (vol. II., p. 132) was misleading, and that the mobilisation orders issued about the time of its despatch destroyed the effect of sincere efforts then being made by Germany to mediate between Russia and Austria.

In the first place, a glance at the Tsar's telegram is sufficient to show that this charge is, to put it frankly, of the flimsiest character. His Majesty gave his "solemn word" that, while it was "technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations" the Russian troops would "undertake no provocative action" "as long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue." There was no promise not to mobilise; there was nothing but a statement which is almost word for word the same as that contained in the German Emperor's telegram to King George twenty-four hours later (vol. II., p. 361, No. 6)—the statement that, under certain circumstances, mobilisation would not be converted into hostilities.

As a matter of fact, a somewhat unscrupulous use, in effect though perhaps not in intention, has been made of the Tsar's telegrams to substantiate the theory of "betrayal." Take for instance the German Chancellor's statement on July 31st (British Book, No. 108), that "the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Tsar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request." The telegram referred to must be that of July 29th (German Book, No. 21), since this is the only one which mentions "old friendship"; but this telegram, though it asks the Emperor to restrain Austria, also says in so many words that popular opinion in Russia would soon force measures which would lead to war.

As to Germany's efforts at mediation, it does seem to be true that on July 29th the Austrian Government showed some signs of moving, in the direction of a peaceful solution. On that day occurred the conversation between Count Szápáry and M. Sazonof (Austrian Book, No. 47), which, on Count Berchtold's instructions of next day (Austrian Book, Nos. 49 and 50), seemed likely to develop into a renewal of the direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd. On that day, too, Herr von Jagow went so far as to admit that these conversations furnished "a basis for possible negotiation" (French Book, No. 92), and on July 30th he forwarded to Vienna, but apparently without comment, Sir E. Grey's last proposal which admitted the possibility of an Austrian

occupation of Belgrade before the mediation of the Powers could be brought into effect (British Book, Nos. 88 and 98; Austrian Book, No. 51), and which Austria seems to have regarded at the time, and Germany subsequently professed to have regarded, as a promising basis of discussion (German narrative (vol. II., p. 132) and Austrian Book, No. 51). By July 31st these negotiations had resulted in distinct formulations of the Russian and Austrian attitudes which were indeed far enough apart, but which still offered some hope of reconciliation. (Russian Book, No. 67; British Book, No. 120; Austrian Book, No. 51.) On July 31st the exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd was proceeding (Russian Book, No. 66), and, though there is a remarkable absence in the Austrian Book of any indication that there was at this moment any revived hope of peace, it does seem from the British and French Books that the atmosphere at Vienna was clearing on July 30th to 31st (British Book, Nos. 94, 95, 96, 118; French Book, Nos. 104 and 115).

All this makes a fair showing, so far as the attitude of Austria and Russia is concerned. But what part had Berlin in these more friendly steps? We hear of many German assurances of moderating counsels sent from Berlin to Vienna; there are no documents either in the German or the Austrian Book showing what these counsels were, though the German Chancellor's account of one message to Vienna is given in British Book, No. 75, but they are mentioned in British Book, No. 95, as having come to the ears of M. Dumaine at Vienna, and it is only fair to point out that the renewal of conversations on July 29th between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry was due to a hint given to the latter by the German Ambassador. The point here is, however, not whether these counsels were actually given, for documentary evidence of which we have still to wait, but whether the attitude of Germany at this moment was calculated to reassure the Russian Government. And here we have the curious fact that there is in the whole correspondence not a single sign of any communication from Berlin to Petrograd during these days even hinting at the possibility of a compromise or of any form of international action to settle the dispute. Look at German Book, No. 14; British Book, No. 93 (2); Russian Book, Nos. 58, 60, 63. These were the communications

which reached M. Sazonof. Their tenor was " mobilisation," ' proposals inacceptable," and so on. And breaking through the diplomatic correspondence come the German Emperor's telegrams. At 6.30 p.m. on July 29th, His Majesty is, after all that has passed, still " of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war " (No. 22, vol. II., p. 160) ; six and a half hours, later, at 1 a.m., on July 30th, he is threatening to abandon all attempts at mediation if Russia mobilises *against Austria*, No. 23. In this correspondence we have many assurances of mediation ; but are we allowed to see the substance ?

In fairness, no one will wish to press against German statesmen points arising out of the events of these last days. We have only gone into these points because Germany herself has tried to make use of them against her antagonists. The truth about these days is, as usual, very simple. Under the strain of a sudden crisis, Europe was bound to break at its weakest link, and that weakest link was Germany. She, alone of all the nations of Europe, could not negotiate on the brink of war. The nature of her institutions, the character of her people, the very perfection of her military organisation alike forbade it. The calculations of her General Staff were too fine drawn ; a state of uncertainty was intolerable to her nerves. The military machine was too vast and elaborate ; once set in motion, it must occupy the whole stage of Government. Every other country could mobilise and yet continue to negotiate with a hope of success. But the German mobilisation was peculiar, not only in its effect but in its nature. Open mobilisation was the last stage. It was not a military preparation ; it was in itself an offensive movement. On that order the German armies did not merely concentrate ; they marched. If history passes judgment on Germany it will not be because she did this or that in the final crisis, but because she had for years consciously set herself to create a military machine which incapacitated her from assuming any other attitude but one of menace to her neighbours, and because, knowing the consequences of even a slight pressure on the levers of that machine, she acquiesced in or perhaps deliberately encouraged the steps which made that pressure inevitable.

In all this, Russia's attitude deserves a fuller recognition

than has yet been accorded to it. She made no parade of pacific intentions ; she played on no weaknesses ; she counted on no doubtful factors ; she took refuge neither in silence nor in catchwords. She stated openly the circumstances under which war would become inevitable. But she gave every chance to international action ; she shunned no discussion ; she was ready to accept any compromise provided only that the Austrian troops paused on the Serbian frontier. She steered her policy throughout by the light of the guiding fact that the Austro-Serbian conflict could not be localised even by her own abstention, for that conflict was not a simple attack on Serbia but a recommitment of the whole Balkan question. Her action during the whole crisis is entitled to the respect which is due to honesty and openness in international relations.

The Question of Belgian Neutrality.

There is no need to go into the details of a question which has now been so exhaustively discussed and on which opinion is already so fully formed. But the charges made by Germany against the action of Belgium and Great Britain in the years preceding the war appear to necessitate a brief statement bringing these charges into relation with the correspondence during the crisis.

Two charges have been made, which to a certain extent neutralise each other :

1. That Great Britain had long intended to violate Belgian neutrality by force.

2. That there was an arrangement between the British and Belgian Governments providing for the violation of Belgian neutrality by consent.

As to the first charge, it may be dismissed in a few words. It is proved to be baseless, not by the statements issued by the British Government after the publication of the " incriminating " documents (Belgian Book, Appendix Nos. 2 and 6, vol. II., pp. 328, 347), but by Sir E. Grey's despatch to Sir F. Villiers of 1913 (No. 1, vol. II., p. 327), and by the simple fact that it was not till more than 60 hours after the presentation of the German ultimatum that Great Britain, on August

5th, definitely and finally promised "joint action with a view to resisting Germany" (Belgian Book, No. 48).

Great Britain had the duty to defend Belgium by arms against a violation of her territory. On the one hand she had solemnly assured Belgium that such defence would never take the form of anticipatory violation. On the other hand, it had for years been a commonplace—not in closed diplomatic circles but among students of politics and in the columns of the Press—that German military preparations indicated an intention to attack France through eastern Belgium. In these circumstances it was the elementary duty of the British Army to obtain such information and make such preparations as would enable Great Britain, if called upon to do so, not merely to go to war in defence of Belgium, but to save her; and if any British officer approached any Belgian officer with this object, he was but fulfilling the functions for which a national army exists and without the fulfilment of which international obligations would become nothing but pious hopes.

As to the second charge, alleging an arrangement between the British and Belgian Governments, the formal denials of such an arrangement issued by the two Governments are really unnecessary, for the charge is sufficiently rebutted by Baron Greindl's despatch, published by the Germans themselves (No. 2, vol. II., p. 328). Nothing that has been published contains a shadow of evidence of anything resembling such an arrangement. But if further evidence of the truth is required, it is contained in the Belgian Book. In this preface we can leave Great Britain's case to the judgment of the student; but the action of Belgium, as revealed in the Grey-book, has never yet had full justice done to it, in spite of the general sympathy which it has excited.

Nos. 2 and 16 of that Book show the careful measures taken by the Belgian Government in advance to secure the maintenance of their neutrality by diplomatic means. But on July 31st the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs assured Sir F. Villiers that it did not "seem possible that our neutrality could be threatened" (No. 38), and in any case stated, in order that there might be no possibility of precipitate action by any of her guarantors, that she was able to defend herself (British Book, No. 128). It was not till August 1st,

after the Belgian Government had received the assurances of the French Government (No. 15), and had heard that the German Government would not commit themselves to any assurance (No. 14), that the Belgian Representatives at the capitals of the guaranteeing Powers were instructed to present to the Governments the declaration of Belgium's intention to maintain and defend her neutrality. The next day, on August 2nd, when the news of the invasion of Luxemburg had arrived and Berlin was still silent, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs was careful to assure the German Minister at Brussels of his confidence in Germany's good intentions. At that conversation the German Minister alluded in reassuring terms to " his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which (Belgium) had the right to entertain towards (her) eastern neighbours " (No. 19). A few hours later, at 7 p.m., he presented the German ultimatum (Nos. 20 and 23). At 7 a.m. the next morning, August 3rd, the Belgian Government returned their reply (No. 22) and telegraphed to their Representatives abroad that " Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack." But still Belgium waited. The enemy's troops were gathering on her frontier ; at any time her armies might be attacked ; but she still refused to be driven into one false step. That morning, some time before midday, the French Minister was informed that " the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers " (Belgian Book, No. 24 ; French Book, No. 142).* Then King Albert sent an appeal to King George, but still only for diplomatic intervention (Belgian Book, No. 25). Later on that day, or during the night, the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier (No. 30 ; French Book, No. 151). At 6 a.m. next morning, August 4th, the Belgian Government received the final German notification (No. 37). The Cabinet was assembled and after deliberation decided to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers, but that appeal was not made until the evening (Nos. 38, last para., 40 and 43).

* According to British Book, No. 151, the French military attaché actually made a definite offer on this day to the Belgian War Office of five army corps for the defence of Belgium, but the Belgian and French documents seems to show that this offer was unofficially made and was not alluded to by the French Minister or referred to in the general reply of the Belgian Government.

We see in this narrative how scrupulously careful the Belgian Government were to avoid the slightest sign of suspicion, the slightest inclination to one of the guaranteeing Powers rather than the other, the slightest confession of mistrust—in short, the smallest movement in any direction, by word or deed, which could furnish the shadow of a pretext for such charges as those which have since actually been made. By this attitude Belgium was serving not only herself, but Europe; she was not only safeguarding her own honour, but she was preventing her peculiar international position from being made the occasion of suspicions or the excuse for hostilities. In face of this record, it may be possible to respect the straightforward avowal of the German Chancellor's speech (vol. II., p. 353), however indefensible the policy he sought to justify; but it is difficult to treat with patience the insinuations made by Herr von Jagow, as early as July 31st, regarding Belgium's hostile acts (British Book, No. 122)—insinuations which are effectively exposed in Belgian Book, No. 79.

This, however, may be said. Charges against Great Britain are fair methods of warfare. They may call for denial, but not for protest. But charges against Belgium, made at such a moment and in such circumstances, can be justified by no standards of policy or morality. They fail before every test known to historical criticism, and the circumstances in which they are made are themselves a refutation. For the sufferings of Belgium to-day are largely due to her steady and honourable determination to appeal for no assistance which by any stretch of malicious construction could be interpreted as an infringement of the law of her existence.*

* The documents published in Germany [*See* vol. II., pp. 314-326] have been most unscrupulously used in the German Press. To take one instance: the word "conversation" in para. 8 of the first document has in more than one reproduction been printed as "convention."

GREAT BRITAIN

AND THE

EUROPEAN CRISIS.

CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT,* TOGETHER WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

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* [The "statements in Parliament" here referred to will be found, with additional speeches, in vol. II., p. 397 *et seq.*]

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INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.*

(1.)

On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manœuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenburg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed.

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measure, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices.

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the Press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for the crime to the Serbian Government, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria

* [*Cf.* the narrative of events in M. Viviani's speech, Y. 159.]

then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not "detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Serbian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Serbian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Serbian people." Serbia's attitude coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria.[1] Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13—successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Serbia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened.

[1] [See No. 4 (p. 81).]

(2.)

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Serbian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives.

But the dangers to European peace which it involved were immediately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Serbian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Serbian Legation. The Austrian Press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign punishment of Serbia. There were signs that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed.

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Serbian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable.

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Serbia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an independent State.[1] It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French—and also of the German—Governments was that the Serbian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Serbia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated in part on Serbian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Serbia to show herself moderate and conciliatory.[2] He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Serbian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were

[1] [*cf.* Y.15.]

[2] [No. 12.]

secret. The Serbian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investigations on foot. The Serbian Government also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Serbian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Serbian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Serbia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July,[1] the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August.

[1] [No. 1.]

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente* remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Serbia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey[2] on the 29th July, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia was to be humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent.[3] It was not a question

[2] [No. 91.]

[3] [No. 7 and O. 10.]

of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburg, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day.

(3.)

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours.[1] She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Serbian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Serbia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Serbian Government was to publish on the front page of the "Official Journal" a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation.

[1] [No. 4.]

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum.

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her Government. What evidence she might have against the Serbian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Serbia did not necessarily affect that interest; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute, that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake, and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Serbia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum.[1] The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice"—by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis.

[1] [Nos. 3, 5, 10, 11, 25, 62, 87.]

(4.)

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey[2] that an ultimatum was being handed to Serbia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning, the text of the ultimatum was handed to him,[3] and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation,

[2] [No. 3.]

[3] [No. 4.]

he felt helpless.[1] There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Serbia. [1] [No. 11.]

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin."[2] What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum;[3] officially, the German Government called it "equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict."[4] Everyone desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburg,[5] had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France,[6] as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Serbian conflict.[7] The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds.[8] "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm.

[2] [No. 54.]
[3] [No. 18.]
[4] [No. 9.]
[5] [No. 6.]
[6] [No. 6.]
[7] [O. 10.]
[8] [No. 161.]

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended.[9] Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna.[10] Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government.[11] All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.[12]

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of conciliation.[13] Italy assented,[14] France assented,[15] Russia declared herself ready;[16] Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."[17]

Thirdly, the Russian,[18] French,[19] and British[20] representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.

[9] [Nos. 11, 18.]
[10] [No. 13.]
[11] [No. 11.]
[12] [No. 18.]
[13] [Nos. 11, 24.]
[14] [Nos. 35, 49.]
[15] [No. 42.]
[16] [No. 17.]
[17] [No. 18.]
[18] [No. 55.]
[19] [No. 15.]
[20] [No. 12.]

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired; and after all Serbia did not need

advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned
[1] [No. 39.] to Austria a reply [1] which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power—Germany not excepted—had ever thought probable. But the same day the British
[2] [No. 20.] Ambassador at Vienna reported [2] that the tone of the Austrian Press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war
[3] [No. 41.] inevitable. [3] In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's
[4] [No. 23.] reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, [4] and Serbia ordered a general mobilisation.

But an outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated
[5] [No. 21.] to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. [5] He
[6] [No. 27.] immediately expressed to Germany [6] the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with " passing on " the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope
[7] [No. 34.] to Vienna [7] through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassa-
[8] [No. 32.] dor directly afterwards [8] that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.

(5.)

During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one question before Europe—how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement ? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Serbian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy ; the popular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take
[9] [Nos. 59, 90.] no territory from Serbia. [9] But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of violent popular en-
[10] [No. 161.] thusiasm. [10] They said themselves that they would be

swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Serbia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that she would have to intervene if Serbia were attacked,[1] but she promised Austria on the 27th[2] that she would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Serbian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostilities[3] in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. She declared war on Serbia on the 28th.[4] Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th.[5]

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means towards a settlement.[6] Italy[7] and France[8] at once accepted; Russia said she was ready to stand aside,[9] but Germany refused.[10] She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began,[11] as we have seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed.[12] She had, moreover, refused to discuss the Serbian reply in any way,[13] and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London,[14] which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept.[15] The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would consent to work for a settlement.

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces.[16] Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade.[17] But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war.[18] Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she

(1) [No. 72; *cf.* O. 10.]
(2) [No. 55.]
(3) [No. 26.]
(4) [No. 50.]
(5) [No. 70 (1).]
(6) [No. 36.]
(7) [No. 49.]
(8) [No. 42.]
(9) [No. 55.]
(10) [No. 43.]
(11) [No. 53; O. 25.]
(12) [Nos. 61, 93 (3).]
(13) [No. 62.]
(14) [Nos. 74, 78.]
(15) [No. 55.]
(16) [No. 70 (1).]
(17) [Y. 113.]
(18) [Nos. 32, 71.]

did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude.[1] But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace."[2] The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th.

[1] [*cf.* No. 76; O. 51.]

[2] [No. 84.]

(6.)

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her.[3]

[3] [No. 85.]

[4] [No. 101.] Sir E. Grey's answer[4] was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on the

frontiers of Serbia and Austria; the only fear of further war had lain in the relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal development; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburg. But now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers,[1] and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace.

[1] [April 19, 1839; *see* vol. II., p. 487.]

Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past; her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death; Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Government, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutrality,[2] and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it.[3] France gave the necessary engagement the same day;[4] Belgium gave it the day after;[5] Germany returned no

[2] [No. 114.]
[3] [No. 115.]
[4] [No. 125.]
[5] [No. 128.]

[1] [No. 122.] reply.[1] Henceforward there could be no doubt of German designs.

[2] [No. 110; O. 66.] [3] [No. 98.] [4] [No. 97.] Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and Austria.[2] On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade.[3] Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations[4] if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Serbia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Serbia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do[5] in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Serbia.[6] Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions.[7] For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace.

[5] [Nos. 61, 62.] [6] [Nos. 131, 133; Y. 120, 121.] [7] [No. 133.]

(7.)

[8] [Nos. 117, 121; O. 76.] At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours.[8] Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August.[9] France also began to mobilise on that day.[10] The German Secretary of State refused to discuss[11] a last proposal from Sir E. Grey[12] for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war.[13] Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain[14] that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as

[9] [No. 142.] [10] [No. 136.] [11] [No. 121.] [12] [No. 111.] [13] [O. 76.] [14] [No. 139.]

to prevent a collision.[1] This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg,[2] a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable.

[1] [Nos. 134, 136.]
[2] [No. 147.]

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume,[3] and no additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support,[4] to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France,[5] Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies.[6] He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute.[7] He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force.[8] We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled,[9] and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July,[10] and to Germany on the 29th July,[11] that we could not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies,[12] but to Germany we gave three times—on the 30th July,[13] the 31st July,[14] and the 1st August[15]—a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

[3] [*See* vol. II., p. 400 *et seq.*]
[4] [No. 6.]
[5] [No. 148.]
[6] [No. 116.]
[7] [Nos. 17, 44.]
[8] [No. 44.]
[9] [Nos. 47, 48.]
[10] [No. 48.]
[11] [No. 89.]
[12] [Nos. 87, 116.]
[13] [No. 101.]
[14] [No. 114.]
[15] [No. 123.]

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows: "In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war."[16] It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of

[16] [Vol. II., p. 311.]

Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe.

Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914.

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(2) Document No. 160 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 8 (1914) [Cd. 7445].

(3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) [Cd. 7596].

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25	To Sir H. Rumbold (Telegraphic)	25	Conversation with German Ambassador respecting question of mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Ambassador thinks Austria might accept it	104
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27	To Sir F. Bertie „ Sir H. Rumbold To Sir G. Buchanan	25	Has informed German Ambassador of projected Serbian reply (see No. 21), and expressed hope that Germany will influence Austria-Hungary to receive it favourably ..	106

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
		1914.		
28	[Nil.]			
29	To Sir R. Rodd	July 25	Has informed Italian Ambassador of statements made to German Ambassador (see No. 25). His Excellency states that Italy is anxious to see war avoided	107
30	To Mr. Crackanthorpe	25	Conversation with Serbian Minister. Although ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary, Serbian Government could not agree to abandon certain political ideals	107
31	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	25	Serbian reply considered unsatisfactory. War regarded as imminent	108
32	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	26	Reports conversation with German Ambassador. Latter considers that Russia will remain inactive..	108
33	Sir H. Rumbold (Telegraphic)	26	Reports sudden return of Emperor to Berlin. German Under-Secretary of State of opinion that Russia will not move unless Serbian territory is annexed	109
34	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	26	German Ambassador at Vienna instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government hope of His Majesty's Government that they will take favourable view of Serbian reply. German Government cannot go beyond this ..	110
35	Sir R. Rodd .. (Telegraphic)	26	Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes proposal for conference, and Italian Ambassador at Vienna will be instructed accordingly	110

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
		1914.		
36	To Sir F. Bertie „ Sir H. Rumbold To Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic)	July 26	To ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree to a conference in London, and to ask that French, German, and Italian representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade should urge on respective Governments that, pending decision, all active military operations should be suspended ..	111
37	To Sir F. Bertie	26	It is important to know if France will agree to suggestion that the four Powers should urge moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg ..	111
38	Sir R. Rodd ..	23	Conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who considers gravity of situation lies in conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that their prestige is involved	111
39	Communicated by Serbian Minister	27	Text of Serbian reply to Austro-Hungarian note	112
40	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	26	Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russian Government will not press for more time. Russia cannot possibly remain indifferent if Serbia is attacked	120
41	„ „ .. (Telegraphic)	27	Considers that Austria-Hungary is fully determined on war with Serbia	121
42	Sir F. Bertie .. (Telegraphic)	27	French Government accept proposals respecting conference. Necessary instructions sent to French representatives at Berlin, Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg ..	122

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
		1914.		
43	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	July 27	German Secretary of State is opposed to British proposal for a conference. In favour of direct exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Germany's position in the event of Russian mobilisation. Secretary of State more hopeful ..	122
44	Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting note to Serbia. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that *Entente* Powers should present solid front to Germany	123
45	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided to propose direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg	124
46	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	27	German Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grey desires to keep in touch with Germany so long as the latter works for peace. Germany should urge moderation at Vienna. Serbian reply might form basis for discussion	124
47	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	27	Russian Ambassador informed of British attitude. Question whether Russia would take action if Austria-Hungary agreed not to annex Serbian territory	125
48	To Sir M. de Bunsen	27	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who reviewed Serbian question at length. Sir E. Grey expressed surprise at Austrian attitude towards Serbian reply, which seems already to involve deep humiliation of Serbia. British fleet will be kept assembled, but this is no more than proof of anxiety felt in country	126

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
49	To Sir R. Rodd	1914. July 27	Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who agrees in proposal for conference. His Excellency will recommend to German Government that Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Serbia should suspend military operations pending conference	128
50	Sir M. de Bunsen	28	Text of declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia	129
51	Sir F. Bertie ..	27	French Government agree to proposals of His Majesty's Government for conference between the four Powers in London	130
52	French Ambassador	27	French Government in favour of British proposal for conference, and are ready to send instructions accordingly	131
53	Communicated by Russian Ambassador	28	Communicates telegram from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Government are in favour of British proposal for conference, failing commencement of direct Austro-Russian conversations	132
54	„ „ ..	28	Communicates telegram received from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to effect that German Government appear to have taken no measures to induce Austria-Hungary to modify attitude towards Serbia, and suggesting His Majesty's Government approaching the German Government. Key of the situation really at Berlin	132

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
55	Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	1914. July 27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all his influence at Belgrade to induce Serbia to give satisfaction to Austria, but Serbian territorial integrity must be guaranteed and sovereign rights be respected. He has proposed direct conversations with Austria, but would be perfectly ready to stand aside if idea of conference accepted	133
56	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	27	Reports conversation between Russian Ambassador and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Russia will be unable to localise war. Russia will restrain Serbia as long as possible, in order to give time for a settlement. Russian Ambassador urged that conversations should be continued at St. Petersburg ..	134
57	Sir R. Rodd .. (Telegraphic)	27	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs' views as to conference and suspension of hostilities. Possibility of Serbia accepting Austrian note in its entirety on recommendation of four Powers	135
58	Sir F. Bertie .. (Telegraphic)	28	Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E. Grey's observations to German Ambassador will tend towards peace	135
59	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	28	Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His Majesty's Government. German Ambassador has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria-Hungary would respect integrity of Serbia, but gave no assurance respecting her independence	136

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
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60	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	July 28	Refers to No. 43. German Secretary of State has used similar language to French and Italian Ambassadors. Agrees with his two colleagues in thinking that German Government object only to form of proposal respecting conference. Suggests Herr von Jagow might himself be induced to suggest lines of co-operation	136
61	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	28	Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Austria cannot delay proceedings against Serbia, and would decline any negotiations on basis of Serbian reply. Nothing could now prevent conflict	137
62	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	28	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who says that war will be declared to-day, and that no mediation could be accepted. Has appealed to him to place peace of Europe first and quarrel with Serbia second ..	137
63	Sir R. Rodd .. (Telegraphic)	28	Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of No. 27. He is telegraphing similar instructions to Berlin and Vienna	138
64	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	28	Informs of conversation between Serbian Chargé d'Affaires and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Serbia might still accept whole Austrian note if certain explanations were given her. Such explanations should be given to the Powers, who should then advise Serbia to accept without conditions	138
65	Mr. Crackanthorpe (Telegraphic)	28	Has urged greatest moderation on Serbian Government pending result of efforts for peaceful solution ..	139

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		1914.		
66	Mr. Crackanthorpe (Telegraphic)	July 28	Declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia	139
67	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	28	Refers to No. 43. Proposed conference would not be arbitration, but private and informal discussion to find a settlement. Agrees that direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna would be preferable	140
68	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	28	Ready to propose that German Secretary of State should suggest method of mediation by four Powers. Will keep the idea in reserve till result of Austro-Russian conversations is seen	140
69	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	28	Refers to No. 55. Expresses satisfaction at prospect of direct Austro-Russian conversations. Enquires further as to proposed action at Belgrade	141
70	Communicated by Count Benckendorff	29	Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Government will announce partial mobilisation on the 29th July ; that Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled ; and that mediation by His Majesty's Government is most urgent	141
71	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	28	Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who expressed anxiety to work in concert with England. Reasons for German refusal to support proposed conference. As Russia had mobilised, he could no longer urge moderation at Vienna. General opinion at Berlin that Russia is unprepared for war	142

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
		1914.		
72	Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	July 28	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for Sir E. Grey's language to German Ambassador (see No. 46). If Austria crossed Serbian frontier Russia would mobilise. Has informed German Ambassador that Germany should use her influence at Vienna	143
73	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	28	Informs of Austrian declaration of war against Serbia	144
74	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	28	Russian Ambassador states that Austro-Hungarian Government have declined Russian Government's suggestion of direct discussion between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Russian Ambassador considers conference in London of less interested Powers the only solution	144
75	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	29	Chancellor states it is too late to act on British suggestion that Serbian reply might form basis of discussion. German Government had informed Austrian Government that they quite understood that latter could not rest satisfied unless guaranteed that demands on Serbia should be carried out in their entirety. Austrian Government had been advised to say openly that hostilities had that exclusive object	145
76	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	29	German Secretary of State states that any appearance of pressing moderation on Austria would probably precipitate matters. His Excellency is troubled by reports of military measures in Russia and France ..	146

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
		1914.		
77	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	July 29	Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates language of Chancellor, and will be very grateful if he can save the peace of Europe. This country will continue to make every effort in that direction	146
78	Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	29	Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. Has communicated substance of No. 68 to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mobilisation only directed against Austria. As Austria has definitely declined direct conversations, Minister for Foreign Affairs will suggest to German Ambassador return to idea of conference. Views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on Italian proposals (see Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador says his Government are continuing to exert friendly influence at Vienna	147
79	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	29	French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no steps can now be taken to stop war with Serbia. Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might remain quiet if Austro-Hungarian Government gave binding engagement to Europe not to acquire Serbian territory or destroy independence of Serbia	149
80	Sir R. Rodd .. (Telegraphic)	29	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that German Secretary of State might propose formula, and that this might be concomitant with direct Austro-Russian conversations	149
81	To Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic)	29	Understands that Austria will not accept any form of mediation between Austria and Serbia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at Berlin and Vienna ..	150

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
		1914.		
82	Mr. Beaumont (Telegraphic)	July 29	Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably beyond the sanjak and punitive occupation of Serbian territory. Expected assistance for Austrian army from Mussulman population in Serbia	150
83	Mr. Crackanthorpe (Telegraphic)	29	Has been asked by Serbian Prime Minister to convey his thanks for statement in the House of Commons on the 27th July	151
84	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	29	German Ambassador states that Chancellor is endeavouring to mediate between Austria and Russia. His Majesty's Government urge that Germany should suggest some method by which the four Powers could preserve the peace between Austria and Russia	151
85	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	29	German Secretary of State offers that in return for British neutrality German Government would give every assurance that they would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France. He was unable to give similar assurance as regards French colonies. If neutrality of Holland were respected by Germany's adversaries, Germany would give assurances to do likewise. Operations of Germany in Belgium depend on action of France, but at end of war Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany	152
86	Sir R. Rodd .. (Telegraphic)	29	In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is passed for further discussion on basis of Serbian note. His utmost hope is that Germany will influence Vienna to prevent or moderate any further Austrian demands on Serbia ..	153

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
87	To Sir F. Bertie	1914. July 29	Conversation with French Ambassador respecting policy of His Majesty's Government. Has told M. Cambon of intention to warn German Ambassador that His Majesty's Government will not necessarily stand aside if efforts for peace fail. On the other hand, the present case is different from that of Morocco a few years back, and if France becomes involved His Majesty's Government, who are free from engagements, will have to decide on their attitude in the light of British interests	153
88	To Sir E. Goschen	29	Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro-Hungarian declaration of war having rendered direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg impossible, it is most important, in the event of German Chancellor failing in his efforts at mediation, that Germany should propose some method of co-operation between the four Powers ..	155
89	,, ,, ..	29	Has warned German Ambassador of possibility of British intervention in certain eventualities	156
90	,, ,, ..	29	Has communicated to German Ambassador text of Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto (see Nos. 64 and 81). Discussion of question of mediation	157
91	To Sir M. de Bunsen	29	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who attempted to justify attitude of his Government in spite of readiness of Powers to assist in obtaining satisfaction from Serbia	158

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92	To Sir R. Rodd	1914. July 29	Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian Government suggest that German objections to mediation might be met by some change in procedure	159
93	Communicated by Count Benckendorff	30	Communicates telegraphic correspondence between himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (1) Austro-Hungarian Government have been urged by Russian Ambassador at Vienna to be moderate towards Serbia; (2) negotiations with German Government through Russian Ambassador at Berlin; (3) Austro-Hungarian Government decline direct conversations with Russian Government	159
94	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	29	In present temper of Austria-Hungary, irrevocable steps may be taken unless Germany with the other three Powers can mediate at once. Russian Ambassador fears effect on Russian opinion if serious engagement takes place before agreement is reached. Reports interviews between the Russian and French Ambassadors and the German Ambassador	161
95	„ „ .. (Telegraphic)	30	Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia could not see Serbia crushed, but would acquiesce in measures that would safeguard Austria-Hungary's Slav provinces from further hostile propaganda. Extreme anti-Serbian and anti-Russian sentiments of German Ambassador, to whom text of Austro-Hungarian note was probably known beforehand	162

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		1914.		
96	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	July 30	Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Russian Ambassador that, as Russia had mobilised, Austria must do likewise. No threat meant. No objection to direct Austro-Hungarian conversations being continued at St. Petersburg. Russian Ambassador more hopeful	163
97	Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	30	German Ambassador has informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government would guarantee that Austria should respect Serbian integrity. Russia could not, however, agree to vassalage of Serbia to Austria. Formula of conditions subject to which Russia would stop military preparations	164
98	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	30	German Government have asked Austrian Government whether they would accept mediation on basis of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and issue of conditions from there. Could His Majesty's Government induce Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement ? German Secretary of State says that Russian mobilisation has increased difficulties of situation. German Government have made no special military preparations ..	165
99	Sir F. Bertie .. (Telegraphic)	30	Conversation with President of the Republic regarding German communication to St. Petersburg as to Russian mobilisation. Russia consents to demobilise subject to assurance from Austria to respect sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain points in the Austrian note to international discussion. Peace depended on attitude of His Majesty's Government. Pacific	

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		1914.		
99	Sir F. Bertie (*continued*)		attitude of France. A British declaration to support France would prevent Germany going to war. Explained difficulty of such a declaration	166
100	Sir R. Rodd .. (Telegraphic)	July 30	German Ambassador at Rome thinks Germany could prevent Austria from making exorbitant demands if Serbia would submit on occupation of Belgrade	167
101	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	30	Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's Government cannot entertain German proposals to secure British neutrality. For many reasons such a bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace to Great Britain. His Majesty's Government cannot bargain away her obligations regarding Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government must preserve full freedom of action. Best way of maintaining good relations with Great Britain is for Germany to work with her for the preservation of peace	167
102	„ „ .. (Telegraphic)	30	Has warned German Ambassador that Germany must not count on Great Britain standing aside in all circumstances	168
103	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	30	German Ambassador states that German Government would advise Austria not to advance beyond Belgrade and adjoining territories, whilst Powers urged Serbia to give satisfaction sufficient to placate Austria. Earnest hope that this may be agreed to. Suggests change in the formula proposed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 97) in order to meet existing situation	169

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104	To Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic)	1914. July 30	To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (see No. 103). Trusts that French Ambassador at St. Petersburg will be able to induce Russian Government not to precipitate a crisis	170
105	,, ,, ..	30	Conversation with French Ambassador respecting attitude of Great Britain in event of conflict between France and Germany; encloses copies of notes exchanged with French Ambassador in 1912, and discusses their scope. Cabinet to meet to-morrow	170
106	Sir R. Rodd .. (Telegraphic)	30	Austria has declined to continue direct conversations with Russia. Germany believed to be more disposed to give conciliatory advice at Vienna owing to likelihood of British support for Russia and France. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in favour of working with His Majesty's Government even if idea of discussions between four Powers is impossible	174
107	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	30	Has asked German Secretary of State if he can suggest any course of action. Latter replied that he was in communication with Vienna to save time. Chancellor was "pressing the button" at Vienna to utmost of his power, and feared he had perhaps gone too far	174
108	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	31	German Chancellor states that owing to Russian mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. These proceedings had come just when the Tsar had appealed to the Emperor and when the latter was about to mediate at Vienna	175

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		1914.		
109	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	July 31	Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His Majesty's Government to his appeal for British neutrality (see No. 101.) Chancellor desires time to reflect on it	176
110	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	31	German Ambassador states that Austro-Russian conversations have been resumed at Vienna and St. Petersburg. German Ambassador has asked that Russia should suspend military preparations in meanwhile. Has informed his Excellency that His Majesty's Government cannot ask Russia to do this unless Austria consents to limit advance of her troops into Serbia. Expresses satisfaction at resumption of conversations	176
111	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	31	If settlement cannot be reached by direct Austro-Russian conversations, suggests that four Powers should undertake to obtain full satisfaction of Austrian demands from Serbia, provided latter's sovereignty and integrity remain intact. Has informed German Ambassador that if Austria and Germany could bring forward any fair proposal, His Majesty's Government would support it strongly at Paris and St. Petersburg	177
112	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	31	German Government are about to proclaim "Kriegsgefahr," to be followed by immediate mobilisation. Germany preparing for all emergencies	178
113	Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	31	Russian general mobilisation ordered, owing to Austro-Hungarian movements of troops against her. Germany also making military preparations. Russia cannot allow Germany to get a start	179

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
		1914.		
114	To Sir F. Bertie ,, Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	July 31	Inquires whether France and Germany will engage to respect neutrality of Belgium	179
115	To Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic)	31	To inform Belgian Government of No. 114. Sir E. Grey assumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality	179
116	To Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic)	31	French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake definite pledge to intervene in war, but that situation will be reconsidered in presence of any new development	180
117	Sir F. Bertie .. (Telegraphic)	31	Informs of German ultimatum to Russia. German Ambassador demands answer from French Government by 1 P.M. to-morrow as to French attitude	180
118	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	31	Under-Secretary of State says that mobilisation was not necessarily a hostile act. Austria-Hungary resents Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia. Russian Ambassador states that his Government have advised Serbian compliance with Austrian demands so far as compatible with independence	181
119	To Sir F. Bertie	31	Has denied to French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government had given German Government the impression that they would remain neutral. His Majesty's Government could not, however, at the present moment give France any pledge, though further developments might justify intervention	182

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
		1914.		
120	Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	July 31	New formula proposed by Russian Government. Russian Government will maintain waiting attitude if Austria agrees to stop advance of her troops and to allow consideration by Great Powers of satisfaction to be given by Serbia to Austria-Hungary without prejudice to her independence. Tsar has undertaken that no Russian soldier will cross frontier so long as conversation with Austria continues	184
121	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	31	German Government appreciate Sir E. Grey's efforts to maintain peace, but cannot consider any proposal pending Russian reply to ultimatum presented by Germany relating to Russian mobilisation	185
122	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	31	Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 114. Secretary of State cannot reply to British request until he has consulted Emperor and Chancellor. He doubts, however, whether German Government can give any answer. German Government alleges commission of hostile acts by Belgium	186
123	To Sir E. Goschen	Aug. 1	Conversation with German Ambassador respecting the possible effect on British public opinion of any violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Any promise that His Majesty's Government should stand aside definitely refused	186
124	Sir F. Bertie .. (Telegraphic)	July 31	German ultimatum to Russia. French Government anxious to know at once attitude of His Majesty's Government	187

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125	Sir F. Bertie .. (Telegraphic)	1914. July 31	Neutrality of Belgium (see No. 114). French Government are resolved to respect neutrality of Belgium unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of violation at the hands of another Power	188
126	,, ,, .. (Telegraphic)	Aug. 1	German Ambassador has been informed that French Government fail to understand reason for German communication respecting attitude of France in the event of a Russo-German war (see No. 117). German Ambassador will see Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening	188
127	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	1	Mobilisation of Austrian army and fleet	189
128	Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic)	1	Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium expects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality; which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power	189
129	Luxemburg Minister of State	2	German Government have informed Luxemburg that the German military measures in that country do not constitute a hostile act, but are only to insure against attack from France	190
130	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	1	British merchant ships have been detained at Hamburg. To request immediate release. Points out deplorable effect on British public opinion if detention continued ..	190

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
		1914.		
131	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	Aug. 1	Russian Government report readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation not open to objections raised in regard to original Russian formula (see No. 97). Hopes that German Government may be able to make use of Russian communication in order to avoid tension	191
132	„ „ .. (Telegraphic)	1	Russia consents to British formula for basis of mediation (see No. 103)	191
133	„ „ .. (Telegraphic)	1	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian Government that Austro-Hungarian Government are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Russian Government hope that these discussions will take place in London with participation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's Government will assume direction of them ..	192
134	Sir F. Bertie .. (Telegraphic)	1	Conversation with President of Republic. German Government are trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility for present situation. President justifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobilising, so France must also. French troops are kept 10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made incursions into French territory. French Government do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war	192
135	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	1	Has received reliable information that Austria-Hungary has informed German Government that she would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Military action	

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135	To Sir G. Buchanan (*continued*)		would continue against Serbia for present, but Russian mobilisation and Austro-Hungarian counter measures would cease. He should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs	193
136	Sir F. Bertie .. (Telegraphic)	Aug. 1	General mobilisation in France ordered owing to German military measures. French troops have left a zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier	194
137	To Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	1	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance that Austrians will respect territorial integrity of Serbia, and will not occupy sanjak. Austria has not "banged the door" on further conversations with Russia	194
138	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	1	Conversation with German Secretary of State. German Government have ordered mobilisation. Absence of reply to German ultimatum must be regarded as creating a state of war. Russian Government will be so informed	195
139	Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	1	Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Tsar and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Austrian domination of Serbia would vitally affect Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Government and German preparations have forced Russian Government to order mobilisation, and mobilisation of Germany has created desperate situation. M. Sazonof would adhere	

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139	Sir G. Buchanan (*continued*)		to formula contained in No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration in the Balkans	196
140	Sir F. Bertie .. (Telegraphic)	Aug. 1	French Minister for War has impressed on British military attaché that only way of securing peace was for Great Britain to take military action. Minister of War maintains that France has, by withdrawing from frontier, given proof of her desire to abstain from any provocative act	198
141	Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	1	Conversation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna respecting German ultimatum to Russia. His Excellency thinks that German Government desired war from the first. Explains nature of Russian mobilisation, and says that Russia had no intention of attacking Austria. French Ambassador to speak earnestly to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Anxiety as to attitude of Great Britain	198
142	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	1	General mobilisation of German army and navy	199
143	„ „ .. (Telegraphic)	1	Detention of British steamers. German Secretary of State has promised to send orders to release steamers without delay	199
144	„ „ .. (Telegraphic)	2	German Secretary of State says that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are in a state of war ..	200

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145	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	Aug. 2	Orders sent last night to allow British ships detained in Hamburg to proceed. This as a special favour to His Majesty's Government. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions taken	200
146	Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic)	2	Belgian Government confirms report that German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg ..	200
147	Luxemburg Minister of State (Telegraphic)	2	Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867. Protest has been made to the German representatives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary of State	201
148	To Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic)	2	Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting protection by British fleet of French coasts or shipping subject to consent of Parliament. Question of despatch of British force to assist France. Effect of violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality	201
149	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	2	Detention of British steamers. Sugar unloaded by force from British vessels at Hamburg and detained. Should inform Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government trust that order already sent for release of British vessels covers also release of cargoes (see No. 143)	202
150	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	3	Detention of British steamers. Refers to No. 149. No information available	203

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151	Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic)	Aug. 3	French Government have offered five army corps to Belgian Government. Belgian Government reply that whilst sincerely grateful they do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers, and will decide later on their action	203
152	To Sir F. Bertie	3	Communication of French Ambassador to effect that Italy does not consider *casus fœderis* has arisen ..	203
153	To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	4	Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government have been informed that German Government have proposed to Belgium friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and of German threat in case of refusal. Belgian Government have declined offer. Should ask for immediate assurance from German Government that they will not proceed with threat or violate Belgian territory	204
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PART I.

CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT.

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day [1] if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Serbia. [1] [*cf.* Y. 19.]

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Serbia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

No. 2.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 22, 1914.*

LAST night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone,[1] and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter.[2] He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Serbian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Serbian relations should be put on a proper footing.

[1] [*cf.* No. 9 & note.]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 36 & note.]

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Serbia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

No. 3.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

COUNT MENSDORFF told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Serbia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Serbian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Serbia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official

communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Serbia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that, if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Serbia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Serbia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided.[1] In 1909, Serbia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria;[2] but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

[1] [*cf.* R.9.]

[2] [No. 4, par. 2.]

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation.[3] Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 5, 10, 11, 25; Y. 25.]

upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favourable recently.

No. 4.

Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)[1]

[1] [For delivery *see* O. 1; S. 32. *See also* note to Y. 49, p. 321.]

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie :

" Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante :—

" ' La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que

les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.'

" Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

" Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

" Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

" Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la ' Narodna Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

" Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus

longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie ; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

" C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

" Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du ' Journal officiel ' en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante :—

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les rélations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration[1] du 31 mars, 1909.

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.'

" Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le ' Bulletin officiel ' de l'armée.

[1] ["ses déclarations," Y. 24.]

" Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre :

" 1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale ;

" 2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite ' Narodna Odbrana,' à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ;

" 3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie ;

" 4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal ;

" 5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie ;

" 6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe ;

" des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives ;

" 7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosić et du nommé Milan Ciganović, employé de l'État serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo ;

" 8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière ;

" à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Ložnica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière ;

" 9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des

explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; enfin

" 10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

" Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

" Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note."

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'État et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique ; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'État voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement

serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier élucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.

ANNEXE.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative—crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier—a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :

1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, le nommé Milan Čiganović et Trifko Grabež, avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosić.

2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež par le nommé Milan Čiganović et le commandant Voija Tankosić.

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevać.

4°. Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Čiganović enseigna à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež la manière de se servir des

grenades et donna, dans un forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et à Grabež.

5°. Pour rendre possible à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Čiganović.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabać (Rade Popović) et de Ložnica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbić de Ložnica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

(TRANSLATION.)[1]

[1] [*cf.* the translation in W., vol. II., p. 136.]

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Serbian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade :—

" On the 31st March, 1909, the Serbian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Serbian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government [2] :—

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 17, 55; also No. 39, last par.]

" ' Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.'

" The history of recent years,[3] and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Serbian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Serbian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

[3] [*cf.* R. 19.]

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the Press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Serbian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Serbian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Serbian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Serbian frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Serbian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

" In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration :—

" 'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

" 'The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

" 'The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.'

" This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army.

" The Royal Serbian Government further undertake :

" 1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ;

" 2. To dissolve immediately the society styled 'Narodna Odbrana,' to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form ;

"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

"4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general,[1] all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy[2];

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

"8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

"9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply

(1) [*See* footnote to R. 34, vol. II., p. 260; *cf. also* Serbian reply, B. 39, p. 112.]

(2) [*cf.* S. 52, vol. II., p. 118; R. 27.]

of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock* on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations [1] :—

[1] [*See* R. 8.]

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Serbian frontier.

Serbia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Serbian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary,

* [In the copy of this Austro-Hungarian note communicated by Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, to the French Foreign Office, the hour named for the reply is 5 o'clock, and the following explanation is appended in the French Yellow-book [Y. 24].

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in a private letter on the 24th July, sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following correction :—

'In the copy of the despatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening.

'I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer of the Serbian Government.'"]

and not a day passes without the organs of the Serbian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Serbian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Serbian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Serbian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Serbian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier*[1] elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. [1] [R. 19.]

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip [2] and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions [3] :— [2] [*cf.* vol. II., pp. 210–212.] [3] [*cf.* R. 19.]

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voija Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of the Serbian Army at Kragujevać.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers of Chabać (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.[1]

[1] [*cf.* R. 10.]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1914.

[2] [No. 4; R. 8.] NOTE addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it,[2] has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.

[3] [*cf.* R. 9.] In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency,[3] I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time-limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings.[4] The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

[4] [*cf.* Conversation in No. 3.]

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe.[5] The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of

[5] [*cf.* Nos. 3, 10, 11, 25.]

His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part.

I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Serbian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

No. 6.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.[1]—*(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.[2]

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 22.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 99; Y. 31, 47.]

I said[1] that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Serbian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

(1) [*See* No. 24.]

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out ; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view ; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia,[1] for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

[1] [*See* Y. 22, note.]

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

No. 7.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

BEFORE departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent.[2]

[2] [*See* O. 10.]

Russian Chargé d'Affaires* was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under

* [Prince Kudachef.]

instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P.M.[1] to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power.

[1] [6 p.m. *See* No. 4 and footnote, p. 85.]

No. 8.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Serbian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Serbian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

No. 9.

Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.[2]

THE publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place[3] disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Serbian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy[4] and their incorporation into the Serbian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Serbian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Serbian chauvinism[5] manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic

[2] [*cf.* Y.28; O.8; W. intro. & exhs. 1, 2; R. 8.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 4; R. 19.]

[4] [*cf.* R., intro.]

[5] [*cf.* R.6.]

interference of the Great Powers that the Serbian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Serbian Government at that time [1] has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Serbia, the Great Serbian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Serbian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

[1] [No. 4, par. 3.]

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, [2] and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, [3] because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences. [4]

[2] [*cf.* No 71.]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 18, 56; Y. 28, 30, 61; O. 8, 18, 41; S. 36; W. intro. & exhs. 1, 2.]

[4] [*cf.* No. 48.]

No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

AFTER telling M. Cambon to-day [1] of the Austrian communication to Serbia,[2] which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday,[3] I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; [4] but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.[5]

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Serbians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand.[6] Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending

[1] [*cf.* Y. 32.]
[2] [No. 4.]
[3] [No. 3.]
[4] [*cf.* Nos. 5, 11.]
[5] [*cf.* Nos. 11, 24; Y. 32, 34. *See also* No. 36.]
[6] [*cf.* O. 1, 41; S. 33.]

mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.[1]

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 24, 25; O. 22.]

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia.[2] I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation.[3] I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg[4] in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

[2] [No. 9.]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 3, 5, 10, 25.]

[4] [*cf.* No. 10 and note.]

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna.[1] You should inform Secretary of State.[2]

[1] [*cf.* O. 14.]

[2] [*See* No. 18.] Prince Lichnowsky said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

SERBIA ought to promise that, if it is proved that Serbian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction.[3] She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Serbian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Serbian interests.

[3] [*cf.* Y. 34, 36.]

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Serbian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues

as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Serbian Government.[1]

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

[1] [*See* No. 22.]

No. 13.

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.

(TRANSLATION.)

M. SAZONOF telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:[2]

[2] [*cf.* No. 26; O. 4; Y. 38, 39.]

"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal[3] to all the Powers (*les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances*), which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Serbian reply should be extended.[4] Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

[3] [*cf.* No. 48.]

[4] [*cf.* R. 9.]

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Serbian Government (*des conseils en conséquence*).

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory (*priverait de toute portée*) the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna."

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.[5]

[5] [*cf.* O. 5.]

No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit,[1] and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.[2] In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris [3] (St. Petersburg),[4] you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 36; R. 17.]
[2] [*cf.* Nos. 25, 26; Y. 40.]
[3] [*See* No. 15.]
[4] [No. 17.]

No. 15.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 25, 1914.*

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director[5] that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram of to-day.[6] They have, however, through the Serbian Minister here, given similar advice to Serbia[7] as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.[8]

[5] [M. Berthelot.]
[6] [*See* No. 14.]
[7] [Y. 34.]
[8] [*See* No. 12.]

No. 16.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 25, 1914.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs[9] has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna[10] as well as Belgrade. He hopes that the Serbian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that

[9] [M. Bienvenu-Martin.]
[10] [Y. 32.]

there would be a revolution in Serbia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

No. 17.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,[1] and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Serbian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.[2]

[1] *See* No. 14.

[2] *See* No 12.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Serbia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Serbian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Serbian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1908,[3] to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.[4]

[3] [In 1909. *See* No. 4, par. 2.]

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 39 (last par.), 55; R. 16.]

If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war,[1] but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war.[2] If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

[1] [*cf.* No. 141; Y. 120.]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 63, and M. Poincaré, vol. II., p. 306.]

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.[3]

[3] [*cf.* Y. 63.]

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

No. 18.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of the 24th[4] July acted on.

[4] *See* No. 11.

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to

pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit,[1] and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from Press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson,[2] and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna[3] and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Serbian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised.[4] I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia.[5] He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that the last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion[6] as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.[7]

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.[8]

[1] [*cf.* Y. 41; O. 14.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 32; Y. 57; O. 66; S. 27, 52; R. 16.]

[3] [*cf.* R. 18.]

[4] [*cf.* No. 9 and note.]

[5] [*cf.* Nos. 32, 48.]

[6] [*cf.* W. exh. 13.]

[7] [*See* No. 37.]

[8] [*cf.* No. 25; Y. 15 and note.]

No. 19.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 25, 1914.*

I SAW the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion[1] that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Serbia become menacing.

[1] [*See* No. 10.]

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Serbian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

No. 20.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

LANGUAGE of Press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Serbia is neither expected nor really desired.[2] It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P.M. to-day.

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 40,41,161 (p. 215); Y. 12,27, 47; S. 22; *also*, Berlin Press, O. 7.]

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor [3] Serbian reply when it comes.

[3] [*cf.* S. 23.]

No. 21.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

THE Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

[4] [Text of reply, No. 39.]

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply :[4]

The Serbian Government consent to the publication of a

declaration in the "Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Serbian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Serbian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply.

No. 22.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Serbian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Serbian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Serbian Government.

No. 23.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

THE Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government have left for Nish,[1] where the Skupshtina* will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 50; 51; O. 21, G. 5; R. 24.]

* The Serbian Parliament.

No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

YOU spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,[1] and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

[1] *See* No. 6.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters.[2] If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 10, 11; Y. 32, 34; *also* No. 36 and note.]

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.[3]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 10, 11, 25; G. 6.]

No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations.[4]

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 14, 26; O. 16.]

In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia,* and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Serbia,[1] but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back.[2] Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 18, 95; Y. 15 and note.]

[2] [*cf.* O. 19.]

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.[3]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 3, 5, 11, 62, 87; W., exh. 13 (vol. II., p. 156).]

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential[4] to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment,[5] and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

[4] [*cf.* No. 24; G. 6.]

[5] [*cf.* No. 6; Y. 22, note.]

No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the

* [Should be "Italy." *See* No. 36.]

Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs [1] :—

[1] [*cf.* No. 13; Y. 39.]

"The delay given to Serbia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Serbia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Serbian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague. [2]

[2] [O. 16.]

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear [3] that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time [4] in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

[3] [No. 25.]

[4] [*See* No. 40.]

No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. [5]

[5] [*See also* No. 63.]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Serbian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day. [6] I have said that, if Serbian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope

[6] *See* No. 21.

the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.[1]

[1] [*See* No. 34.]

No. 28.

[Nil.]

[So in Blue-book.]

No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.[2]

[2] [Nos. 25, 27.]

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.[3]

[3] [*cf.* Giolitti's speech vol. II., p. 394.]

No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

THE Serbian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the present strained relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo—an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Serbian territory, the Serbian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Serbian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Serbia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Serbia, and that the Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Serbian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

No. 31.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

SERBIAN reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade.[1] War is thought to be imminent.

[1] [No. 23; G. 5.]

No. 32.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

ACCORDING to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia,[2] which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Serbian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 18, 33, 47, 48, 71, 161 (p. 216); Y. 65, 85, 96; S. 52; R. 16.]

imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Serbia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Serbia. Serbia was about to receive a lesson [1] which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

[1] [*cf.* No. 18; Y. 57; O. 66.]

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Serbian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory.[2] He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Serbian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Serbia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Serbian concessions were all a sham.[3] Serbia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation [4] and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

[2] [*cf.* No. 27.]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 48, 93 (1); Y. 75 (2); R. intro.]

[4] [*cf.* Y. 75 (2); G. 5; S. 41; R. 23.]

No. 33.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

EMPEROR returns suddenly to-night,[5] and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and

[5] [*cf.* Y. 50 and footnote.]

excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Serbian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 32 and note.]

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Serbian reply[2] if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.[3]

[2] [No. 27.]

[3] *See* No. 21.

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope.[4] German Government do not see their way to go beyond this.

[4] [*cf.* No. 75.]

No. 35.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 26, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.[5]

[5] [*cf.* No. 36, and No. 49 (reply).]

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

WOULD Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference[1] immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg[2] should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 35, 37, 40. *cf.* R. 38. Replies—from France, Nos. 42, 52; Italy, No. 49; Russia, No. 53; Germany No. 43; R. 35.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 53; Y. 67; O. 31. *Also* No. 11.]

No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

BERLIN telegram of 25th July.[3]

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.[4]

[3] *See* No. 18.

[4] [*See* Nos. 42, 51.]

No. 38.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

Rome, July 23, 1914.

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant[5] of the terms of the communication[6] which will be addressed to Serbia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

[5] [*But see* Y. 26, 35, 51, 72.]

[6] [No. 4.]

No. 39.

Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.[1]—(*Communicated by the Serbian Minister, July 27.*)

[1] [*See* note to Y. 49, p. 321.]

LE Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du *10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gâter[2] les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

[2] ["de compromettre," Y. 49.]

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient[3] que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina† nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'Etat, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le *18 mars, 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine,[4] le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et[5] au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois[6] donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice[7] qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible[8] des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

[3] ["a conscience," Y. 49.]

[4] [New sentence here in Y. 49.]

[5] ["représentation au sujet de," etc., Y. 49.]

[6] ["a, à de nombreuses reprises," Y. 49.]

[7] ["aux sacrifices qu'elle a faits," Y. 49.]

[8] ["les agissements," Y. 49.]

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement

* Old style. † The Serbian Parliament.

surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo ; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver [1] son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites. Se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, [le Gouvernement Royal] [2] est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du " Journal officiel " en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante :

[1] [" par des actes," Y. 49.]

[2] [So in Y. 49.]

" Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars 1909.* [Le Gouvernement,] qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina† une disposition dans la loi de la presse,

* New style. † The Serbian Parliament.

par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société " Narodna Odbrana " et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société " Narodna Odbrana " et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délais[1] de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

[1] [" délai," Y. 49.]

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même [2] à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

[2] [" du moins," Y. 49.]

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que [3] la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la [4] collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

[3] [" tendant à ce que," Y. 49.]

[4] [" toute collaboration," Y. 49.]

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de

son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15 * juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou[1] autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle ; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux agents[2] austro-hongrois.

[1] ["agents des autorités," Y. 49.]

[2] ["aux organes," Y. 49.]

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Voïslav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongrois et qui jusqu'au 15 * juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.[3]

[3] ["être joint," Y. 49.]

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu[4] après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique[5] le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

[4] ["ont tenus," Y. 49.]

[5] ["propos au sujet desquels," Y. 49.]

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera[6] le Gouvernement

[6] ["informe," Y. 49.]

* Old style.

Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question[1] à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars, 1909.

[1] ["en remettant cette question soit à la décision," etc., Y. 49.]

Belgrade, le 12 (25) *juillet*, 1914.

(TRANSLATION.)[2]

[2] [*cf.* the translation in W., vol. II., p. 140.]

THE Royal Serbian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government[3] of the 10th instant,* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

[3] [No. 4.]

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupshtina † and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Serbian Government on the 18th * March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice

* Old style. † The Serbian Parliament.

that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the Press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13 (26th) July, the following declaration :—

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Serbian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Serbian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909,*

* New style.

which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official Army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake :—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupshtina * a provision into the Press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the " Narodna Odbrana " and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the " Narodna Odbrana " Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

* The Serbian Parliament.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service[1] all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

[1] [*See* footnote to corresponding passage in R. 34, vol. II., p. 260; *cf.* also B. 4, p. 84.]

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th* June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

* Old style.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part [1] in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.[2]

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 17, 55.]

[2] [*See* No. 4, par. 2.]

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

No. 40.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July* 26, 1914.

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war,[3]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 20, 41.]

and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent.[1] He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant[2] (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris[3] arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Serbian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

(1) [*cf.* O. 10.]

(2) *See* No. 26.

(3) *See* No. 36.

No. 41.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ;[4] that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia ; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake ; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

(4) [*cf.* Nos. 20, 40, 161 (p. 215).]

No. 42.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 27, 1914.*

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,[1] is accepted by the French Government.[2] French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

[1] Nos. 36 and 37.
[2] [*cf.* Y. 70.]

No. 43.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 26th July.[3]

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia.[4] He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion,[5] desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.[6] I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration,[7] but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold.[7] He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome

[3] *See* No. 36.
[4] [*cf.* Y. 57 and note.]
[5] [*cf.* No. 60; R. 35; Y. 73, 74; G. 6. *Contrast* No. 46, and *see* No. 80, which points out the inconsistency.]
[6] [*cf.* Nos. 18, 71; Y. 61, 74.]
[7] [*See* No. 67.]

of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.[1] [1] [*cf.* Y.80.]

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit.[2] I asked him what he meant by " mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. [2] [*cf.* Y.67.]

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

No. 44.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,[3] to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Serbian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Serbian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Serbia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.[4] [3] [*cf.* Y. 54.]

[4] [But *see* No. 45.]

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's

Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.[1] I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

[1] *See* No. 6. [*Also* No. 24.]

No. 45.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,[2] I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation[3] between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

[2] *See* No. 44.

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 53, 55, 56, 68, 69, 70 (2), 74, 78, 93 (1), (2), (3); *also* Y. 80; O. 25, 32; S. 52; W. exh. 15.]

No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me[4] that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria

[4] [*See* Nos. 58, 72. *cf.* Y. 80; O. 42.]

and Russia by the four Powers,[1] reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked.[2] He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied[3] that the Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept.[4] I assumed that Serbian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required.[5] If Austria put the Serbian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Serbian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.[6]

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised,[7] and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other Powers in,[8] and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Serbian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

(1) [*cf.* Y. 61, 68.]

(2) [Contrast No. 43, and *see* note thereto.]

(3) [*cf.* Y. 66.]

(4) [No. 18.]

(5) [*cf.* No. 51, encl.; Y. 56 and note.]

(6) [*See* Nos. 67, 75; *cf.* 74; R. 43. Response, R. 44.]

(7) [No. 9.]

(8) [*cf.* Nos. 47, 48, 89; Y. 63.]

No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.[9]

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador[10] that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside.[11] His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

(9) *See* No. 46.

(10) [*cf.* No. 59.]

(11) [*cf.* Y. 63.]

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave.[1] But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Serbian territory.[2] I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Serbian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.[3]

[1] [*cf.* No. 48; Y. 66. *See* first Naval vol.]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 32, 33, 71, 80, 94; Y. 96.]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 59, 78.]

No. 48.

Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

COUNT MENSDORFF told me by instruction to-day[4] that the Serbian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Serbia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Serbia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Serbia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Serbian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Serbian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier

[4] [*See* R. 38. *cf.* R. 19; Y. 75, 80.]

of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force.[1] They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 75; O. 37.]

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Serbian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Serbian territory or aggressive designs against Serbian territory.[2]

[2] [*See* No. 90, note.]

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Serbian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.[3]

[3] [*See* No. 46.]

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Serbian reply might seem to be satisfactory;[4] but the Serbians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Serbians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

[4] [*cf.* No. 93 (1).]

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Serbian reply, they could make

war upon Serbia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute.[1] If they could make war on Serbia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government.[2] I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Serbian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse.[3] We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Serbian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Serbia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 18, 32, 47, 80, 94.]

[2] [No. 9. *cf.* No. 13.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 47; Y. 66.]

No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.[4]

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

[4] [No. 36. *cf.* No. 35; Y. 71, 72.]

No. 50.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31).

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Serbia.

Enclosure in No. 50.

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.

(TRANSLATION.)

IN order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues (*menées subversives*) originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Serbian Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Serbian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Serbia a formal declaration, in conformity with article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907,[1] relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.[2]

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907,[3] as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909,[4] provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Serbia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

[1] [*See* vol. II., p. 508.]

[2] [*cf.* S. 45.]

[3] [*See* vol. II., p. 508.]

[4] [*See* first Naval vol.]

No. 51.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Enclosure in No. 51.

[1] [*cf.* No. 52.] *Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.*[1]

(TRANSLATION.)

IN a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at St. Petersburg;[2] and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

[2] [*cf.* No. 10; Y. 34.]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie, in his note of the 26th of this month,[3] the Government of the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed[4] with a view to discovering in consultation with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in London a means of settling the present difficulties.

[3] [Nos. 36, 37.]

[4] [Y. 70.]

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to

instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Serbian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna.[1] Representations made to the Austrian-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless* the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.[2]

[1] [*cf.* Y. 56 and note.]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 70.]

The President of the Council *ad interim* (*Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères par interim*) takes the opportunity, &c.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

No. 52.

Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

THE Government of the Republic accept[3] Sir Edward Grey's proposal[4] in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Serbia; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

[3] [*See* No. 51. Y. 70, 71.]

[4] [No. 36.]

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

French Embassy [*London*], *July* 27, 1914.

* [Should be, "*if* the German Government do not" etc. The French text reads:—"Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne."]

No. 53.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

(TRANSLATION.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July* 14 (27), 1914.

[1] [*cf.* O. 32.] THE British Ambassador came to ascertain [1] whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.[2]

[2] [*See* No. 36.] I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations (*entamé des pourparlers*) with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador [3] under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 45, 56, 69, 74, 78, 93, (1),(2),(3); *also* O. 25, 32.] If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding (*écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu*) which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice [4] to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.[5]

[4] [M. Bienvenu-Martin.]

[5] [*See* Y. 56.]

No. 54.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)

(TRANSLATION.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July* 15 (28), 1914.

MY interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria (*l'intransigeance de l'Autriche*).

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.[1]

The Ambassador considers that the Serbian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming (*tout particulièrement alarmante*).

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 95; O. 41.]

No. 55.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday,[2] I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Serbian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria,[3] but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal.[4] He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Serbia in 1908,[5] alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.[6]

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers,[7] and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me,[8] and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views,[9] which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.[10]

[2] *See* No. 44.

[3] [*See* No. 118. Y. 127.]

[4] [*cf.* No. 90 and note.]

[5] [1909. *See* No. 4, par. 2.]

[6] [*See* No. 17.]

[7] [No. 36.]

[8] [*See* No. 24.]

[9] [*See* No. 45 and note.]

[10] [*cf.* No. 93 (2).]

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside[1] if the Powers accepted the proposal of a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

[1] [*cf.* Y] 68.]

No. 56.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.[2] He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Serbia it would be impossible to localise it,[3] for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Serbia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Serbians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Serbians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place,[4] and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Serbian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.[5] The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Serbia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers[6] to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,[7]

[2] [*cf.* No. 45 and note.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 9.]

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 55, 118.]

[5] [O. 25. *cf.* Y. 80.]

[6] [*cf.* Y. 93, 104.]

[7] [*See* No. 74.]

who was very willing to advise Serbia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 57.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 27, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.[1]

[1] [*See* No. 78.]

Telegrams from Vienna to the Press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

No. 58.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram[2] to Berlin of the 27th July.

[2] *See* No. 46

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

No. 59.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday[1] to St. Petersburg.

[1] *See* No. 47.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves " solidaires " with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Serbian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 47, 78.]

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia,[3] but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

[3] [*cf.* No. 90 and note.]

No. 60.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday[4] to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself

[4] *See* No. 43.

could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.[1]

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 68, 84, 88; *also* Y. 74 (last par), 81.]

No. 61.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Serbian reply.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 62, 79, 137; Y. 61, 120.]

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

No. 62.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day[3] in the sense of your telegram of 27th July[4] to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation,"[5] but said that, as mentioned in your speech,*[6] which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Serbian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Serbian note;[7] that war would be declared to-day,[8] and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said

[3] [*cf.* No. 161 (p. 216); R. 41.]

[4] *See* No. 46.

[5] [*cf.* Nos. 43, 71; Y, 57 and note.]

* "Hansard," [*See* vol. II., p. 399.]

[6] [*See also* No. 83.]

[7] [*cf.* No. 61.

[8] [*cf.* Y. 83.]

that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe.[1] I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement[2] and which could no longer be postponed.

[1] [*cf.* No. 25.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 61 and note.]

No. 63.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 28, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.[3]

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

[3] *See* No. 27.

No. 64.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)[4] *Rome, July 28, 1914.*

AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you :—

In a long conversation this morning Serbian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Serbia, they might be given to Powers

[4] [Reply, No. 81, *See also* No. 90.]

engaged in discussions, who might then advise Serbia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Serbian reply was considered inadequate.[1] Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation —such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda[2]—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Serbia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Serbia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this.[3] He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

[1] [*See* R. 34; W., vol. II., p. 140 *sqq.* *cf.* Y. 75 (2).]

[2] [R. 34, vol. II., p. 261.]

[3] [R. 34, vol. II., p. 263.]

No. 65.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Nish, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE urged on the Serbian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

Two Serbian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Serbian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Nish, July 28, 1914.*

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria.[4]

[4] [No. 50.]

No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1914.

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July[1] of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion[2] to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement.[3] No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.[4]

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government,[5] and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna[6] in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.[7]

[1] *See* No. 43.
[2] [*cf.* No. 73.]
[3] [*cf.* No. 78.]
[4] [*cf.* No. 84; No. 80.]
[5] [*cf.* No. 43.]
[6] [*cf.* No. 71.]
[7] *See* No. 46.

No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1914.

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary,[8] I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied.[9] I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

[8] [No. 18.]
[9] [*cf.* No. 60.]

No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1914.

IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments,[1] as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.[2]

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

[1] [*See* No. 45 and note.]

[2] *See* No. 55.

No. 70.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914.

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(1) *Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July* 28, 1914.

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circonscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan.[3] Please inform German Government,[4] confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.[5]

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

[3] [*See* No. 78; *cf.* No. 71; Y. 50; W.exh.11; R. 28.]

[4] [*cf.* No. 76.]

[5] [*cf.* Nos. 78, 93 (2); Y. 95, 96, 109.]

(2) *Telegram to Count Benckendorff.*

The Austrian declaration of war[6] clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.[7]

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.[8]

[6] [No. 50.]

[7] [*cf.* No. 74; Y. 95, 97.]

[8] [*cf.* Y. 103.]

No. 71.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening.[1] He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept the proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation.[2] You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way.[3] He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result,[4] but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south,[5] he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising,[6] would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Serbian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Serbian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern[7] with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to

(1) [*cf.* Y. 92, though the dates indicated do not agree.]

(2) [*cf.* Nos. 18, 43; Y. 74.]

(3) [*cf.* Nos. 67, 84, 88; Y. 92; W. exh. 15.]

(4) [*cf.* Y. 81.]

(5) [*See* Nos. 70 (1), 78.]

(6) [*cf* Y. 100.]

(7) [*cf.* Nos. 2, 9.]

do his utmost to maintain general peace. " A war between the Great Powers must be avoided " were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war.[1] I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

[1] [*cf.* No. 47 and note.]

No. 72.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram[2] to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Serbia's integrity and independence.[3] I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Serbia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points,[4] and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Serbian frontier.

[2] *See* No. 46.

[3] [Nos. 48, 79.]

[4] [*cf.* O. 10.]

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest,[5] a general war could not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria.

[5] [*cf.* No. 47 and note.]

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

No. 73.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE received *note verbale*[1] from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Serbian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July[2] in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Serbia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities,[3] and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Serbia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Serbia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London[4] of 26th February, 1909.

[1] [For text *see* No. 50.]

[2] *See* No. 4.

[3] [*See* vol. II., p. 508.]

[4] [*See* first Naval vol.]

No. 74.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government.[5] The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorised accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed,[6] offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe,[7] and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

[5] [*See* Nos. 45, 56, 93 (1), (3), 137; Y. 91.]

[6] [No. 36.]

[7] [*cf.* Nos. 70 (2), 78.]

No. 75.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)[1] *Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

[1] [*See* No. 77.]

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the basis of discussion.[2] His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Serbian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Serbia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees,[3] seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.[4]

[2] [No. 46.]

[3] [*See* No. 93 (1) and note.]

[4] [Nos. 48, 72.]

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna,[5] his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

[5] [*cf.* No. 34.]

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

No. 76.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria,[1] as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*.[2] This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion[3] had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia,[4] and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.[5]

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.[6]

[1] [*cf.* No. 43.]
[2] [*cf.* O. 51.]
[3] [No. 46.]
[4] [*cf.* No. 71.]
[5] [*cf.* No. 43; Y. 92, 97; O. 54.]
[6] [*See* No. 70 (1).]

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.[7] His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain

[7] [*See* No. 75.]

every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.[1]

[1] [*See* No. 85.]

No. 78.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 70 (1), 71.]

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant[3] to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin.[4] This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

[3] *See* No. 67.

[4] [No. 71; *cf. also* No. 76.]

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.[5] The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors,[6] or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took.[7] No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept.[8] Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

[5] [*See* No. 45 and note.]

[6] [*cf.* No. 74.]

[7] [*cf.* Y. 86, 91; O. 32, 64.]

[8] [*cf.* Nos. 80, 84, 97.]

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,[1] which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Serbia; he could not, he said, be more Serbian than Serbia.[2] Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

[1] *See* No. 57.

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 47, 59.]

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant[3] was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Serbia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

[3] *See* No. 69.

No. 79.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Serbia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning,[1] and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Serbia nor to acquire Serbian territory,[2] the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

(1) [*See* vol. II., p. 485.]

(2) [*cf.* Nos. 59, 61, 62, 137; Y. 120.]

No. 80.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 29, 1914.*

IN your telegram of the 27th instant[3] to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant[4] from Berlin.

(3) *See* No. 46.

(4) *See* No. 43.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,[4] but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference,"[5] so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government.[6] Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that

(5) [*cf.* Y. 57 and note.]

(6) [*cf.* Nos. 78, 84, 97.]

this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest.[1] As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.[2]

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.[3]

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 47, 94.]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 96.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 139.]

No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1914.

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.[4]

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Serbian note,[5] and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Serbia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

[4] *See* No. 64. [*Also* No. 90.]

[5] [Nos. 61, 62.]

No. 82.

Mr. Beaumont, British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July* 29, 1914.

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory.[6] I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable

[6] [Denial, No. 137 and Y. 120.]

economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Serbian rule.

No. 83.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Nish, July 29, 1914.*

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.[1]

[1] [Vol. II., p. 397. *See also* No. 62.]

No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*[2]

[2] [Despatched at 4 p.m.; *see* p. 36.]

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me [3] that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success.[4] Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Serbia.[5] I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution.[6] I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict.[7] The Press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary.[8] They seemed to think the particular method of conference,[9] consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London [10] too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any

[3] [*cf.* Y. 98.]

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 71, 88.]

[5] [*cf.* Y. 94; W. exh. 14.]

[6] [*cf.* No. 67.]

[7] [No. 93 (1), (3).]

[8] [*cf.* Nos. 18, 43 and note.]

[9] [No. 80.]

[10] [*cf.* R. 51.]

method [1] by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable.[2] In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button"[3] in the interests of peace.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 60, 88; Y. 81, 98, 107, 108, 109.]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 78, 80.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 107.]

No. 85.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)[4]

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 29, 1914.*[5]

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said[6] that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

[4] [Reached Foreign Office "about mid-night"; *see* p. 36.]

[5] [Reply, No. 101; delivered, No. 109.]

[6] [*See* No. 98, last par.]

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day[1] to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

(1) *See* No 77.

No. 86.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 29, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Serbian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation.[2] The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Serbia.

(2) [No. 70 (1).]

No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

AFTER telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day[3] that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with

(3) [*See* No. 89.]

Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand.[1] Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider.[2] France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside,[3] but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany[4] that France would be

(1) [*cf.* No. 25 and note.]

(2) [*cf.* No. 116; *also* No. 105.]

(3) [No. 89.]

(4) [*cf.* No. 105; *see* Y. 117.]

neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation.[1] I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff, that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria.[2] I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg.[3] If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning,[4] and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Serbia.[5] It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Serbian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.[6]

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

[1] [*See* Nos. 70 (1), 93 (2).]

[2] [No. 70 (2).]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 71, 84.]

[4] [*See* No. 84.]

[5] [No. 70 (2).]

[6] [*cf.* Nos. 98, 103; S. 51; W., vol. II., p. 132.]

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind.[1] The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering with it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

[1] [*cf.* No. 87.]

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be.[2] I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.[3]

[2] [*cf.* No. 46 and note.]

[3] [*cf.* Y. 92.]

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July[1] to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's telegram of the 28th July[2] and of my reply to it.[3] I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Serbia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity.[4] I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you,[5] and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Serbia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Serbia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Serbian territory,[6] as to which I observed that, by taking

(1) *See* No. 84.
(2) *See* No. 64.
(3) *See* No. 81.
(4) [*See* No. 64.]
(5) [No. 84; *cf.* No. 81.]
(6) [*cf.* Nos. 18, 48, 59, 91, 97, 137; Y. 56, 62, 103, 120, app. V. (iii.); O. 28, 35, 73; W.exh.10; R. 32.]

territory while leaving nominal Serbian independence, Austria might turn Serbia practically into a vassal State,[1] and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 55, 91, 97, 139; Y. 103.]

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.[2]

[2] [*cf.* G. 11.]

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day [3] he had ready a long memorandum,[4] which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Serbia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

[3] [Instructions, R. 39.]

[4] [*See* R. 19.]

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement,[5] and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

[5] [*cf.* No. 90 and note.]

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal [5] State.

Count Mensdorff deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.[1]

[1] [No. 84.]

No. 93.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 30, 1914.

(1.)

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof.

(TRANSLATION.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.*

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold to-day [2] in the sense of your Excellency's instructions.[3] I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees [4] for its future relations with Serbia.

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet.[5] He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided much against their will on the energetic

[2] [*cf.* R. 40.]

[3] [O. 25.]

[4] [*cf.* No. 75; Y. 85, 92, app. V. (iii.); O. 37, 53; W. exh. 3; R. intro., R. 10.]

[5] [*See* No. 45 and note.]

measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.[1]

[1] [*See* No. 93 (3); *cf.* No. 74.]

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Serbian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity[2] of Serbia's promises for the future.

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 32, 48; Y. 75 (2); R. intro.]

(2.)

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July* 16 (29), 1914.

[3] [*cf.* W., vol. II., p. 130.]

THE German Ambassador[3] informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army had crossed the Serbian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia,[4] none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

[4] [*cf.* No. 70 (1); *also* No. 78.]

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves,[5] and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna (*pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne*).*

[5] [*See* No. 45 and note.]

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

* [The official translation of this passage is inexact. A true rendering of the French clause quoted within brackets would be: "*however little* the advice of the German Government to which he referred *finds* an echo at Vienna."]

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views (*un contact direct*) between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.[1]

[1] [*cf.* O. 63.]

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Serbia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise (*un terrain de compromis*) to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

(3.)

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July* 16 (29), 1914.

AT the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's telegram of the 15th (28th) July.[2]

[2] [No. 93 (1).]

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

No. 94.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July* 29, 1914.

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered.[3] My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent[4] in present crisis I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a

[3] [*See* Nos. 78, 79 (1).]

[4] [*See* O. 10, 40; *cf.* Nos. 7, 32, 47, 48, 72, 80, 94.]

surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Serbian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Serbian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Serbian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favourable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Serbia.

No. 95.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Serbia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia

measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Serbian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Serbian feeling [1] prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 18 and note; S. 22.]

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched [2] and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

[2] [*cf.* Y. 15 and note, Y. 21; S. 52.]

No. 96.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,[3] which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Serbian reply.

[3] [For another account, *see* Y. 104.]

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

No. 97.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Serbian integrity would be respected by Austria.[1] To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal.[2] There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

[1] [*cf.* No. 90 and note.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 90 and note; R. 47.]

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia[3]—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

[3] [*cf.* O. 68.]

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m.,[4] when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation :—[5]

[4] [*cf.* O. 60.]

[5] [*cf.* O. 60; Y. 103. Modification of formula, Nos. 103, 120, 132.]

"If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Serbia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation.

No. 98.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you[1] he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties,[2] as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Serbia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement[3] and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

(1) [*See* No. 88; *cf.* No. 103.]

(2) [*cf.* No. 108; Y. 109; O. 68; W. *passim.*]

(3) [*cf.* S. 51.]

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation[4] and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations.[5] Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

(4) [*cf.* No. 108; Y. 109; O. 68; W. *passim.*]

(5) [*cf.* Y. 105.]

His Excellency added that telegram[6] received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

(6) *See* No. 102.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done.[7]

(7) [*See* No. 85.]

No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.) [1]

[1] [Reply, No. 116.]

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 30, 1914.*

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise.[2] But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation.[3] The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

[2] [*cf.* Y. 100; O. 58; R. 46.]

[3] [*See* O. 60.]

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain.[4] If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

[4] [*cf.* No. 6; Y. 31, 47.]

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war.[5] If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

[5] [*See* Y. 106.]

No. 100.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 30, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 29th July.[1]

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.[2]

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.[3]

(1) *See* No. 85.

(2) [Conveyed to Chancellor, No. 109.]

(3) [*cf.* No. 123, 148; Y. 144.]

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now.[1] We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 126.]

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1914.

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances.[2] This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince

[2] [*See* No. 89.]

Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.[1]

[1] *See* No. 98.

No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Serbian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further,[2] while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday[3] as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

[2] [*cf.* S. 51.]

[3] [No. 88; *cf.* No. 98; R. 51.]

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,[4] and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula[5] might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Serbian sovereign rights or independence.[6]

[4] *See* No. 97.

[5] [*See* No. 97.]

[6] [*See* Nos. 120, 132; *also* O. 67.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Serbian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest[7] if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[7] [*cf.* No. 104.]

No. 104.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1914.

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of to-day,[1] and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

[1] *See* No. 103.

No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

M. CAMBON reminded me to-day[2] of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia.[3] Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.[4]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 108.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 87; Y. 117.]

[4] [*See* No. 119.]

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.[5]

My dear Ambassador, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1912.

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has

[5] [Quoted in Sir E. Grey's speech, (vol. II., p. 403); *also* by French Prime Minister, Y. 159 (p. 428).]

always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,
E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 105.

M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey.[1]

[1] [Quoted by French Prime Minister, Y. 159 (p. 429).]

(TRANSLATION.)

French Embassy, London,
November 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward,

YOU reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces;

that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,
PAUL CAMBON.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 105.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory.[1] Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier.[2] The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 106.]
[2] [*cf.* Nos. 134, 136, 140.]

This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have not called back a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday,* the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

* *Sic :* in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Serbian reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended.

[This is not the only sign of haste about " Enclosure 3," which has undergone some emendation since its original publication in the White Paper " Miscellaneous. No. 6 (1914). [Cd. 7467.]" It there appeared with a date appended, " Paris, July 31, 1914." This was obviously incorrect, inasmuch as the covering despatch from Sir Edward Grey is dated July 30, and states that the enclosure was received from M. Cambon on that day. Moreover, the document in question is in substance an abbreviated reproduction of M. Viviani's despatch to M. Cambon (No. 106 in the French Yellow-book) which is also dated July 30. In a later issue of the White Paper, and in the still later Blue-book, the incorrect date " July 31 " is eliminated and the enclosure is left undated. A further confusion was to be found in its opening sentence, which in the original White Paper reads thus, in the two languages : " L'armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier vendredi ; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire." " The German army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory." But, as July 31 was a Friday and July 30 a Thursday, the " vendredi " " (Friday) " was in any case incorrect ; and this word also was eliminated in later issues. Reference to M. Viviani's despatch of July 30 (Y. 106) makes it clear that the " yesterday " on which the frontier is stated to have been violated must have been Wednesday, July 29—two days earlier than would be indicated by the erroneously inserted " Friday." M. Viviani's words are : " L'armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes frontières ; par deux fois, hier, des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire." " The German army has its outposts on our frontier ; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory." This sentence seems, moreover, to clear up an ambiguity caused by variations in the punctuation of Enclosure 3 ; for M. Viviani connects the " yesterday " with the later, and not the earlier, clause, and applies it expressly to the violation of the frontier by the German patrols. This being so, a more exact rendering of the opening sentence of Enclosure 3 might run thus : " The German army has its advance-posts on our frontiers ; yesterday on two occasions German patrols penetrated on to our territory."]

No. 106.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July 30, 1914.*

I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Serbia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

No. 107.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication [1] which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London

[1] *See* No. 84.

asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button"[1] as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

[1] [*See* No. 84.]

No. 108.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria.[2] He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

[2] [*cf.* No. 98 and note.]

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Tsar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.[3]

[3] [*See* Correspondence between Tsar and Kaiser, Y. app. V. (pp. 437–443); *cf.* No. 118.]

No. 109.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.[1] His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram,[2] that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

[1] *See* No. 101.

[2] [No. 108.]

No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador.[3] The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed [4] that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Serbians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

[3] [*cf.* O. 66.]

[4] [R. 49.]

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia,[1] and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

[1] [*cf.* R. 53, 55.]

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.

No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1914.

I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Serbian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Serbia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided that they did not impair Serbian sovereignty and the integrity of Serbian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them.[2] Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Serbian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

[2] [No. 90 and note.]

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.[3]

[3] [*See* No. 121; *cf.* No. 135.]

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to

preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 119.]

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

No. 112.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr"*[2] will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr"* signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

[2] [*cf.* No. 136; Y. 116, 117; 127; W. exh. 17.]

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal,[3] and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

[3] [*See* Nos. 84, 107.]

* "Imminence of war."

No. 113.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation. [1]

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Serbia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

(1) [*cf.* Y. 118; R. 52.]

No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. [2]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French [3] (German) [4] Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

(2) [*cf.* Sir E. Grey (vol. II., p. 410); *also* No. 115; G. 11.]

(3) [French reply, No. 125.]

(4) [German reply, No. 122; *cf.* No. 160 (p. 207).]

No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. [5]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

(5) [*cf.* Sir E. Grey (vol. II., p. 411); *also* No. 114; G. 11.]

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.[1]

[1] [Reply, No. 128.]

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1914.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 110.]

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.[3]

[3] *See* No. 99.

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.[4]

[4] [*See* No. 119, *cf.* Nos. 87, 105.]

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

No. 117.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 31, 1914.

AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency[5] that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the

[5] [*cf.* Y. 117.]

Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.[1]

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.[2]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.[3]

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 P.M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.[4]

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.

[1] [*cf.* No. 121, 124; Y. 117, 120, app. V. (vii.); O. 70.]

[2] [*cf.* O. 70; R. 54.]

[3] [*See* Nos. 116, 119.]

[4] [*See* Y. 125.]

No. 118.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor,[5] and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier

[5] [Y. app. V.; *also* W.]

at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Serbia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Serbia ; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views ; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Serbia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence.[1] His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

[1] [*See* No. 55 ; Y. 127.]

No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 110.]

M. CAMBON referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral.[3] I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it.[4] That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

[3] [Nos. 101, 109.]

[4] [No. 111.]

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.[1]

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day,[2] that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.[3]

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.[4]

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.[5]

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

(1) [*See* No. 105.]

(2) [*See* No. 105.]

(3) [*See* No. 114.]

(4) [*cf.* No. 117.]

(5) [*cf.* No. 116.

No. 120.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula[1] as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July[2] with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.[3] He trusted it would meet with your approval :—

[1] [*Also* in No. 132. *See also* Nos. 97, 103, 139; Y. 113; O. 67.]

[2] *See* No. 103.

[3] *See* No. 97.

" Si l'Autriche consentira à arrêter marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'Etat souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante."*

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia[4] in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier ; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress.

[4] [Y., app. V. (vi.) (p. 440) ; and W. (vol. II., p. 132.]

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

* [For translation *see* No. 132. This formula is quoted several times (see references in margin) with trifling variations of phraseology, which, however, do not affect the sense.]

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

No. 121.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 31, 1914.*[1]

[1] [*cf.* Y. 121.]

YOUR telegram of 31st July.[2]

[2] *See* No. 111.

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum,[3] being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

[3] [*cf.* No. 117.]

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

[4] [Y. app. V. (vii.) (p. 441); and W. (vol. II., p. 133).]

He again assured me that both the Emperor William,[4] at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria

to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 138; Y. 109; S. 51 and note.]

No. 122.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

NEUTRALITY of Belgium,[2] referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.[3]

I have seen Secretary of State,[4] who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer.[5] I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all.[6] His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium.[7] As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

[2] [*cf.* G. 38.]

[3] *See* No. 114.

[4] [*cf.* No. 160 (p. 207).]

[5] [*See* Sir E. Grey (vol. II., p. 410).]

[6] [*cf.* No. 123.]

[7] [Explained and answered in G. 79 and encls.]

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day[8] that the reply[9] of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If

[8] [*cf.* No. 148.]

[9] *See* No. 122.

Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

No. 124.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 31, 1914.

ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,[1] I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

[1] *See* No. 114.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if

Russia do not demobilise at once.[1] He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 112, 117.]

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

No. 125.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 31, 1914.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.[2]

[2] *See* No. 124.

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium.[3] It is as follows :—

[3] [No. 114.]

> French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.[4]

[4] [*cf.* Y. 119, 122; G. 9, 15.]

No. 126.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 1, 1914.*

I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning,[5] that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening.[6] It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of

[5] [*cf.* Y. 125.]

[6] [Y. 117.]

this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment[1] presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 121.]

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

No. 127.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August* 1, 1914.

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 115.]

No. 128.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August* 1, 1914.

BELGIAN neutrality.[3]

[3] [*cf.* G. 11.]

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday[4] have been acted upon.

[4] *See* No. 115.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

No. 129.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(TRANSLATION.)

(Telegraphic.) *Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 147; Y. 132, 133.]

THE Luxemburg Minister of State, Eyschen, has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg,[2] but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.[3]

[2] [*cf.* G. 20.]

[3] [*cf.* Y. 133.]

No. 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.[4]

[4] [Reply, No. 143.]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what ground the detention of British ships has been ordered.[5]

[5] [Explanation, No. 145. *See also* Nos. 149, 150, 156.]

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.[1]

[1] [*See* No. 138.]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me[2] the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.[3]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 110, 133; Y. 121.]

[3] [*See* No. 97.]

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:—[4]

[4] [*cf.* No. 120; Y. 113; O. 67.]

" (Urgent.)

" Formule amendée[5] conformément à la proposition anglaise: ' Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits

[5] [*See* footnote to No. 120.]

d'Etat souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.' "*

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

M. DE ETTER came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows :—[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 131; Y. 121.]

" The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.[2] M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

[2] [*cf.* Y. 120 and note; O. 73.]

" M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Serbian territory."

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

No. 134.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 1, 1914.

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility ;[3] that it was only after a decree of general

[3] [*cf.* Y. 56 and note, 127, app. V. (iv.); O. 78; W. exh. 2; S. 51.]

* TRANSLATION.—" Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal : ' If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.' "

mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation,[1] they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom.[2] so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace;[3] that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

(1) [*cf.* Y. 105.]

(2) [*cf.* No. 105 (3), 136, 140; *also* Y. 136.]

(3) [*See* Y., app. V.]

No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1914.

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal[4] for mediation between Austria and Serbia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

(4) [*See* No. 111.]

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation

by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government.

No. 136.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 1, 1914.*

MINISTER of War informed military attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army.[1] This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand,"[2] the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.[3]

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom.[4] has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.

(1) [Y. 127; O. 74; W. p. 135.]

(2) "State of war." [*cf.* No. 112.]

(3) [*cf.* O. 73.]

(4) [*cf.* Nos. 105 (3), 134, 140; Y. 136.]

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair

the sovereign rights of Serbia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement.[1] The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.[2]

[1] [*cf.* No. 90 and note.]

[2] [*See* No. 82; *cf.* Y. 120.]

Count Mensdorff called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold, and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations.[3] The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction of Serbian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Serbian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

[3] [*cf.* No. 161 (p. 218); R. 56.]

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg[4] had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

[4] [*See* No. 74 and note; *cf.* Y. 120.]

No. 138.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August* 1, 1914.

YOUR telegram of to-day.[5]

[5] *See* No. 131.

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not

Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well.[1] But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation,[2] and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to an answer (*sic*) as creating a state of war.

[1] [*cf.* No. 121; S. 51 and note.]

[2] [No. 142; Y. 130; W., vol. II., p. 135.]

No. 139.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, August* 1, 1914.

MY telegram of 31st July.[3]

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor[4] to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonof had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal,[5] or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Serbian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion

[3] *See* No. 120.

[4] [*See* Y., app. V.]

[5] [*cf.* No. 90 and note.]

of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonof informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum ; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg : the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused.[1] He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four,[2] for mediation by Great Britain and Italy,[3] for direct conversation between Austria and Russia ;[4] but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,[5] had been forwarded

(1) [e.g., *see* No. 93 (2) ; *also* No. 55 ; O. 49.]
(2) [*cf.* No. 36 ; O. 31.]
(3) [*cf.* No. 80.]
(4) [*See* No. 45 and note.]
(5) *See* No 120.

by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

No. 140.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 1, 1914.*

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom.,[1] which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 105 (3), 134, 136; Y. 136.]

No. 141.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that

Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Serbian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first,[1] and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.[2]

[1] [*cf.* Y. 18.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 17; Y. 83, 114, 120, 121.]

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

No. 142.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August* 1, 1914.

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.[3]

[3] [*cf.* No. 138; Y. 130.]

No. 143.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August* 1, 1914.

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August[4] acted on.

[4] *See* No. 130. [*cf. also* Nos. 145, 149, 150, 156.]

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

No. 144.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.[1]

[1] [Declaration of war, O. 76; *cf.* Y. 134, 135.]

No. 145.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

MY telegram of 1st August.[2]

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

[2] *See* No. 143; [*cf. also* Nos. 130, 149, 150, 156.]

No. 146.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.[3]

[3] [*See* No. 147.]

No. 147.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(TRANSLATION.)[1]

(Telegraphic.) *Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts :—[2]

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is [immediately*] (*d'un instant à l'autre*) expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867.[3] The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

[1] [Duplicate of Y. 131; G. 18.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 129; Y. 132, 133.]

[3] [*See* vol. II., p. 489.]

No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum :—[4]

" I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

[4] [*See* Y. 137 and footnote; quoted by Sir E. Grey (vol. II., p. 407).]

* [So translated in Y. 131. In G. 18, " where they are expected at any moment."]

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg.[1] I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.[2]

[1] [*cf.* Y. 137.]

[2] [*See* No. 123, and Sir E. Grey (vol. II., pp. 413–414).]

No. 149.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 1st August.[3]

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship *Sappho* at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,[4] I most earnestly trust

[3] *See* No. 143.

[4] *See* No. 130 [and note.]

that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 2nd August[1] : Detention of British ships at Hamburg.[2]

No information available.

[1] *See* No. 149.

[2] [*See* No. 130 and note.]

No. 151.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government.[3] Following reply has been sent to-day :—

" We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on[4] the action which they may think it necessary to take."

[3] [*cf.* Y. 142 ; G. 24, last par. *Also* p. 22, note.]

[4] [*See* G. 40.]

No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication :—

" In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy,[5] the Marquis di San Giuliano replied :—

" ' The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object.[6] Both were therefore

[5] [*cf.* Y. 50.]

[6] [*cf.* Y. 124, 159 (p. 431).]

in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.' "[1]

[1] [*See* No. 161 (p. 220); *cf.* pp. 393–394.]

In making this communication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1914.

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms :—[2]

[2] [G. 25 (original text); quoted by Sir E. Grey (vol. II., (p. 411); *see also* Mr. Asquith (vol. II., p. 425).]

" Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again,* I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note[3] proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.[4]

[3] [For text *see* G. 20.]

[4] [*See* G. 23; *also* Y. 141 and note.]

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused[5] this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

[5] [G. 22.]

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.[6]

[6] [*cf.* Nos. 159, 160; G. 43.]

* ["which she has once again shown us," G. 25.]

No. 154.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note[1] to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.[2]

[1] [For text *see* G. 27; *cf.* Y.154.]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 157, 159.]

No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

YOU should inform Belgian Government[3] that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

[3] [*See* G. 28.]

No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships[4] at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the

[4] [*See* No. 130 and note.]

assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

No. 157.

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)[1]

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 154, 159; G. 36.]

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, August* 4, 1914.

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.[2]

[2] [*cf.* No. 160 (p. 208); Y. 1 (encl. 2), 2 (encl.).]

No. 158.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, August* 4, 1914.

MILITARY attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1914.

WE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.[1]

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.[2]

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined[3] to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave[4] last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris,[5] we must repeat that request,[6] and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning[7] be received here by 12 o'clock to-night.[8] If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.[9]

(1) [*cf.* Nos. 154, 157; G. 27.]
(2) [*See* G. 30; *cf.* Y. 151.]
(3) [No. 122.]
(4) [No. 125.]
(5) [No. 114.]
(6) [*cf.* G. 36, 43; Mr. Asquith, vol. II., p. 420.]
(7) *See* No. 153.
(8) ["A time limit of ten hours"—G. 43.]
(9) [*See* No. 160.]

No. 160.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.[10]

Sir, *London, August* 8, 1914.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant[11] I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated.[12] Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able

(10) [*cf.* French Ambassador's departure, Y. 155.]
(11) *See* No. 153.
(12) [*See* No. 159; G. 30.]

to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them,[1] as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

[1] [*cf.* No. 157.]

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,[2] and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

[2] *See* No. 159.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given

were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper[1] Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the

[1] [*See* vol. II., p. 382.]

future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.*

* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

At about 9.30. P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by

12 o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became threatening.[1] We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 155, p. 407.]

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential *Tageblatt*," which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by

gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message :—

" The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route viâ the Hook of Holland to that viâ Copenhagen ; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most

friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his

firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, &c.,

W. E. GOSCHEN.

No. 161.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir, *London, September* 1, 1914.

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.[1]

[1] [*cf.* Russian summary of events, O. 77.]

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Serbia[2] was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirschky, who must have been aware of the tenor, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression[3] that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

[2] [No. 4.]

[3] [*cf.* Y. 20.]

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July.[4] He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador

[4] [*cf.* Y. 18, 55; S. 52.]

of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day.[1] It is true that during all this time the *Neue Freie Presse* and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Serbia.[2] The official *Fremdenblatt*, however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 14.]

[2] [Y. 12, 14.]

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither expected nor desired,[3] and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment.[4] The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Serbian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 20, 41; Y. 27.]

[4] [*cf.* S. 52.]

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably

in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and Press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Serbian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside.[1] This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Serbian question by which Austrian fears of Serbian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial Russian mobilisation[2] against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation,[3] and Russia again responded[4] with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.* On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold[5] and urged as strongly

[1] [*See* No. 32 and note.]

[2] [Nos. 70 (1), 78.]

[3] [No. 96; O. 47.]

[4] [No. 113.]

[5] [No. 62.]

* " Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)." [The White Paper in question contains despatches B. 1–159.]

as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons* on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Serbia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Serbian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Serbia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Serbia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirschky

* *See* Hansard, Vol. 65. [*See* vol. II., pp. 397–9.]

abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect,[1] and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schébéko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schébéko endeavoured on the 28th July[2] to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szápáry with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schébéko again,[3] in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg.[4] From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schébéko that Count Szápáry had at last conceded the main point at issue[5] by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Serbian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schébéko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[6] M. Schébéko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schébéko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

(1) [*cf.* Nos. 95, 141 Y.]

(2) [Nos. 93 (1), 74.]

(3) [No. 96; *cf.* Y. 104.]

(4) [*cf.* No. 137.]

(5) [Nos. 131, 133; R. 56.]

(6) [*See* No. 137.]

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July[1] by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August,[2] and on France on the 3rd August.[3] A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

[1] [No. 117.]
[2] [O. 76.]
[3] [Y. 147.]

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schébéko had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Serbian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."[4]

[4] [O. 79.]

M. Schébéko left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count

Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons,[1] and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August,[2] appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The *Neue Freie Presse* was violently insulting towards England. The *Fremdenblatt* was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

[1] [*See* vol. II., pp. 400, 417.]

[2] [*See* vol. II., p. 353.]

The declaration of Italian neutrality[3] was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

[3] [No. 152.]

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to

the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.[1] [1] [R. 65.]

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Chargé des Archives. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my

profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 P.M. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, &c.,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS,
1914.

THE EUROPEAN WAR.

I.

DOCUMENTS

RELATING TO THE
NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED GERMANY'S
DECLARATION OF WAR
ON RUSSIA (August 1, 1914), AND ON
FRANCE (August 3, 1914).

DECLARATION OF SEPTEMBER 4, 1914.

[PARIS: IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE.]

[*Official Translation Published in December*, 1914, *as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No.* 15 (1914). *Cd.* 7717.]

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27	,,	,,	Information given to our Ambassadors as to bellicose inclinations of the Austrian military party, as to difficulty for Serbia to accept whole of Austrian demands, and as to threatening tone of German Press	302
28	,,	,,	*Démarche* taken by Herr von Schoen at the Quai d'Orsay to support, in the name of his Government, the *démarche* of Austria-Hungary, approving its note, and making apparent the "incalculable consequences" which, by reason of the natural play of the alliances, would result from any attempt at interference by a third Power in the Austro-Serbian conflict ..	303
29	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 24	Austrophil and chauvinist manifestations at Berlin; pessimism of diplomatic circles	306

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
30	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 24	Herr von Jagow states approval of Austrian note, but denies absolutely previous knowledge of contents. He hopes Serbia will be advised by her friends to give in. The official Press is equally in agreement with Austria	306
31	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 24	Peaceable tendency of Russian Government, in spite of deep impression made on public by presentation of Austrian note	308
32	M. Paul Cambon	London, July 24	Sir E. Grey explains to M. Paul Cambon his plan of mediation by four Powers. Pessimism of Count Benckendorff on subject of Germany's intentions	309
33	„	„	Semi-official intervention by Germany at Vienna appears to M. Paul Cambon the best means of arresting the conflict	310
34	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 24	Sir E. Grey wishes to propose to Germany that they should act together at Vienna and St. Petersburg, in order that Austro-Serbian conflict should be submitted to mediation by four Powers not interested in question. Counsel of prudence given to Serbian Minister at Paris	310

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
35	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 25	Belgian Minister at Berlin sees in the course crisis is taking the execution of warlike intentions premeditated by Germany ..	311
36	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 25	Summary of situation. At Paris, Herr von Schoen comes to the Quai d'Orsay to deny menacing character of his action of previous evening. At London the Austrian Ambassador states that Austrian note is not in the nature of an ultimatum. Sir E. Grey advises prudence at Belgrade and explains to German Ambassador his plan of mediation by four Powers	311
37	M. de Fleuriau	London, July 25	German Government refusing to intervene between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey draws Prince Lichnowsky's attention to fact that this attitude will help to bring on a general conflict in which England could not remain inactive	313
38	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 25	Conciliatory efforts of M. Sazonof; he requests Vienna to extend the time limit allowed Serbia for her reply	314
39	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 25	French Government support this request for delay ..	314
40	M. de Fleuriau	London, July 25	English Government also associate themselves with this request	315

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
41	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 25	Herr von Jagow again states categorically that he had no knowledge of Austrian note before its presentation. He gives evasive answer to request of English Chargé d'Affaires that he would intervene at Vienna in order to prevent a conflict and to prolong period of ultimatum	315
42	,,	,,	Russian Chargé d'Affaires also presents this last request to Berlin. He insists on the urgency of a reply which Herr von Jagow tries to postpone	316
43	,,	,,	On further pressing action by Russian Chargé d'Affaires, Herr von Jagow states that he considers Austro-Serbian differences as a purely local affair, which should be confined to Austria and Serbia, and which does not appear to him likely to lead to international difficulties	317
44	M. Barrère ..	Rome, July 25	Russian Ambassador at Rome requests Italian Government to intervene on behalf of extension of time limit of ultimatum	318
45	M. Dumaine ..	Vienna, July 25	Austrian Government evade request for extension of time limit presented at Vienna by Russian Chargé d'Affaires	318
46	M. Boppe ..	Belgrade, July 25	Summary of Serbian reply to Austrian note	319

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
47	M. Jules Cambon	1914. Berlin, July 25	News of departure of Austrian Minister from Belgrade evokes demonstrations of chauvinism at Berlin. Financiers believe there will be war	320
48	M. Dumaine ..	Vienna, July 25	French Ambassador at Vienna, on account of delay of telegram sent him from Paris, does not receive his instructions in time to associate himself with action of his Russian colleague ..	321
49	Serbian Note ..	Belgrade, July 25	Text of Serbian reply to Austro-Hungarian note ..	321

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (JULY 25, 1914) TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR (JULY 28, 1914) BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA.

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
50	M. Bienvenu-Martin	1914. Paris, July 26	Summary of situation on evening of 25th, as resulting from Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude. Impressions made in the different capitals, and attempts to prevent aggravation of conflict which would result from military measures taken by Austro-Hungarian Government against Serbia. Sir E. Grey still hopes to prevent a conflict by the intervention of four disinterested Powers	322

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
51	M. Barrère ..	Rome, July 26	Italy will participate in efforts to maintain peace, but wishes to remain outside conflict if it comes ..	324
52	,,	,,	Russia still hopes for peaceful solution; Italian opinion hostile to Austria	325
53	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 26	French Government support Serbia's request for mediation, addressed to English Government by Russia's advice	325
54	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 26	M. Sazonof, still imbued with the same spirit of conciliation, proposes a direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg, on modifications to be introduced in ultimatum to make it acceptable. ..	325
55	M. Dumaine ..	Vienna, July 26	Russian Ambassador, on return to Vienna, proposes to present there fresh proposals for a settlement ..	326
56	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 26	*Démarche* by Herr von Schoen at the Quai d'Orsay that France should intervene with Germany at St. Petersburg only, in order to give counsels of peace. His refusal to reply, in default of instructions, to the request for mediation by four Powers at St. Petersburg and Vienna	327

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
57	Note for the Minister	Paris, July 26	Further visit of German Ambassador to confirm and strengthen the pacific intentions of his previous *démarche*. He refuses to give an opinion as to the advisability of Germany recommending moderation at Vienna, and persists in trying to bind the French Government in a common action of "pacific solidarity" at St. Petersburg only, on whom, according to him, peace depends	329
58	M. Chevalley ..	Christiania, July 26	Order to German fleet to return to Germany from Norway	331
59	M. d'Annoville	Luxemburg, July 26	First preparations for mobilisation at Thionville ..	331
60	M. Farges ..	Basle, July 27	First preparations for mobilisation in Grand Duchy of Baden	332
61	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 27	Summary of three successive *démarches* made by Herr von Schoen. The situation becomes more serious, Austria refusing both to content herself with Serbian concessions and to enter into conversation on the subject with the Powers. New English proposal to endeavour to find, at Berlin, Paris, Rome, and London means of avoiding a crisis, Russia and Austria, the Powers directly interested, remaining apart.	332

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
62	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 27	Further *démarche* of Herr von Schoen at the Quai d'Orsay, with the object of compromising France in regard to Russia, while gaining time to facilitate military action by Austria in Serbia, which Germany does nothing to delay	334
63	M. de Fleuriau	London, July 27	The German and Austrian Ambassadors make it known that they are sure of England's neutrality, in spite of language used by Sir A. Nicolson to Prince Lichnowsky	336
64	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 27	Conciliatory attitude of M. Sazonof	336
65	M. Bompard ..	Constantinople, July 27	It is considered at Constantinople that Austro-Serbian dispute will remain localised, and that Russia will not intervene on behalf of Serbia	336
66	M. de Fleuriau	London, July 27	Great Britain stops demobilisation of her fleet, and warns Germany that an Austrian invasion of Serbia may cause European war ..	337
67	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 27	Herr von Jagow gives vague pacific assurances, and states, in reply to a question, that Germany would not mobilise if Russia mobilised only on the Austrian frontier. The Secretary of State shows lively anxiety	338

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
68	M. de Fleuriau	London, July 27	Sir E. Grey suggests that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London should examine, in concert with him, the means of solving the present difficulties	338
69	„	„	Serbia has not asked for English mediation; the plan of mediation by four Powers advocated by England must therefore be adhered to ..	339
70	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 27	French Government accepts English position, that a sincerely moderating action by Germany at Vienna could alone bring matters to a close	339
71	M. de Fleuriau	London, July 27	Italian Government also accepts mediation by four Powers	340
72	M. Barrère ..	Rome, July 27	The Marquis di San Giuliano states that he had no previous knowledge of Austrian note, and adheres, without hesitation, to Sir E. Grey's proposal	341
73	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 27	Herr von Jagow dismisses the plan of a conference of the Powers, while proclaiming his desire for a peaceful settlement	342
74	„	„	He evades fresh pressure from M. Jules Cambon. Opportunity of renewing the English suggestion in a different form in order to drive Germany into a corner ..	342

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
75	M. Bienvenu-Martin	1914. Paris, July 27	Count Szécsen hands to the Quai d'Orsay a memorandum from his Government justifying the coercive measures against Serbia which he states are imminent. Text of this memorandum	344
75 (2)	Communiqué of the Press Bureau	Vienna, July 28	Semi-official communiqué of the Vienna Press Bureau on the subject of the Serbian reply, which is represented as insufficient	345
76	M. René Viviani	On board the "La France," July 28	Acknowledgment of receipt of communications received from M. Bienvenu-Martin and approval of replies he made both to Herr von Schoen and to Sir E. Grey's proposal	346
77	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 28	Summary of the situation: Germany's refusal to intervene at Vienna, objection raised by her to English proposal, postponement of Austrian memorandum. Dangers of the situation ..	347
78	,,	,,	Visit of Herr von Schoen to the Quai d'Orsay. He protests again his pacific sentiments, but always evades investigation as to practical means of preventing a conflict	348

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
79	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 28	Recommendation to M. Dumaine to keep in touch with his English colleague for the purpose of presenting the English proposal for mediation to Vienna ..	349
80	M. Paul Cambon	London, July 28	German Ambassador at London insists, as does Herr von Schoen at Paris, on the expediency of moderating action by England at St. Petersburg alone. On the other hand, M. Sazonof has accepted the English proposal of mediation, but he would like it to be preceded by direct conversation with Vienna, from which he expects good results ..	349
81	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 28	Herr von Jagow continues to show hostility to the conference proposed by Sir E. Grey, and rests his dilatory attitude on the news of Russian efforts for a direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg	351
82	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 28	M. Sazonof is obliged to state that Austria evades his proposal for a direct understanding	352
83	M. Dumaine ..	Vienna, July 28	Austrian declaration of war on Serbia renders useless all attempts at conciliation, according to Count Berchtold, who thus breaks off all discussion with St. Petersburg	352

CHAPTER V.

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914) TO GERMANY'S ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA (JULY 31, 1914).

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
84	M. Barrère ..	Rome, July 29	The Consulta considers that Austria's declaration of war should not prevent the continuance of diplomatic efforts for the meeting of a conference at London ..	354
85	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 29	Germany appears to renounce hope of Franco-English pressure on Russia alone, but continues to refuse to act at Vienna. It therefore appears indispensable that Russia should join definitely and at once in the English proposal for mediation by four Powers, in order that it should be accepted by Berlin before Austria's military measures should have definitely compromised peace	354
86	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 29	Russian Government gives complete adherence to this proposal	356
87	M. Klobukowski	Brussels, July 29	Anxiety caused at Brussels by the enigmatical and threatening attitude of Germany	356
88	M. Ronssin ..	Frankfort, July 29	Important movements of troops noted round Frankfort	357
89	M. Allizé ..	Munich, July 29	Military preparations in South Germany	357

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
90	M. Dumaine ..	Vienna, July 29	Military preparations in Bohemia	357
91	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 29	Austria evades the direct conversation to which she was invited, and hastens to arm	358
92	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 29	Herr von Jagow maintains his dilatory attitude, vaguely pacific, throwing all final responsibility for the conflict on Russia, stating at the same time his hope of a direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, for the success of which he claims to be trying to work	358
93	M. Dumaine ..	Vienna, July 29	Austria appears to have decided for war; she is strongly urged thereto by Herr von Tschirschky, German Ambassador. The situation grows worse. ..	360
94	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, July 29	Herr von Schoen called to say that Germany was going to consult Vienna as to its intentions, that that would furnish a basis for discussion, and that military operations would not be actively advanced ..	361
95	,,	,,	Russia, confronted with the disquieting attitude of Germany and with the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue the discussions, and with Austria's military preparations, is obliged to proceed to partial mobilisation	362

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
96	M. Barrère ..	1914. Rome, July 29	Marquis di San Giuliano explains the attitude of Germany and Austria as due to their erroneous conviction that Russia would abandon Serbia.	363
97	M. René Viviani	Paris, July 29	Direct Austro-Russian conversations having been interrupted by Austria's declaration of war on Serbia, the French and Russian Governments beg Sir E. Grey to renew at Berlin his proposal of intervention by four Powers, and to work upon Italy to obtain her complete co-operation ..	364
98	M. Paul Cambon	London, July 29	Germany having been willing to accept only the principle of mediation by four Powers, Sir E. Grey, to avoid any further dilatory reply, will leave the German Government to choose whatever form of intervention may appear practicable to it. He considers the situation very grave	365
99	M. Boppe ..	Belgrade, July 29	Serbian Government has obtained from Russia the assurance that that Power will not abandon its interest in the fate of Serbia. ..	365
100	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 29	German Ambassador at St. Petersburg called to state that his country would mobilise if Russia did not discontinue her military preparations	366

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
101	M. René Viviani	1914. Paris, July 30	Informed of this menacing step, the French Government declare their resolution to fulfil all the obligations of the Russian alliance while continuing to work for a peaceful solution, and requesting the Russian Government to act in the same way on their side	366
102	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 30	Russian Government state their readiness to continue negotiations to the end, while remaining convinced that Germany will not work at Vienna in favour of peace	367
103	,,	,,	Upon a further and less threatening move by the German Ambassador, M. Sazonof hastened to make a fresh proposal, intimating that Russia would break off her military preparations if Austria declared herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which impugned the sovereignty of Serbia	368
104	M. Dumaine ..	Vienna, July 30	Following a very friendly interview between Russian Ambassador and Count Berchtold, a fresh attempt will be made at St. Petersburg to hold direct communication between Austria and Russia for friendly settlement of Serbian affair	369

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
105	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 30	German Government deny the report of mobilisation, but take all necessary measures to hasten it	370
106	M. René Viviani	Paris, July 30	M. Paul Cambon is requested to bring to knowledge of English Government all corroborative information proving the active and threatening military measures taken by Germany since July 25, while France is keeping her covering troops at about ten kilometres from the frontier ..	371
107	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 30	Herr von Jagow states that M. Sazonof's proposal is unacceptable for Austria ..	373
108	M. Paul Cambon	London, July 30	German Ambassador has brought no answer to Sir Edward Grey's request that the German Government should themselves put forward a proposal for mediation by four Powers. Prince Lichnowsky has questioned English Government as to their military preparations. The information given to Sir E. Grey as to Germany's military operations has led him to believe, like M. Paul Cambon, that the time has come for them to consider together all the possibilities	373

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
109	M. Jules Cambon	1914, Berlin, July 30	Herr von Jagow states that in order to gain time he will take direct action at Vienna by asking to know the Austrian conditions, thus again evading Sir Edward Grey's request. He makes recriminations against Russia ..	374
110	M. Paul Cambon	London, July 31	Sir E. Grey warns German Ambassador at London that England could not remain neutral in a general conflict in which France was implicated. On the other hand, he had said to M. Paul Cambon that the English Government could not promise France that they would intervene .. .. The autograph letter from the French President to the King of England had been handed to the King ..	375
111	M. Mollard ..	Luxemburg, July 31	The Luxemburg Minister of State notifies military preparations on German frontier, and requests France to engage to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, a promise it cannot obtain from Germany	376
112	M. René Viviani	Paris, July 31	French Government, in compliance with England's wish, request St. Petersburg to modify the suggestion M. Sazonof has made to Austria, in order to make it acceptable to that Power and to permit of a peaceful settlement of the dispute	377

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
113	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, July 31	Russian Government have agreed to modify their formula, in spite of the feeling aroused by the bombardment of Belgrade and the constantly provocative action of Austria-Hungary	379
114	M. René Viviani	Paris, July 31	The concurrent efforts made by England and Russia for the maintenance of peace have been united, and give hope of an understanding with Austria-Hungary, who appears more inclined thereto. Germany's attitude, however, gives the impression that that Power has worked from the beginning for the humiliation of Russia, the breaking up of the Triple Entente, and, if this result could not be obtained, for war	380
115	M. Dumaine ..	Vienna, July 31	General Austrian mobilisation is decreed	381
116	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, July 31	Germany, in her turn, decrees "Kriegsgefahrzustand," and requests Russia to demobilise	381
117	M. René Viviani	Paris, July 31	In announcing to Paris the ultimatum addressed to Russia, Herr von Schoen asks the French Government to inform him, before 1 o'clock on the following afternoon, what attitude France would assume in the event of a Russo-German conflict	382

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
118	M. Paléologue ..	1914. St. Petersburg, July 31	General mobilisation of Austro-Hungarian army entails general Russian mobilisation	382
119	M. Klobukowski	Brussels, July 31	Belgian Government receive official assurance that France will respect Belgian neutrality	383

CHAPTER VI.

GERMANY'S DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA (SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, AT 7.10 P.M.), AND ON FRANCE (MONDAY, AUGUST 3, AT 6.45 P.M.).

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
120	M. René Viviani	1914. Paris, August 1	Austrian Ambassadors at Paris and St. Petersburg make two conciliatory moves. Unfortunately Germany's attitude leaves hardly any hope of a peaceful settlement	384
121	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, August 1	Austria-Hungary announces at St. Petersburg that she is willing to discuss the ground of her differences with Serbia; but Germany's summons to Russia to demobilise within twelve hours seems to destroy the last hope of peace ..	386
122	M. René Viviani	Paris, August 1	French Government inform English Government that they will respect Belgian neutrality	387

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
123	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, August 1	German Government refuse a similar engagement ..	387
124	M. Barrère ..	Rome, August 1	Marquis di San Giuliano informs German Ambassador that Italy will preserve neutrality	387
125	M. René Viviani	Paris, August 1	Herr von Schoen, informed of Austria's conciliatory attitude and of Russia's acceptance of the English formula, makes no further mention of his departure and proclaims his peaceful intentions, at the same time stating that he has received no further information from his Government	388
126	M. Paul Cambon	London, August 1	Sir E. Grey states that England has refused the promise of neutrality for which Germany asked. The observance of Belgian neutrality is of great importance to England, and Germany has not answered the question put to her	390
127	M. René Viviani	Paris, August 1	French mobilisation has been ordered during the day, as a reply to German preparations	390
128	M. Mollard ..	Luxemburg, August 1	Luxemburg Minister of State asks French Government for an assurance of neutrality similar to that received by Belgium	392
129	M. René Viviani	Paris, August 1	This assurance is given by French Government ..	393

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
130	M. Jules Cambon	Berlin, August 1	General mobilisation is ordered at Berlin	393
131	M. Eyschen ..	Luxemburg, August 2	Violation of Luxemburg neutrality by German troops. Protests by Minister of State	394
132	M. Mollard ..	,,	Explanations furnished by German Government who state that measures taken in Luxemburg are solely preventive and are in no sense hostile to the Grand Duchy	394
133	Note of Herr von Schoen	Paris, August 2	The same explanation regarding the entry of German troops into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg ..	394
134	M. Paléologue ..	St. Petersburg, August 2	Germany has just declared war on Russia	395
135	M. René Viviani	Paris, August 2	Communication of this news to French diplomatic representatives abroad	395
136	,,	,,	French diplomatic representatives abroad are requested to make known the situation to the Governments to which they are accredited	395
137	M. Paul Cambon	London, August 2	Sir E. Grey has given assurance that British fleet will defend French coasts against any German attack by sea. The violation of the neutrality of Belgium would be considered a *casus belli*	396

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
138	M. René Viviani	1914. Paris, August 2	The President of the Council communicates to French Chamber Sir E. Grey's statements as to co-operation of British fleet ..	397
139	,,	,,	Protest to Berlin against the violations of French frontier	397
140	M. Pellet ..	The Hague, August 3	German Mininster at the Hague informs Netherlands Government of the entry of Imperial troops into Luxemburg and Belgium, under the pretext of preventive measures	398
141	M. Klobukowski	Brussels, August 3	Belgian Government refuse the summons sent to them to allow German troops a free passage through their territory	399
142	,,	,,	Belgium does not think the moment has come to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers to defend her independence	399
143	M. Paul Cambon	London, August 3	The statement regarding intervention of English fleet is binding on British Government	400
144	,,	,,	Fruitless attempt by German Ambassador to obtain from Sir E. Grey assurance that England's neutrality would not depend on the observance of Belgian neutrality	401

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
145	M. Paul Cambon	London, August 3	Sir E. Grey makes statement in the Commons regarding intervention of English fleet, and reads a letter from King Albert asking for England's support ..	401
146	M. René Viviani	Paris, August 3	French Government deny in London statement that German frontier had been violated by French officers	402
147	Herr von Schoen	,,	Declaration of war handed by German Ambassador at Paris to President of the Council	402
148	M. René Viviani	,,	Communication of this news to French diplomatic representatives abroad	403
149	,,	,,	Instructions sent to M. Jules Cambon, at Berlin, to ask for his passports	404
150	,,	,,	French Minister at Munich instructed to ask for his passports	404
151	,,	,,	Violation of Belgian territory by German troops ..	404
152	M. Klobukowski	Brussels, August 4	Belgium's appeal to England, France, and Russia ..	405
153	M. Paul Cambon	London, August 4	German Government will be requested by English Government to withdraw before midnight their ultimatum to Belgium ..	405

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
154	M. Klobukowski	Brussels, August 4	German Government state at Brussels that they find themselves obliged to invade Belgian territory ..	405
155	M. Bapst ..	Copenhagen, August 6	Enclosing a report in which M. Jules Cambon informs the Government of the circumstances of his return journey and of the annoyances to which he was subjected ..	406
156	M. Mollard ..	Paris, August 4	Report of M. Mollard to the Government on the subject of his depature from Luxemburg, which was insisted on by German military authorities	412
157	M. René Viviani (Circular to the Powers)	Paris, August 4	Text of notification to the Powers of the state of war existing between France and Germany	416
158	M. Raymond Poincaré, President of the Republic (Message to Parliament)	,,	Message of President of the Republic, read at the sitting of Parliament on August 4, 1914	419
159	M. René Viviani, President of the Council. (Speech in the Chamber)	,,	Text of speech delivered by President of the Council to the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914	421

CHAPTER VII.

DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
160	M. Delcassé ..	1914. Paris, September 4	Declaration of England, Russia, and France regarding their reciprocal undertaking not to conclude a separate peace, and not to put forward conditions of peace without previous agreement with each of the other Allies	433

APPENDIX I.

EXTRACTS FROM [BRITISH] BLUE-BOOK CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY ENGLAND DURING THE POURPARLERS WHICH PRECEDED THE WAR.

[The despatches quoted are B. 6, 87, 89, 99, 119, 148.]

APPENDIX II.

EXTRACTS FROM [BRITISH] BLUE-BOOK RELATING TO THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE NEUTRALITY OF ENGLAND.

[The despatches quoted are B. 85, 101, 123.]

APPENDIX II. (*b*).

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN, UNDER PRETENCE OF A "MISUNDERSTANDING," A GUARANTEE BY ENGLAND OF THE NEUTRALITY OF FRANCE IN A GERMAN-RUSSIAN WAR.

(*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, AUGUST 20, 1914.).

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
		1914.		
1	Prince Lichnowsky	London, July 31	Account of a *soi-disant* request by telephone concerning an eventual undertaking by Germany not to attack France if the latter would remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia	435
2	His Majesty Emperor William II.	Berlin, August 1	Telegram from the Emperor William to King George V., stating that he cannot stop his mobilisation against Russia and France, but will not attack France in the hypothesis of that Power offering its neutrality guaranteed by the English army and fleet	435
3	Herr von Bethmann Hollweg	,,	Telegram to Prince Lichnowsky repeating Germany's undertaking ..	435
4	His Majesty King George V.	London, August 1	Telegram from the King of England to the Emperor William, stating that German Ambassador is mistaken and that Sir Edward Grey spoke to Prince Lichnowsky only of the means of delaying an armed conflict between France and Germany until some definite ground of understanding should have been reached by Austria-Hungary and Russia	436

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
5	Prince Lichnowsky	1914. London, August 2	Notice given to Herr von Bethmann Hollweg that the conversations of which he had given an account had been abandoned as "useless"	436

APPENDIX III.

EXTRACTS FROM [BRITISH] BLUE-BOOK CONCERNING ENGLAND'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

[The despatches quoted are B. 153, 155, 157, 159, 160.]

APPENDIX IV.

EXTRACTS FROM THE [BELGIAN] GREY-BOOK SHOWING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH GERMANY VIOLATED BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

[The despatches quoted are G. 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 39, 40, 41, 44, 48, 52, 60, 71.]

APPENDIX V.

EXTRACTS FROM [GERMAN] WHITE-BOOK.

Telegrams exchanged between the Emperor of Germany, William II., and the Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II., from July 28 to August 1, 1914 .. .. p. 437

APPENDIX VI.

EXTRACTS FROM [RUSSIAN] ORANGE-BOOK RELATING TO GERMANY'S DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA.

[The despatches quoted are O. 76, 77, 78.]

CHAPTER I.

WARNINGS.

(1913.)

No. 1.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 17, 1913.

OUR naval and military attachés are sending to their respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these important documents.

The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (*personalité*) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power.

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis.

The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the

manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength ; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative.

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave.

JULES CAMBON.

ENCLOSURE I.

Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attaché to the Embassy of the French Republic at Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War.

Berlin, March 15, 1913.

THE patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles.

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* is the expression of prevalent opinion.

It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been immediately disavowed by the Government.

However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* cannot be disregarded; several important newspapers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger.

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments.

For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing-room a member of the Reichstag, who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.

To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realising that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely.

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912.

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling the gaps.* The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right moment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining

* The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing.

with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France.

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor, Colonel Pellé, a year ago, when the law of 1912 was published :

" We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year.

" The Treaty of the 4th of November, 1911,[1] has proved a complete disillusion.[2]

" The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco.

" It seemed, a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion.

" Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany always requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a second-rate Power.

" In the crisis of 1911, however, this second-rate Power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. *People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again.*"

And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, " her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of Germany can well be understood.

Of course the Government points to the general situation in

(1) [Text, vol. II., p. 494.]

(2) [*cf.* No. 5.]

Europe and speaks of the " Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this " Peril," and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws.

On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the *levée en masse* of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers.

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the Prussians into Paris.

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the *Kölnische Zeitung*, we are in fact, and shall long remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

Germans wish for peace—so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than anyone—but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

It must be emphasised again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France.

ENCLOSURE II.

M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.

Berlin, March 15, 1913.

IN reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Financial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us.

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with " an increase of military strength of immense scope " to use the expression of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal in terms which enable us to consider the communiqué of the *Lokal Anzeiger* as accurate.

The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October 1914, the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000.

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations.[1]

[1] [*cf.* B. 157.]

The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, " There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the

German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists.

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result.

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than in success."

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 2 (encl.); B. 157.]

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The *Kölnische Zeitung* has said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse.

But we must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the *Kölnische Zeitung* is at the present moment that of the immense majority of the German people.

In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles.

Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donnersmarck spoke as follows:—

"French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget

that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves."

And the Prince added: "I have even been considered in France as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No, it is not because I am afraid, that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but rather because I think that it is in the interest of both countries to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not sufficiently accurate; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be.'" And Prince Donnersmarck added: "An exactitude which played so great a rôle forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous."

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation.

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include

also an increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be necessary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs.

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures.

The military and naval law of 1912 had been provisionally covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent together the sum of 60,000,000 francs.)

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been raised by the Empire and Prussia : 500,000,000 marks on the 29th January 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses.

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures.

According to the indications given by the semi-official Press, the " non-recurring " expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the " permanent " annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

It seems certain that the " non-recurring " expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect.

The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the warlike times of 1813 and the present day.

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of

sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard.

With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be necessary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming.

To sum up: In Germany the execution of military reforms always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provisions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in *personnel* and *matériel*.

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale of the active army will deteriorate.

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little more.

They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations.

FARAMOND.

No. 2.

M. Etienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, April 2, 1913.

I HAVE just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts ; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this document, which seems to merit your attention.

ETIENNE.

ENCLOSURE.

Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army.

Berlin, March 19, 1913.

I.—GENERAL MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW MILITARY LAWS.

THE increase has taken place in three stages :—

(1) The Conference of Algeciras [1] has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an *Entente* between France, England, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Serbia and Italy ; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthening of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the English plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances

[1] [Jan.-Apr., 1906.]

in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort.

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir.[1] At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the English fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum.

[1] [July, 1911; *cf.* No. 5.]

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new *loi des cadres;* it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution contemplated by the new military law.

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end.

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschtum* (German influence) all the world over.

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of negroes in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

II.—Aim and Obligations of our National Policy, of our Army, and of the Special Organisations for Army Purposes.

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the

sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. *We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.* We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen organisations, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose;

more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop[1] our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their strong positions can be rapidly conquered or neutralised ; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by England to abandon her neutrality ; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter.

[1] [*cf.* No. 1 (encl. II); B. 157.]

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our north-western frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days.[2] For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisation, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no

[2] [*cf.* B. 157.]

circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality.[1] Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests. [1] [cf. G. 35.]

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion,[2] would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law. [2] [cf. G. 20, 23.]

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question of restoring to Germany her former possessions.

No. 3.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, May 6, 1913.

I WAS talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors* and the results obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising in front of us." "The height which we have just surmounted," I replied, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross."

The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German

* [On Balkan affairs.]

Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know.

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confidentially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely nothing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Government, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe.

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East; preparations have even been made here.

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the call of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure[1] which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 15, 105.]

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco.

Now it has been given again about ten days ago—that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to make the trial trip on the "Imperator," did not embark.

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff.

On this point I have been informed of some remarks made in a German *milieu* by General von Moltke,[1] who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German army. [1] [*cf.* No. 6.]

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. " We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, " all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly," added the General, " we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance."

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles ; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy.

This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago.

From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which comprise the facts stated above ; these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. *They wish to be always ready.*

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence ; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the country.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 4.

M. Allizé, Minister of the Republic in Bavaria, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Munich, July 10, 1913.

FROM a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no

one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911,* it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed.

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the political and economic difficulties which will continue to increase.

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Germany. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune of war is always uncertain; every war is an adventure, and the man is a fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory."

ALLIZÉ.

No. 5.

Report to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public Opinion in Germany according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents).

Paris, July 30, 1913.

FROM observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds:—

(1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1911 is considered a disappointment for Germany[1];

(2) France—a new France—undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911, is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war.

[1] [*cf.* No. 1 (encl. I.)]

* [Signed Nov. 4, 1911. For text *see* vol. II., p. 494.]

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Brandenburg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentlemen, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions :

The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck ; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma.

In July 1911, the " Coup of Agadir "[1] made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the Press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organised, what Pan-German greed it has awakened, and what hatred it has left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen* was the best-hated man in Germany last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge.

[1] [*cf.* No. 2 (encl.)]

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most

* [Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, German Foreign Secretary at that time.]

persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion.

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt.

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the Press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories; that Germany on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial conquest this consolation was offered:—"Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home."

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled.

Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility and proximity of war?

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war.

There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit England.

The forces consist of the following elements:—

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct.

Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the *grands seigneurs* of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful.

Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital.

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein—conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states—Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden—are divided by these two opinions :—an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages ; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy.

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.

An example will make this idea clear :—The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.

Finally, it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favour war.

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a Press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire.

Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is *inevitable*. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.

Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over-population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, *i.e.*, to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses.

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible.

Others are bellicose from "Bismarckism" as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From that still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal

memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the *Wehrvereine*, and other associations of Young Germany.

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war.

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows:—The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conservative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists.

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag; in 1874, 155; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 65. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading rôle in parliament,

helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown.

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity—all these regard war as good business.

Amongst the " Bismarckians " must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the " pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the *Post*. They find disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities.

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence ; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German *Kultur* wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the *Kriegsvereine*, *Wehrvereine* and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that

the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th[1] has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies.

[1] [1911, *see* p. 276.]

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war Press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact.

They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France, until she has every sound man under arms."

In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

Must war then be considered as inevitable?

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The English fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany.

No. 6.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, November 22, 1913.

I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff—General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success.

[1] [*cf.* No. 3.] General von Moltke[1] spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, " for," he said, to the King, " this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes."

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view.

During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot go much further.

One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of General von Moltke.

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts [to] escape him. Whatever may have been the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the general situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion in France and Germany.

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, " we must keep our powder dry."

JULES CAMBON.

CHAPTER II.

PRELIMINARIES.

From the death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914) to the Presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia (July 23, 1914).

No. 7.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, June 28, 1914.

NEWS has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife have been to-day assassinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite.

The Emperor, who is now at Ischl,[1] was immediately informed by telegraph.

[1] [*See* S. 23]

No. 8.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 2, 1914.

THE crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content to allow Serbia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired.

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intolerable to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures.

No. 9.

M. de Manneville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 4, 1914.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that he hoped Serbia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Serbia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her.

The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German Press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so.

No. 10.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.

IN the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian Press against Serbia are in danger of producing in his country.

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Serbian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him : " No country," he said, " has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which

your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."

May this warning not be in vain.

No. 11.

M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Budapest, July 11, 1914.

QUESTIONED in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Serbian question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a *démarche* at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation.

With regard to this *démarche* it seems that the word has been given to minimise its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the Press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word "*démarche*," with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression "*pourparlers*," which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace.

All is for peace, in the Press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with one another; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is

preparing a coup, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (*à plaisir*). Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level; the Hungarian 4 per cents. were quoted yesterday at 79·95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued.

No. 12.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 15, 1914.

CERTAIN organs of the Vienna Press,[1] discussing the military organisation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs; this would ensure to the Dual Monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting Serbia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The *Militärische Rundschau* frankly admits it. "The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned—to be or not to be—which is in truth the great matter to-day."

(1) [*cf.* B. 20, 161.]

Surpassing itself, the *Neue Freie Presse* of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech,[2] in which he said, "Our relations with Serbia require, however, to be made clear." These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a *war*

(2) [*cf.* S. 23]

[1] [*cf.* S. 22.] *to the knife*[1] against Pan-Serbism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Serbian race.

No. 13.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 19, 1914.

THE Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has added a section containing political information emanating from a trustworthy source.

I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has obtained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note to Serbia, which the papers have for some days been persistently announcing.

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account of the accurate information which it contains.

No. 14.

Memorandum.

(*Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situation in Austria.*)

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

FROM information furnished by a person specially well informed as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism ; much will be demanded of Serbia ; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in co-operation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools ; and it is a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply ; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether

she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin.

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localised operations against Serbia. But everything must be regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out: generally the official telegraph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign Press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the most important organs; it omits all quotation from and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian Press a complete review of the whole Serbian Press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant.

No. 15.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister[1] *for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

(1) [*See* heading to No. 25.]

IT has come to my knowledge that the Serbian representative at Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Government was ready to entertain Austria's requirements[2] arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only for judicial co-operation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Serbia.

(2) [*cf.* B. intro. (p.29).]

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Serbian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note,[1] and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect.

(1) [*cf.* Nos. 17, 21, 30, 35, 36, 41, 57, 78; B. 18, 25, 95; O. 18; S. 52.]

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices for mobilisation, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of " attention " attitude in times of tension,[2] have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant.

(2) [Nos. 3 (p. 274), 105.]

No. 16.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 21, 1914.

I SPECIALLY draw your attention to information of which I am in receipt from Berlin ;[3] the French Ambassador notifies the extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Serbian question.

(3) [No. 17.]

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the *démarche* at Belgrade which she judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with her authority,[4] without seeking to play the part of mediator.

(4) [*cf.* Nos. 17, 30, 31 ; W. exh. 2 ; R. 12.]

No. 17.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 22, 1914.

M. JULES CAMBON having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenor of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew nothing of the text ;[1] our Ambassador expressed his great astonishment at this. He emphasises that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse continues,[2] and that pessimistic rumours are current.

(1) [No. 15 and note.]

(2) [No. 16.]

M. Barrère also discussed the same question with the Marquis di San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance that he is working at Vienna in order that Serbia may not be asked for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo.

In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away by the Press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maximum from Serbia by starting to intimidate her, directly and indirectly, and looks to Germany for support[3] in this.

(3) [*cf.* No. 16 and note.]

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly conversation, how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Serbia.

No. 18.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

NOTHING is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, who is prolonging his stay at Ischl,[4] is trying to obtain from the Emperor. The intention of proceeding against Serbia with the greatest severity, of having done

(4) [*cf.* S. 23.]

with her, of "treating her like another Poland," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

In any case it is believed that the *démarche* will be made at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Serbians; M. Jovanovich believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Serbian army; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country.

Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself a supporter of violent measures,[1] while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,[2] has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Serbia. I am ... nal feeling.

[1] [*cf.* No. 20, 109; B. 95, 141, 161 (pp. 217–218); S. 22.]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 20, 55; B. 161 (p. 214).]

No. 19.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 22, 1914.

YOUR Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the impressions which have been collected by our

Ambassador at Berlin[1] with regard to the *démarche* which the Austro-Hungarian Minister is proposing to make at Belgrade.

[1] [Nos. 16, 17.]

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.[2] Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him that at Berlin a *démarche* of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Serbian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna,[3] but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a *démarche* of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the circumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that the Serbian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the consequences. For if it could not be proved that the Serbian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe.

[2] [*cf.* B. 1.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 56.]

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Serbian relations.

This morning the Serbian Minister came to see me, and he shares the apprehensions[4] of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may make of the Serbian Government demands which their dignity,[5] and above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors accredited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were most fundamentally hostile to Serbia. But, he added, if these feelings take a public form (*démarche*) which lacks the moderation that is desirable, it will be necessary to take

[4] [*cf.* S. 27.]

[5] [*cf.* No. 45; S. 25, 30.]

account of Serbian public opinion, which has been inflamed by the wrong methods which the Austrian Government have used in approaching that country, and which has been made less patient by the memory of two victorious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Serbia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Serbia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far.[1]

[1] [*cf.* B. 3.]

No. 20.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome.

Paris, July 23, 1914.

ACCORDING to information collected by the French Ambassador at Vienna,[2] the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Serbia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

[2] [*See* No. 18 and note.]

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory; in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formulated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result.[3] In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances.

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 55, 159 (p. 422); S. 52.]

In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short space of time. The Serbian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna,[1] and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Serbia.

[1] [*cf.* No. 18.]

No. 21.

M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

Munich, July 23, 1914.

THE Bavarian Press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Serbian incident is not only possible but even probable; on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him (*dont il avait connaissance*)[2] was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious.

[2] [*See* No. 15 and note.]

CHAPTER III.

THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERBIAN REPLY.

(From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.)

No. 22.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*[1]

[1] [*cf.* B. 6.]

I SHOULD be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine the following information and instructions.[2]

[2] [*See* No. 23.]

Reval, July 24, 1914, 1 a.m.

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Serbia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an explanation or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia, of such a kind that Serbia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself with a *démarche* for removing any

* [M. Viviani, who was also Minister for Foreign Affairs, was out of France at this time, attending President Poincaré on his visit by sea to the Tsar.]

danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect.[1]

[1] [*See* B.6.]

M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schébéko. While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and English Ambassadors, and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which each of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require.

Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Benckendorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation.

No. 23.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France."[2]

[2] [*See* No. 22, footnote.]

Paris, July 24, 1914.

I HAVE sent on your instructions[3] to Vienna as urgent, but from information contained in this morning's papers it appears that the Austrian note[4] was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday evening.

[3] [No. 22.]

[4] [Text, B. 4.]

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Serbian Press and army. It is said to give Serbia till 6 o'clock[5] on Saturday evening to make her submission.

[5] [*See* B. 4, footnote (p. 85).]

In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested him to come to an agreement with his English and Russian colleagues as to his action.

No. 24.

TEXT OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE.[1]

[1] [*See* note to No. 49, p. 321.]

(Note communicated by Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, on Friday, July 24, 1914, at 10.30 a.m.)

(For text and translation of the Austrian Note to Serbia, *see* B. 4, pp. 74–88. For Serbian Reply, *see* B. 39, pp. 112–120.)

No. 25.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France," and to London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, Belgrade.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

[2] [*cf.* R. 11.]

[3] [B. 4.]

I HAVE the honour to inform you [2] that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note[3] which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Szécsen informs me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Serbian Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th for their answer.*

The note is based on the undertaking made by Serbia on the 31st March, 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reproaches the Serbian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the Press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade.

The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their tranquillity, and to require from the Serbian Government an official pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette

* [*See* footnote to B. 4, p. 85.]

of the 26th a declaration, the terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Serbian army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the army. In addition to this, the Serbian Government are to undertake to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept the co-operation of Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Serbian officer and an official who were concerned in it.

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Belgrade; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and came from a depôt of the Serbian army; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Serbian officers and officials.

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making this communication, Count Szécsen without any observations informed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety[1] which had been aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical a *démarche* with so short a time limit; that is to say, a time when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburg[2] and were at sea,[3] and consequently were not able to exert, in agreement with those Powers which were not directly interested, that soothing influence on Serbia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace.

(1) [*cf.* B. 3.]

(2) [*cf.* No. 29.]

(3) [*See* No. 22, footnote.]

The Serbian Minister has not yet received any information as to the intentions of his Government.

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock this afternoon.[4]

(4) [*See* No. 28.]

No. 26.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Thiébaut, French Minister at Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

M. VESNITCH* was this morning still without any telegram from his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note.

To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, that Serbia must try to gain time, as the limit of forty-eight hours perhaps formed rather a "*mise en demeure*" than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term; that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia; he was advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Serbia, while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full information as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all speed; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

I have asked at London and St. Petersburg for the views and intentions of the English and Russian Governments. It appears on the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed of it.[1]

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 35, 50, 51, 56, 72; contrast B. 38.]

No. 27.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

THE French Ambassador at Vienna informs me that opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated

* [Serbian Minister at Paris.]

nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be that Serbia may give way.[1]

The Serbian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punishment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign officials in Serbia. M. Jovanovich considers that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dispute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers.

Our Ambassador at Berlin gives an account of the excitement aroused by the Austrian note,[2] and of the state of feeling of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Germany would desire war. The tone of the Press is threatening and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening.

M. Barrère informs us that Italy is exercising moderating influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications.

[1] [*cf.* No. 47; B. 20, 41, 161 (p. 215).]

[2] [*cf.* O. 7.]

No. 28.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

HERR VON SCHOEN came to inform me[3] of a note from his Government, of which he would not leave me a copy, but at my request he read it twice over to me.[4]

The note[5] was almost word for word as follows:

"The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Serbian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav

[3] [*cf.* O. 8; R. 12, 13.]

[4] [*cf.* No. 36.]

[5] [Text, B. 9.]

provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Serbian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the Government and the army.

"The Serbian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Serbian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Serbian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Serbian Government at that time[1] has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Serbia, the Pan-Serbian propaganda has, since that time, continuously increased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified.[2] In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Serbian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them."

[1] [*See* B. 4, p. 81.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 30.]

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally; it is as follows: "The German Government

" consider that in the present case there is only question of a " matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary " and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to " endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned.

" The German Government desire urgently the localisation " of the dispute,[1] because every interference of another Power " would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed " by incalculable consequences."[2]

(1) [*cf.* B. 9 and note.]

I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia ; the Serbian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution.

(2) [*cf.* B. 48.]

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses : that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Serbia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration ; that of Serbia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined ; if Serbia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Serbia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localise the dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple *mise en demeure*, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views.[3]

(3) [*cf.* O. 8.]

No. 29.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

THE delivery of the Austrian note to Serbia has made a deep impression.

The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as in the Press, the same view is expressed.

Most of the Chargés d'Affaires present in Berlin came to see me this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires bitterly remarked that Austria has presented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburg.[1] He is inclined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will no doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the monarchic principle (*par un sentiment de solidarité monarchique*)[2] and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon.[3]

[1] [*cf.* No. 25.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 30.]

[3] [*See* No. 30.]

No. 30.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it,[4] the Serbian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to

[4] [*cf.* No. 28.]

be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localised.[1]

[1] [*cf.* B. 9 and note.]

I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so,[2] I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

[2] [*See* No. 15 and note.]

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, "It is only "because we are having a personal conversation that I allow "you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Serbia; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna?" I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Serbia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe.

Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement (*un peu d'émotion*) on the part of Serbia's friends, but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

"I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would endeavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter?"

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off."

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude[3] with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years

[3] [*cf.* No. 16; W. exh. 2.]

past, has weakened the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were violent.

An article which appeared in the *Lokal Anzeiger* this evening shows also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must stand together (*sentiment de la solidarité monarchique*).[1] I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously.

[1] [*cf.* No. 29.]

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend[2] to every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Serbia.

[2] [*cf.* No. 35.]

No. 31.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Serbia.[3]

[3] [Text, B. 4.]

The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could not be more pacific,[4] a fact of which the President of the Republic and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation.

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 54, 64, 103, 104, 117, and app. V. (vi.).]

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Serbia.[5] The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

[5] [*cf.* Nos. 50, 52, 96; O. 40.]

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally[1] and I am afraid that this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude.[2]

[1] [*cf.* No. 16.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 47; B. 6, 99.]

No. 32.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 24, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY having discussed with me[3] his desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the English Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the initiative in approaching Vienna[4] with the object of offering the mediation, between Austria and Serbia, of the four Powers which are not directly interested.[5] If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the essential point.

[3] [B. 10.]

[4] [*cf.* No. 33.]

[5] [*cf.* No. 34; B. 10 and note.]

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lichnowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany.

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum.

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events.

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the *démarche* upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey.

No. 33.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 24, 1914.

THE Serbian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a telegram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him their ultimatum,[1] the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's *Times*, it seems impossible for the Serbian Government to accept it.

[1] [Text, B. 4.]

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention of the German Government at Vienna[2] to prevent a sudden attack.

[2] [No. 32.]

No. 34.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

THE Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Government's note to Sir Edward Grey,[3] the latter observed that no such formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria.

[3] [B. 5.]

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the co-operation of the German Government with a view to the mediation of the four Powers who are not directly interested

in the Serbian question, namely, England, France, Italy and Germany; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburg.[1]

I advised the Serbian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing to co-operate in any conciliatory action in Vienna, in the hope that Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satisfaction which is considered compatible with her independence and her sovereignty.[2]

[1] [*cf.* No. 32; B. 10 and note, 51 (encl.).]

[2] [*cf.* B. 12.]

No. 35.

M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

THE Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events.

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the military law is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended ignorance[3] of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's *démarche*.

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies.[4]

[3] [*cf.* No. 30; *see* No. 15 and note.]

[4] [*See* No. 26 and note.]

No. 36.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna.

Paris, July 25, 1914.

THE German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock [*midi*] to protest against an article in the *Echo de Paris*[5] which

[5] [*cf.* O. 19.]

applied the term "German threat" (*menace allemande*) to his *démarche* of yesterday.[1] Herr von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state at the *Direction Politique*, that there has been no "concert" between Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowledge of this note[2] when it was communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subsequently.

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat";[3] the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggravating it.

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's *démarche*. Having asked him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note,[4] he remarked to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been given to any journalist, the information in the *Echo de Paris* involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the German *démarche* appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey,[5] telling him that the Austrian note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are not accepted by six o'clock this evening, the Austrian Minister will leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military "preparations" but not military "operations."

The Cabinet of London,[6] like those of Paris[7] and St. Petersburg,[8] has advised Belgrade to express regret for any complicity which might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was Serbia's business to reply in terms which the interests of the country appeared to call for. The English Minister at Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues,

(1) [No. 28.]
(2) [*See* No. 15 and note.]
(3) [*cf.* O. 18.]
(4) [No. 28; B. 9.]
(5) [B. 14.]
(6) [B. 12.]
(7) [No. 34; B. 15.]
(8) [*cf.* B. 17.]

and, if these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise the Serbian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall decide that they are able to do so.[1]

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky[2] (who, up to the present, has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris)[3] that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the English Government would not have to concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy and England, Germany alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction.

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to any *démarche* at Vienna.[4]

(1) [B. 12.]

(2) [B. 11.]

(3) [No. 28; *but see* B. 9.]

(4) [*cf.* Nos. 37, 57, 72, 78, 94; B. 2; O. 38, 51.]

No. 37.

M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 25, 1914.

THE German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office[5] to state that his Government would refuse to interfere in the dispute between Austria and Serbia.[6]

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Petersburg. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy?

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

(5) [*cf.* B. 25.]

(6) [*See* No. 36 and note.]

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached attitude (*pourrait s'en désintéresser*).

No. 38.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

THE Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum,[1] in order that the Powers may be able to form an opinion on the judicial *dossier*,[2] the communication of which is offered to them.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 39, 41, 42, 43; B. 13, 26.]

[2] [R. 19.]

M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from making any allusion to the measures which Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity of Serbia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recriminations of Count de Pourtalès left an unfavourable impression on M. Sazonof.

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow * with the Emperor presiding.[3] M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Serbia, we ought not to break off negotiations."

[3] [*cf.* No. 50.]

No. 39.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.[4]

[4] [Reply, No. 48.]

Paris, July 25, 1914.

THE Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia,[5] so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on the *dossier*[6] which Austria has offered

[5] [B. 13, 26.]

[6] [R. 19.]

* [From M. Bienvenu-Martin's statement in No. 50 it would seem that this Council, or a similar one, was held on Saturday, July 25.]

to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for every one.

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all meaning the *démarche* which she made to the Powers by communicating her note to them, and would place her in a position of conflict with international ethics.

The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corresponding and urgent *démarche* to Count Berchtold.[1] I beg you to support the request of your colleague.[2] The Russian Government have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest.[3]

[1] [*cf.* No. 40.]

[2] [*cf.* O. 15.]

[3] [London, not Bucharest; *see* O. 5. *cf.* No. 44.]

No. 40.

M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 25, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has had communicated to him this morning the instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time limit[4] given to Serbia by Austria's note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian *démarche* should be supported by the English Embassy.[5]

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same action as his Russian colleague,[6] and to refer to Austria's communication which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Serbia to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations.[7]

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis.

[4] [B. 13, 26.]

[5] [*cf.* No. 39.]

[6] [B. 26.]

[7] [B. 14, 25, 26.]

No. 41.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

THIS morning the English Chargé d'Affaires, acting under instructions from his Government, asked Herr von

Jagow if Germany were willing to join with England, France and Italy with the object of intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time limit[1] imposed on Serbia by the ultimatum.

[1] [See No. 38 and note.]

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this very morning to the German* Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension.[2] Unfortunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl. In any case, Herr von Jagow does not think that this request would be granted.

[2] [cf. B. 18; O. 14.]

The English Chargé d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative[3] that he was not able to carry the matter further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

[3] [See No. 15 and note.]

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one.

No. 42.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum.[4]

[4] [See No. 38 and note.]

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon, that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in

* In French text by an obvious error " de la Grande-Bretagne " is printed.

which he points out that the lateness of Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this communication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis.

No. 43.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires has, in accordance with his instructions,[1] approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum.[2] Herr von Jagow replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature,[3] but that in his opinion all these *démarches* were too late.

[1] [O. 5.]
[2] [O. 14.]
[3] [*cf.* No. 41; O. 14.]

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, action at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Serbia and to force her into war.

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an "*exécution*" in a local matter.

The Chargé d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hostilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Serbia until she had received complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me, "what this word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic.

No. 44.

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 25, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the *démarche* which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest* to undertake,[1] the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit imposed on Serbia.

[1] [O. 5. *cf.* No. 39.]

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step in Vienna.

No. 45.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires received instructions from his Government[2] to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to Serbia at the very moment that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

[2] [B. 13.]

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the *démarche* which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams *en clair*, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result.[3]

[3] [O. 11.]

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to whom the Prince communicated the tenor of his instructions and of his telegrams,[4] behaved

[4] [O. 11, 12.]

* [London, not Bucharest; *see* O. 5.]

with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs without leaving time for the *dossier* to be studied, was not consonant with international courtesy. Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Serbia;[1] it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow has been delivered and received full in the face by Serbia.

[1] [*cf.* No. 19; S. 27, 30, 52; R. 6, 18.]

No. 46.

M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

M. PASHITCH has just acquainted me with the reply[2] which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister.

[2] [Text, B. 39; *cf.* No. 56.]

The Serbian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in the *Journal Officiel* the declaration which has been required of them; they will communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other associations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary; they undertake to modify the Press law, to dismiss from service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda; they only request that the names of these officials may be communicated to them.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an explanation of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no participation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly relations.

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to The Hague Tribunal or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, 1909.[3]

[3] [B. 4, p. 81.]

No. 47.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

THROUGHOUT the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Serbia had submitted to the Austrian demands.[1] This evening the newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister.[2]

[1] [*cf.* No. 48.]

[2] [B. 23.]

The correspondent of the *Agence Havas* at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the *Siegessaül*, the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism.

A German whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had been feared here that Serbia would accept the whole of the Austrian note,[3] reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture.

[3] [*cf.* No. 27; B. 20.]

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

I, for my part, see in England the only Power which might be listened to at Berlin.

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg and London will not succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front.[4]

[4] [*cf.* No. 31; B. 6, 99.]

No. 48.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

YOUR telegram[1] reaches me exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Serbia expires. On the other hand I have just informed you[2] under what conditions the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has had to carry out his *démarche*. It seems useless to support him when there is no longer any time for it.

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Serbia had yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly ;[3] he must have thought the Serbian Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate.

[1] [No. 39.]

[2] [No. 45.]

[3] [B. 23 ; G. 51 ; R. 24.]

No. 49.

Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.

(Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister, July 27.)

[For text and translation of the Serbian Reply, *see* B. 39, pp. 112–120.—For Austrian Note, *see* B. 4, pp. 74–88.

Trifling differences of phraseology occur in the text of the Austrian Note and the Serbian Reply, as given in B. and in Y. Some of these have been noted in the margin of B. 4 and B. 39.]

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (JULY 25, 1914) TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914).

No. 50.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome).

Paris, July 26, 1914.

THE events of Saturday[1] can be summed up as follows:—Refusal of Austria to grant the extension of the time limit[2] asked for by Russia,—departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade[3] after receiving a reply from Serbia which was considered insufficient although it reached the limit of any possible concession,—order for mobilisation given in Serbia whose Government retired to Kragujevatz,[4] where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday,[5] without any request for support or even advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano,[6] who does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an extension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paléologue that at Vienna people still soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm."[7] It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand.[8]

From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Serbia to ask for English mediation[9] At the Council of Ministers on the 25th,[10] which was held in presence of the

(1) [July 25.]
(2) [No. 45; O. 12.]
(3) [No. 48; B. 23; O. 21; R. 24.]
(4) [To "Nish," B. 23; O. 21.]
(5) [July 24; *see* No. 26 and note.]
(6) [No. 44.]
(7) [*cf.* No. 96.]
(8) [*cf.* B. 152.]
(9) [No. 53.]
(10) [*See* No. 38 and note.]

Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps[1] intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilisation, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.[2]

[1] [*cf.* B. 70 (1).]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 31, 52; O. 40.]

In London the German *démarche* was made on the 25th[3] in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris.[4] Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Serbian Minister. The communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador[5] makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene.

[3] [24th; *see* B. 9.]

[4] [No. 28.]

[5] [B. 14.]

At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory;[6] when the latter asked him to associate himself with a *démarche* at Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences.

[6] [No. 43; O. 14; *cf.* Nos. 85, 114.]

A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin.[7] The German Emperor* returns direct to Kiel.[8] M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us.

[7] [No. 47.]

[8] [B. 33.]

* [According to Berlin telegrams in *The Times* of July 27 and 28, the Emperor William left Balestrand, Norway, at 6.30 p.m. on Saturday, July 25, and arrived at Potsdam, from Kiel, in the afternoon of Monday, July 27.]

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time to join in the *démarche* of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia;[1] he does not regret it, this *démarche* having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it.

[1] [No. 48.]

A note from the English Embassy has been delivered to me: it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and M. Sazonof and M. Paléologue.[2] Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to England, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play.[3] If Germany accepts, the English Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or allies.

[2] [*See* B. 6.]

[3] [B. 24; *cf.* B. 10 and note.]

No. 51.

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 26, 1914.

A TELEGRAM from Vienna which has just been received at the Consulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Serbia has taken place,[4] and that Austria is proceeding to military measures.

[4] [B. 23; O. 21; R. 24.]

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to Rome till the day after to-morrow.[5]

[5] [*See* No. 72.]

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises. From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the impression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.[6]

[6] [*See* B. 152.]

M. Salandra said to me on this subject: "We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England.

Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together with the English." M. Salandra stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment.[1]

[1] [*See* No. 26 and note.]

No. 52.

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 26, 1914.

M. SAZONOF yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising attitude ; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Serbia to be crushed.[2]

[2] [*cf.* No. 31 and note.]

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious business.

No. 53.

M Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

M. PALÉOLOGUE sends me the following telegram :—

" M. Sazonof advises the Serbian Government to ask for the mediation of the British Government."

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, I think that the French Government can only say that they hope to see the English Government accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them.

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Office.

No. 54.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful

solution.[1] "Up to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready to negotiate."[2]

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to come to a "frank and loyal explanation."[3] M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article,[4] making clear the insulting character of the principal clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Serbian anarchists; but the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded: "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg[5] on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Serbia has the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to succeed.

(1) [*cf.* No. 31.]
(2) [*cf.* No. 102, and app. V. (vi.).]
(3) [*cf.* B. 44.]
(4) [*cf.* O 25.]
(5) [*See* B. 45 and note.]

No. 55.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

M. SCHEBEKO has returned hastily from a journey to Russia;[6] he had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from Count Berchtold that the demands on Serbia would be thoroughly acceptable.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg spoke in the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual in the diplomacy of the Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me,[7] seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian Government.

(6) [*See* No. 18 and note.]
(7) [No. 20.]

M. Schébéko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allowing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany.

While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company with Sir M. de Bunsen, the latter received instructions from the Foreign Office with reference to the *démarche* to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested.[1] I am expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirschky, who, in order to refuse his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the principle of localising the conflict. [1] [B. 36.]

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military action.

No. 56.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

THE summary of the Serbian reply to the Austrian note only reached us after twenty hours' delay.[2] Although the Serbian Government had given way on all points, with the exception of two small reservations, the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off relations,[3] thus proving the determined wish of his Government to proceed to execution on Serbia. [2] [No. 46.] [3] [B. 23; O. 21; R. 24.]

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the English Ambassador thinks that there is a slight yielding;[4] when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but, as this question ceased to be localised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburg, the [4] [*cf.* B. 14.]

Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 19.]

In the course of an interview between M. Barrère and the General Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indicated that probably the Italian Government would not have approved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to them beforehand,[2] the Government consider themselves by this fact relieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria.[3]

[2] [*See* No. 26 and note.]

[3] [*cf.* B. 152.]

The German Ambassador came this afternoon[4] to make a communication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, "has declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement nor any attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia; her only intention is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia;[5] Germany feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburg."

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 57, 62; O. 28.]

[5] [*cf.* Nos. 62, 85; B. 134; O. 78; W. exhs. 2, 10a.]

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna,[6] where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to the occupation of Serbia.

[6] [*cf.* Nos. 61, 70, 74, 80; B. 51 (encl.).]

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the question concerned only Austria and Serbia," I told him that the mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be the act of the four other Powers less interested in the question.

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburg alone.[7]

[7] [*cf.* B. 53.]

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Ambassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared to be on this point identified with France.

No. 57.

Note for the Minister.

Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914.

AFTER the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the afternoon,[1] Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the *Direction Politique*, to ask that in order to avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion, such as that in the *Echo de Paris*[2] of the evening before, and in order to define exactly the sense of the *démarches* of the German Government, a brief statement should be communicated to the Press on the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(1) [No. 56.]

(2) [*See* No. 36.]

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, suggested the following terms,[3] which the Acting Political Director took down at his dictation: "During the "afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for "Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of "which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical "spirit of peaceful co-operation (*sentiment de solidarité "pacifique*), they examined the means which might be em- "ployed to maintain general peace."

(3) [*cf.* No. 62; W. exh. 10a.]

The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your opinion, everything is settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Serbian note or will enter into conversations with the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared surprised and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the Press" were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident.

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war ; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Austrian note,[1] it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point ; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed ? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a position without any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncompromising attitude ?[2] How surprising appeared the refusal[3] by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note ! What responsibility was the German Government assuming and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing between Austria and the Powers, after what might be called the absolute submission of Serbia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe !

[1] [*See* No. 15 and note.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 87.]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 36, 37.]

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Serbian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St. Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note,* and had only approved it after its delivery ; she

* *Cf.* No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Serbia.

Cf. also the English Blue-book, No. 95, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, English Ambassador at Vienna, states :—

"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."

thought, however, that Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a Great Power.[1] He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian reply,[2] and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, represented it to be.

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, the "spectre" of a conference:[3] a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communicate to the Press a short note[4] in a moderate tone.

[1] [*cf.* B. 9, 18, 32; O. 66.]

[2] [B. 39. *See also* S. 52.]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 70, 73, 74, 78, 81; B. 43, 62, 71, 80, 84; O. 34, 55; W. exh. 12.]

[4] [*See* No. 62.]

No. 58.

M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Christiania, July 26, 1914.

THE whole German fleet in Norway has received orders to put to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make straight for Germany.[5]

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger.

[5] [*cf.* Nos. 59, 60.]

No. 59.

M. d'Annoville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, July 26, 1914.

ACCORDING to information which I have just received from Thionville, the four last classes set at liberty have been

ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the *Kommandatur* at any moment.

Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden to go away from their place of residence.[1]

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 58, 60; O. 68.]

No. 60.

M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Basle, July 27, 1914.

FOUR days ago the German officers on leave in this district received orders to break off their leave and return to Germany.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 58, 59; O. 68.]

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has been directed under penalty of a fine.

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are restricted.

No. 61.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France" (for the President of the Council), and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

THE three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic:—On Friday[3] he reads a note[4] in which the German Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and adding that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any intervention of another party must through the play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences;"—the second day, Saturday,[5] the effect having been produced, and the Powers having, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time limit, and the risks of general war, advised Serbia to yield,[6] Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step,[7]

[3] [July 24.]
[4] [No. 28; B. 9.]
[5] [July 25.]
[6] [No. 36.]
[7] [No. 36.]

pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards;"—the third day, Sunday,[1] the result having been obtained, since Serbia has yielded, as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands,[2] the German Ambassador appears on two occasions[3] to insist on Germany's peaceful intentions, and on her warm desire to co-operate in the maintenance of peace,[4] after having registered the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis.

[1] [July 26.]
[2] [B. 39.]
[3] [Nos. 56, 57.]
[4] [*cf.* B. 43, 71.]

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on account of the incomprehensible refusal of Austria to accept Serbia's submission,[5] of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to invade Serbia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the Powers,[6] practically do not allow the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the mediation of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate the occupation of Serbia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna; if she does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war.

[5] [No. 75.]
[6] [*cf.* B. 61.]

The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield; they have thus fulfilled their part; now it is for Germany, who is alone able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria,[7] who has obtained satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war.

[7] [*cf.* No. 56.]

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet of London is put forward; M. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Serbia to the Powers, Russia would agree to stand aside,[8] Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome:[9] the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving

[8] [B. 55.]
[9] [B. 36.]

the present difficulties, it being understood that during this conversation Russia, Austria and Serbia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable to it ;[1] it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her goodwill by other means than words.

[1] [*cf.* No. 68; but *see* B. 43 and note.]

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your English colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Government in whatever form appears to you opportune.

No. 62.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

[2] [No. 56.] AFTER his *démarche* of yesterday[2] tending to an intervention by France at St. Petersburg in favour of peace, the German Ambassador returned, as I have informed you,[3] to the *Direction Politique* on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the Press a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the conversation ; he even suggested the following terms :—"During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation, they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace." He was told in answer,[4] that the terms appeared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situation ; that, however, a brief note in the sense indicated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the means employed to safeguard peace had been examined, might be issued if I approved it.

[3] [No. 57.]

[4] [No. 57.]

The note communicated was as follows :—" The German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh interview, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately terse, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted.

This morning Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the Political Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the Minister, and has added : " Note well the phrase in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation.[1] This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows :— " The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused it to be declared to that of St. Petersburg, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Serbia,[2] and that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the kingdom ; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tranquillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war must break out depends solely on Russia.[3] The German Government have firm confidence that the French Government, with which they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should be able to be maintained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in a pacific spirit."

(1) [*cf.* No. 57.]

(2) [*cf.* B. 90; O. 35.]

(3) [*cf.* No. 56 and note.]

I have let you know the reply which has been given[4] (a French *démarche* at St. Petersburg would be misunderstood, and must have as corollary a German *démarche* at Vienna, or, failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals).

(4) [No. 56.]

Herr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations ; the most probable is that it has for its object, like his *démarche* itself, an attempt to compromise France with Russia[5] and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on France ; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military action by Austria in Serbia intended to complete the success of Austria.

(5) [*cf.* O. 29, 35.]

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for any useful purpose you can put it to.

No. 63.

M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

THE German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure that England would preserve neutrality[1] if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson has told me, however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to preserve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient.

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the side of France.[2]

[1] [*cf.* B. 17; but *see* B. 46, 48.]

[2] [*cf.* B. 17; and M. Poincaré, vol. II., p. 306.]

No. 64.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

M. SAZONOF has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues.

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is applying itself successfully to restraining the Press; in particular great moderation towards Germany has been recommended.[3]

M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from Berlin since yesterday.

[3] [*cf.* No. 31 and note.]

No. 65.

M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Therapia, July 27, 1914.

THE Austro-Serbian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted at the

misfortunes of Serbia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia will not intervene[1] in favour of Serbia in circumstances which would extend the armed conflict.

[1] [*cf.* B. 32 and note.]

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Serbia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance.

No. 66.

M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY told the German Ambassador this morning[2] that if Austria were to invade Serbia after the Serbian reply, she would make it clear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23,[3] but that she wished to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question would arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would be led to take a part."

[2] [B. 46.]

[3] [B. 4.]

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilisation of the fleet.[4] The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday[5] on his own initiative; to-night, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public.* This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia.

[4] [*cf.* B. 47, 48.]

[5] [July 24.]

* [The decision to make the fact public cannot have been taken later than the night of July 26; for the following official communication, dated "Admiralty, July 26, midnight," appeared in *The Times* of Monday, July 27:—

"Orders have been given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave for the present. All vessels of the Second Fleet are remaining at their home ports in proximity to their balance crews."

See also note in first Naval volume, under date July 27, 1914.]

No. 67.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

TO-DAY I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State[1] on the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Petersburg and Vienna.[2]

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied that he was disposed to join in,[3] but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once,[4] that we should be forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Austrian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to communicate this limitation to you.[5] He also attached the greatest importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which were friendly with and allied to her.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention proposed by England at St. Petersburg and Vienna could, in his opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated. In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude had led Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect.

(1) [*cf.* B. 43.]
(2) [B. 36.]
(3) [*See* B. 43 and note.]
(4) [*cf.* B. 43.]
(5) [*cf.* No. 109.]

No. 68.

M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

YESTERDAY in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paléologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian

Minister said that Serbia was disposed to appeal to the Powers,[1] and that in that case his Government would be prepared to stand aside.[2]

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal[3] with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency.[4] The four Powers would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties.

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little conference, Russia, Austria and Serbia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it.[5]

[1] [*cf.* No. 69.]

[2] [*cf.* B. 55.]

[3] [B. 36.]

[4] [*See* No. 70.]

[5] [*cf.* No. 61. *See* B. 43 and note.]

No. 69.

M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

THE Serbian Minister has not received instructions from his Government to ask for the mediation of England[6]; it is, however, possible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on the way.

However, the English proposal for intervention by the four Powers intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first place.

[6] [*cf.* No. 68.]

No. 70.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

THE English Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's proposal[7] for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg, to stop active military operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London

[7] [No. 68; B. 36.]

examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a solution for the present complications.

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over with the English Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his *démarche* in whatever form he should judge suitable.[1]

[1] [No. 61.]

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. Grey.[2] I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade, instructions in the sense asked for by the English Government.

[2] [*cf.* B. 51, 52.]

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna[3]; a *démarche* from this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first exercised.[4]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 56, 61; B. 51 (encl.).]

[4] [*cf.* B. 51 (encl.).]

I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were used,[5] and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "conversations."

[5] [*cf.* No. 57 and note.]

No. 71.

M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence[6] to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the necessary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same *démarche*.

[6] [No. 70; B. 52.]

The Italian Government have accepted[7] intervention by the four Powers with a view to prevent military operations; they are consulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference and the procedure to be followed with regard

[7] [No. 72; B. 49.]

to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Government have not yet replied.[1] [1] [*cf.* B. 43.]

No. 72.

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 27, 1914.

THE Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome[2] this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.[3] [2] [*See* No. 51.] [3] [*See* No. 26 and note.]

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria.[4] "In no way," the Minister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such communication to Vienna." [4] [*cf.* S. 28.]

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Serbia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally.[5] He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London, and he believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful action, it is England. [5] [*cf.* No. 36 and note.]

As for Italy she will continue to make every effort in favour of peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered[6] without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Serbian dispute. [6] [*cf.* No. 71; B. 49.]

No. 73.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

THE English Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secretary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal.[1] In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace, but added that he could not consent to anything which would resemble a conference of the Powers; that would be to set up a kind of court arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburg. Herr von Jagow's language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency.[2]

In fact, a *démarche* by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be brought about by diplomatic means without assuming the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifications; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburg the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided.[3] A peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be found by gaining time.

(1) [*cf.* B. 43.]

(2) [No. 57.]

(3) [*cf.* Nos. 74, 78; B. 67.]

No. 74.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

I HAD a conversation yesterday with the Secretary of State and gave support to the *démarche* which Sir E. Goschen had just made.[4]

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the English Ambassador, that he could not accept the proposal that the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, because that would be to set up a real conference[5] to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia.

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view

(4) [*cf.* B. 43; O. 39. *cf. also* No. 81.]

(5) [*See* No. 57 and note.]

went beyond any question of form ; that what was important was the co-operation of England and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace[1] ; that this co-operation could take effect through common *démarches* at St. Petersburg and at Vienna ; that he had often expressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one another in Europe ; that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict.

[1] [*cf.* No. 73; O. 55.]

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia, and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two groups of allies in opposition.

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Serbian dispute. " The one is the consequence of the other," I said, " and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Serbia[2] to Austria which the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. " I have not yet had time,"[3] he said. " I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Serbia has yielded entirely. It appears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or to examine with Serbia the terms of her reply."

[2] [B. 39.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 92.]

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. " You must then," I replied, " act consistently. When you read the Serbian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the terms on your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be

prepared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort,[1] but that it was necessary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point.

[1] [*cf.* No. 61 ; B. 18, 43, 71.]

"For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg have been entered upon and are in progress.[2] I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful.

[2] [B. 53 ; O. 32.]

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the impression that the hour of *détente* had struck, but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken ; that he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna[3] as would hasten the progress of events, because it was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before them.

[3] [*cf.* No. 56 and note.]

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen[4] of the refusal to his proposal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another form,[5] so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to associate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of England.

[4] [B. 43.]

[5] [B. 60.]

No. 75.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me[6] to hand me a memorandum which amounted to an indictment of Serbia ; he was instructed by his Government to state that since Serbia had not given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Government, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures to induce Serbia to give the

[6] [*cf.* B. 48.]

satisfaction and guarantees that are required of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that effect.[1]

[1] [*cf.* O. 37; B. 48.]

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures contemplated by Austria, and Count Szécsen replied that they might be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point.

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Serbia had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point,[2] and that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish with a little goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who wished for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave responsibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which it was impossible to foresee.

[2] [B. 39.]

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count Szécsen handed to me.

ENCLOSURE.

Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government, handed by Count Szécsen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 1914.

[Duplicate of R. 19, vol. II., p. 199.]

No. 75 (2).

Official Communiqué of the Press Bureau.[3]

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

[3] [*cf.* Austria's Comments on Serbian Reply, R. 34.]

THE Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and presented the text of the Serbian reply.[4]

A spirit of insincerity[5] pervades the whole of this reply; it makes it clear that the Serbian Government have no serious intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the anti-Austrian intrigues. The Serbian reply contains such restrictions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian *démarche*, but also with regard to the claims advanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are without importance.

[4] [B. 39.]

[5] [*cf.* B. 32 and note.]

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Serbian territory.

In the same way, the Serbian reply to the Austrian demand that the hostile intrigues of the Press should be suppressed, amounts to a refusal.

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even been considered.

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south-east of the Monarchy, the Serbian reply is considered to be insufficient.

That the Serbian Government is aware of this, appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due[1] and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobilisation.[2]

[1] [Saturday July 25.]

[2] [*cf.* B. 32; G. 5; S. 41 and note.]

No. 76.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On board the "La France," July 28, 1914.

[3] [No. 50.] [4] [July 25.] [5] [No. 56.] [6] [No. 61.] [7] [No. 62.] I HAVE received from Copenhagen your telegram[3] summarising the events of Saturday[4]; the telegram describing the last visit of the German Ambassador[5]; that relating to the mediation which Russia advises Serbia to ask for and to the English *démarches* at Berlin,[6] as well as your telegram received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower.[7]

[8] [No. 56.] I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen[8]; the proposition which you maintained is self evident; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action has provoked the crisis.

We must now continue to use the same language to the German Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two English proposals mentioned in your telegram.[1] I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view to seeking a solution of the Austro-Serbian dispute. The action of the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above, be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert it also at Belgrade which means, in fact, between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers on the other hand to Germany, a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the *démarche* by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Serbian and without any general character.[2]

[1] [No. 61.]

[2] [*See* No. 28.]

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives with the Great Powers and to our Ministers at Belgrade.

No. 77.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France."

Paris, July 28, 1914.

IN spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris by the German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken by them to hold back Austria; the English proposal,[3] which consists in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military operations at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg, and in a meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solution of the Austro-Serbian difficulty,

[3] [B. 36.]

meets with objections at Berlin[1] of such a nature as must lead to failure.

The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures[2] to compel Serbia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they demand from that Power; Count Szécsen has given no explanation as to those measures; according to our Military Attaché at Vienna, mobilisation dating from July 28 appears to be certain.

[1] [*See* B. 43 and note.]

[2] [No. 75; O. 37; B. 48.]

No. 78.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them, and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing.

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers to which we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy and Germany, had been put forward by England, the Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or a conference,[3] which had been rejected by Austria.

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other means[4]; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation.

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure[5] on Austria, who does not wish for a conference.

[3] [*See* No. 57 and note.]

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 73, 74; B. 67.]

[5] [*cf.* No. 36 and note.]

He accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken up, alleging that she is urging Austria on ; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge[1] of the Austrian note ; she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs.

[1] [*See* No. 15 and note.]

No. 79.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.

Paris, July 28, 1914.

THROUGH the telegrams from our Embassies which I have forwarded to you, you are aware of the English proposal[2] for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our adherence[3] to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy[4] and of the reservations of Berlin.[5]

[2] [B. 36.]
[3] [No. 70.]
[4] [B. 49.]
[5] [B. 43.]

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your English colleague, who has received the necessary instructions to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the English suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same *démarche* ; you will adapt your attitude to his.

No. 80.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 28, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian[6] and German[7] colleagues. The first continued to maintain that the Serbian reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by Great Britain at St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning of the crisis, especially in her advice to the Serbian Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing

[6] [B. 48.]
[7] [B. 46.]

to give her pacific advice. He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act[1] and that Germany's help was indispensable.

[1] [*cf.* No. 56 and note.]

On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg has telegraphed[2] that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Serbian business. This information has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna,[3] who has sent the information that the first interview between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szápáry had produced a good effect at the Ballplatz.[4]

[2] [B. 55.]

[3] [B. 45.]

[4] [B. 56; *cf.* O. 25.]

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agreement could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Petersburg and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation,[5] but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof's attempt.

[5] [B 69.]

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual meeting in London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situation, the latter replied " that he had begun *pourparlers* with the Austrian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable; that, however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the revision of the Serbian note by the two Cabinets."[6] If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable, M. Sazonof declares himself ready to accept the English proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute.[7]

[6] [B. 53; O. 32.]

[7] [B. 53; O. 32.]

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna.[8] Sir E. Grey, has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his *démarche* for the moment.[9] In addition, the

[8] [B. 43.]

[9] [B. 67.]

news that Austria has just officially declared war against Serbia,[1] opens a new phase of the question.

[1] [No. 83; B. 50; S. 45.]

No. 81.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

M. SAZONOF'S conversation with Count Szápáry[2] was brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.[3] The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Government did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse with M. Schébéko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the present difficulties. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires takes a favourable view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburg enter into direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations.

[2] [*cf.* No. 54; O. 25.]

[3] [O. 26, 38.]

To-day I gave my support to the *démarche* made by my British colleague with the Secretary of State.[4] The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen,[5] that it was impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors of the four Powers,[6] and that it would be necessary to give another form to the English suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favourable result.[7]

[4] [*cf.* No. 74.]

[5] [B. 43.]

[6] [No. 57 and note.]

[7] [*cf.* No. 92; B. 71.]

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language to them as to me,[8] accepting in principle the idea of joining in a *démarche* with

[8] [B. 60.]

England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference.

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic *démarche* at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any *démarche* at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma, by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally; but to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes.[1]

[1] [*cf.* B. 84, 88.]

No. 82.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

THE Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the proposal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria is unwilling to converse."[2]

[2] [*cf.* B. 74 and note 4.]

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism.

No. 83.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

COUNT BERCHTOLD has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of

the discussion between Austria and Serbia on the basis of the Serbian reply, would be useless,[1] and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially declared[2] at mid-day.

[1] [B. 62.]

[2] [Text of declaration, B. 50.]

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the present ; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very difficult the initiation of *pourparlers* by the four Powers, as well as the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry.

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain the adherence of Germany—" Mediation between Austria and Russia,"—is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between those two Empires which does not exist up to the present.

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France,[3] in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered.

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 114, 120; B. 141.]

CHAPTER V.

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914) TO THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA (JULY 31, 1914).

No. 84.

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 29, 1914.

THE Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts for calling together a conference in London with a view to mediation should be interrupted.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 94.]

No. 85.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

[2] [*cf.* O. 53] THE Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer.[2] Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Serbian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Serbian Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the question is a local one,[3] namely, the punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees[4] that the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect

[3] [No. 28; B. 9.]

[4] [B. 93 (1) and note.]

that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the integrity of Serbia ;[1] in these circumstances the danger of war can only come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburg alone.

This sophism, which would relieve Germany from intervening at Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco-German action at St. Petersburg ;[2] it has been also expounded in London to Sir E. Grey.[3] In France, as in England, a reply was given that the St. Petersburg Cabinet have, from the beginning, given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating themselves with the Powers in advising Serbia to yield to the requirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any way threaten peace ; it is at Vienna that action must be taken ;[4] it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Serbia to exorbitant demands ; that they refuse to accept the co-operation of the Powers[5] in the discussion of the points which remain to be arranged between Austria and Serbia ; and, finally, that they do not hesitate to make a declaration of war[6] as precipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note.

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory.[7] In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safeguard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested,[8] and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna.[9] In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an *entente* which might result from direct conversations, while they are taking action against Serbia.

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the English proposal.[10] This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin[11] in order to decide Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic

(1) [B. 32 and note.]
(2) [Nos. 56, 62.]
(3) [B. 46.]
(4) [No. 56 and note.]
(5) [B. 61, 62.]
(6) [No. 83.]
(7) [*cf.* Nos. 50, 114.]
(8) [No. 77; B. 43 and note.]
(9) [No. 36 and note; B. 2.]
(10) [B. 36.]
(11) [*cf.* No. 97.]

advantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on Serbia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," conditions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandisement was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern Europe,[1] and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in the near future.

[1] [*cf.* B. 90 and note.]

No. 86.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

I AM now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and England may propose in order to maintain peace.[2] My English colleague is telegraphing to London to the same effect.

[2] [*cf.* No. 91; B. 78; O. 64.]

No. 87.

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 29, 1914.

I REPORT the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.[3]

[3] [*cf.* No. 57.]

The German Government stand "with grounded arms" ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues share this feeling.

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the country.[4]

[4] [G. 2 (encl.), 8, 15.]

No. 88.

M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Frankfort, July 29, 1914.

I NOTIFY you of important movements of troops yesterday and to-night.[1] This morning several regiments in service dress arrived here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence, which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext of preparations for the autumn manœuvres.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 89, 102, 105, 106, 114; O. 68. For Austrian military preparations *see* No. 90.]

No. 89.

M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Munich, July 29, 1914.

I AM informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all their output for the army.

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles.

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manœuvres the non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders yesterday to return immediately.[2]

[2] [*cf.* No. 88 and note.]

No. 90.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

THE French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation[3] of the 8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 91, 100, 101; O. 44. For German military preparations *see* No. 88 and note.]

been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district.

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a general mobilisation of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow.

No. 91.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

THE direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter.[1]

[1] [*cf.* B. 74 and note.]

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied themselves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on the Galician frontier.[2] As a result the order to mobilise will be despatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria.[3]

[2] [*cf.* No. 90 and note.]

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 92, 95, 100; B. 70 (1).]

In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London;[4] further, he does not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discussions, and will support all English efforts in favour of peace.[4]

[4] [*cf.* B. 78.]

No. 92.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day how the question of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, which seemed to him yesterday[5] the best means of arriving at a *détente*, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburg they seemed well disposed towards them and that he had asked

[5] [No. 81.]

Vienna[1] to take this course. He was awaiting the reply.[2] The British Government, after seeing the suggestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria and Russia,[3] and had asked Germany to urge Austria,[4] which the Imperial Government are not failing to do.[5]

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Serbian reply to Austria[6] and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. I added that it was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations one could never obtain sufficient guarantees,[7] and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a supervision which Serbia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Serbia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one, for instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria ; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply of Serbia[8] opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture.

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors.[9] He answered in the affirmative,[10] adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their influence in support of direct conversations.[11]

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to come and see him.[12] He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference ; he told him that he had not been able to accept

(1) [*cf.* B. 67, 71.]
(2) [*cf.* No. 91.]
(3) [B. 69.]
(4) [*cf.* B. 46.]
(5) [B. 67, 71.]
(6) [*cf.* No. 74.]
(7) [*cf.* B. 93 (1) and note.]
(8) [B. 39.]
(9) [*cf.* B. 78.]
(10) [*cf.* No. 97 ; B. 76.]
(11) [B. 84.]
(12) [*cf.* B. 71, which records the same conversation, though differently dated.]

a proposal which seemed to impose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my colleague of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was making to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to maintain peace or let loose war.

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmissible for her to have broken with Serbia after the reply of the latter.

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria and Russia; he knew that England looked on such conversations with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier.[1] He asked my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said.

[1] [*See* No. 91 and note.]

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky.[2] Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question,[3] and the impression produced on the German Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound.

[2] [*cf.* No. 63; B. 46, 89.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 63.]

No. 93.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

THE opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Serbia, since all attempts to avoid the collision have failed.

M. Schébéko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Petersburg by MM. Sazonof and Szápáry should be continued and made more effective by special powers[4] being conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly

[4] [*cf.* B. 56.]

refused.[1] He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Serbia.

[1] [B. 93 (1), (3).]

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict.

No. 94.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

THE following communication was semi-officially made to me this morning by the German Ambassador :[2]

[2] [*cf.* O. 55.]

"The German Government are still continuing their efforts to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly conversation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating exactly the object and extent of the operations in Serbia.[3] The Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war[4] which has occurred." A similar communication will be made at St. Petersburg.

[3] [*cf.* B. 84; W. exh. 14.]

[4] [*cf.* No. 84.]

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to intervention easier.

When I observed that the military operations which had been begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exercise any pressure,[5] but that he hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very actively.

[5] [*See* No. 36 and note.]

No. 95.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

M. ISVOLSKY came to me by order of his Government to communicate a telegram[1] addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin. It appears from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia,[2] the measures of mobilisation already taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army,[3] and finally the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg,[4] Russia had decided to mobilise in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While informing the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did not imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary ; furthermore the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

(1) [B. 70 (1) ; *cf.* No. 96.]
(2) [No. 83.]
(3) [Nos. 90, 91 ; O. 24, 47.]
(4) [B. 93 (1), (3).]

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two telegrams addressed to London by M. Sazonof : the first,[5] after pointing out that the declaration of war on Serbia put an end to the conversations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush Serbia while mediation was dragging on) ; the second[6] communicated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conversations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very disquieting, and considers that England is in a better position than the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pressure on Vienna.

(5) [B. 70 (2).]
(6) [B. 54 ; *cf.* O. 41.]

No. 96.

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 29, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia and of the measures of mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan.[1] He added that this step had no aggressive character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

[1] [No. 95.]

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Germany had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not move.[2] In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also told his English colleague that he did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make war.[3]

[2] [*cf.* No. 50; B. 32 and note.]

[3] [B. 71.]

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Serbia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Serbia or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to intervene by military measures.[4]

[4] [*See* No. 31 and note.]

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of an agreement. He thinks that England

can still exercise a great deal of influence in Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yesterday, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd,[1] in order to show him to what extent English intervention might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make representations to this effect in London."

[1] [*cf.* B. 80.]

No. 97.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

I SHOULD be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin,[2] in the form which he may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of mediation by the four Powers,[3] which had in principle obtained the adherence of the German Government.[4]

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the same desire directly to the British Government;[5] the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia,[6] her sending of troops to the Austro-Russian frontier,[7] the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician frontier[8] have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian conversations.[9]

The explanations which the German Government are going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you,[10] in order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

I would ask you also to point out to the English Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

[2] [*cf.* No. 85.]
[3] [B. 36.]
[4] [*cf.* Nos. 92, 98; B. 76; *also* B. 43 and note; O. 54.]
[5] [B. 78.]
[6] [No. 83.]
[7] [No. 91.]
[8] [B. 70 (1).]
[9] [B. 93 (3).]
[10] [No. 94.]

No. 98.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 29, 1914.

IN his interview to-day with my German colleague,[1] Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having been accepted at Vienna, it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are not directly interested.[2] This suggestion has been accepted in principle by the German Government,[3] but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lichnowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new formula.[4] Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by England, France and Italy.

(1) [B. 84; *cf.* O. 54.]

(2) [B. 36; *cf.* R. 56.]

(3) [*See* No. 97 and note.]

(4) [*See* B. 84 and note.]

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication[5] and to that of Russia concerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier[6] would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present.

(5) [*cf.* No. 108.]

(6) [B. 70 (1).]

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution.

No. 99.

M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 29, 1914.

THE Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was received, telegraphed to the Tsar to ask his

help.[1] My Russian colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply.[2]

The Tsar thanks the Prince for having turned to him at so critical a juncture; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never cease to interest herself in the fate of Serbia.

[1] [Text, O. 6.]

[2] [Text, O. 40.]

No. 100.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

THE German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will receive the order to mobilise.[3]

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been caused, on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising attitude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps are already mobilised.[4]

The tone in which Count Pourtalès delivered this communication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria.[5]

[3] [Nos. 101, 103; O. 58; B. 99; *cf.* O. 60; R. 46.]

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 90 and note, 101.]

[5] [*See* No. 91 and note.]

No. 101.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and London.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

M. ISVOLSKY came to-night to tell me that the German Ambassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Government to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease her military preparations.[6]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobilised eight army corps and had refused to arrange peacefully her differences with Serbia.[7] M. Sazonof declares that in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her

[6] [*See* No. 100 and note.]

[7] [No. 100.]

arming and consider war as imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and France without loss of time.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance.[1]

[1] [*cf.* O. 55.]

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversation entered into between the Powers which are less directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved ; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defence which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces.[2]

[2] [No. 102.]

Yesterday in the late afternoon the German Ambassador came and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of the Republic were taking,[3] adding that France was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret[4] and that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them.

[3] [*cf.* R. 45.]

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 3, 15, 105.]

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted.

No. 102.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

M. SAZONOF, to whom I communicated your desire that every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general mobilisation should be avoided,[5] answered that in the course of last night the General Staff had suspended all measures of military precaution so that there should be no misunderstanding. Yesterday the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attaché of the German

[5] [No. 101.]

Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against Austria.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 104; O. 51, 68, 77.]

Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with Count Pourtalès, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received the same impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor William.[2]

[2] [*See* app. V. (pp. 437–443).]

Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German army and navy.[3]

[3] [No. 105 and note.]

In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Russian Government are continuing none the less their efforts towards conciliation. He repeated to me: "I shall continue to negotiate until the last moment."[4]

[4] [*cf.* No. 54, *also* app. V. (vi.).]

No. 103.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

THE German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations,[5] and affirmed that Austria would not infringe the territorial integrity of Serbia:—[6]

[5] [*cf.* No. 100 and note.]

[6] [*cf.* B. 90 and note.]

"It is not only the territorial integrity of Serbia which we must safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, "but also her independence and her sovereignty. We cannot allow Serbia to become a vassal of Austria."[7]

[7] [*cf.* B. 55, 97, and notes.]

M. Sazonof added: "The situation is too serious for me not to tell you all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburg while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Serbian kingdom before Russia can come to its aid.[8] But the Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war[9] that I am going to make a new proposal[10] to you in his name:

[8] [*cf.* B. 70 (2); O. 48.]

[9] [*cf.* No. 31 and note.]

[10] [*cf.* O. 60; B. 97. *See also* Nos. 107, 112, 113.]

"If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations."*

Count Pourtalès promised to support this proposal with his Government.

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discussion by the Powers in London.

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict.

No. 104.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

IN spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his country,[1] the Vienna Press refrained from publishing the news. This enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great importance between M. Schébéko and Count Berchtold,[2] who examined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions.

[1] [B. 70 (1), 93 (2).]

[2] [*cf.* B. 96.]

M. Schébéko explained that the only object of the military preparations on the Russian side was to reply to those made by Austria,[3] and to indicate the intention and the right of the Tsar to formulate his views on the settlement of the Serbian question. The steps towards mobilisation taken in Galicia, answered Count Berchtold, have no aggressive intention[4] and are only directed towards maintaining the situation as it stands. On both sides endeavours will be made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as signs of hostility.

[3] [*cf.* No. 100, and app. V. (vi.).]

[4] [*cf.* No. 115.]

* ["Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les clauses qui portent atteinte à la souveraineté de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesser toutes mesures militaires."]

With a view to settling the Austro-Serbian dispute it was agreed that *pourparlers* should be resumed at St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry;[1] they had only been interrupted[2] owing to a misunderstanding, as Count Berchtold thought that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed that the Austrian representative should be given powers[3] which would allow him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szápáry will only be authorised to discuss what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige for which both Empires had equal concern.

[1] [*See* B. 45 and note; W., vol. II., p. 131.]
[2] [B. 93 (3).]
[3] [B. 56.]

It would therefore for the moment be in this direct form, and only between the two most interested Powers, that the discussion which Sir Edward Grey proposed[4] to entrust to the four Powers not directly interested would take place.[5]

[4] [B. 36.]
[5] [*cf.* No. 114.]

Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once declared to M. Schébéko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure. Repeating the statement he made at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would take a much broader view than was generally supposed of the demands of the Monarchy; M. Schébéko did everything to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's desire to arrive at an agreement[6] which would be acceptable to the two Empires.

[6] [*See* No. 31 and note.]

The interview was carried on in a friendly tone and gave reason for thinking that all chances of localising the dispute were not lost, when the news of the German mobilisation[7] arrived at Vienna.

[7] [*See* No. 105.]

No. 105.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

HERR VON JAGOW telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news of the German mobilisation[8] which had spread an hour before was false,[9] and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial Government is confiscating the extra editions of the papers which announced it. But

[8] [No. 104; O. 61.]
[9] [*cf.* O. 62.]

neither this communication nor these steps diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presidency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, and this explains the preparation of the special edition of the *Lokal Anzeiger*, but that from various causes (the declaration of England that she reserved her entire liberty of action,[1] the exchange of telegrams between the Tsar and William II.[2]) the serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.

[1] [B. 89.]

[2] [App. V. (pp. 437–443.]

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw Herr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered,[3] because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, had been successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the *Lokal Anzeiger*, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news calculated to cause excitement in France.

[3] [*cf.* No. 109.]

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the measures for mobilisation which can be taken before the publication of the general order of mobilisation[4] have already been taken here,[5] and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilisation first in order to attribute the responsibility to us.

[4] [*See* Nos. 3, 15; *cf.* Nos. 88, 89, 101, 102, 104.]

[5] [*cf.* B. 98.]

No. 106.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

PLEASE inform Sir E. Grey of the following facts[6] concerning French and German military preparations. England will see from this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps.

[6] [*See* B. 105 (encl. 3) and footnote thereto. *cf. also* Nos. 88, 89, 136.]

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, however, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before.

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz[1] been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Treves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.

[1] [*cf.* B. 99.]

The arming of positions on the frontier (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries and protection of railway junctions) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures.

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th;[2] in France on Tuesday, the 28th.

[2] [*cf.* No. 114.]

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation. None of these measures have been taken in France.

The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our

territory. (*L'armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes frontières; par deux fois, hier, des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire.*) The whole 16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier.

No. 107.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

THE British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's reply[1] to Sir E. Grey's request.[2] He told me that Berlin had consulted Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally.

(1) [*cf.* Nos. 108, 109.]
(2) [B. 84.]

My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von Jagow (to whom Count Pourtalès had communicated the conciliatory formula[3] suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria,[4] thus showing the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna.

(3) [No. 103.]
(4) [*cf.* No. 114.]

No. 108.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 30, 1914.

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY has not brought any reply[5] to the request addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday[6] to obtain from the German Government a formula for the intervention of the four Powers in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations of England.[7]

(5) [*cf.* Nos. 107, 109.]
(6) [No. 98; B. 84.]
(7) [*cf.* B. 87, 89; O. 65.]

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the Continent it was natural to take some precautions; that in England, as in France, there was a desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defensive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object of making any aggression.

The information which your Excellency has addressed to me on the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French frontier[1] gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression which might provoke general war.

[1] [No. 106; B. 105 (encl. 3).]

Sir E. Grey understood my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis.

No. 109.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

IN the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State, I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey, who had asked him[2] to draw up himself the formula for the intervention of the disinterested Powers.

[2] [*cf.* B. 84.]

He answered that "to gain time,"[3] he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her This answer has the effect, under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating England, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirschky, whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known,[4] the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude.

[3] [*cf.* B. 107.]

[4] [*cf.* B. 95.]

Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier;[5] he told me that this mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it.[6] He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result

[5] [B. 70 (1).]

[6] [*cf.* B. 121, 138; S. 51 and note.]

of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany.

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers,[1] and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it,[2] for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and " that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part."

(1) [No. 67.]

(2) [*cf.* No. 105.]

The impression which I received from this conversation is that the chances of peace have again decreased.

No. 110.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 31, 1914.

AT the beginning of our conversation to-day[3] Sir E. Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if England would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict became general, England would not be able to remain neutral, and especially that if France were involved England would be drawn in.

(3) [For Sir E. Grey's account, *see* B. 119.]

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their intervention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality,[4] but that before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to develop.

(4) [B. 114.]

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in

the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, England should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied.

Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be modified, and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be called together at once in order to consider it.

Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion.

According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to secure that the autograph letter[1] which the President of the Republic has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.

[1] [Text of letter and reply, vol. II., pp. 304–8.]

No. 111.

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, July 31, 1914.

THE Minister of State has just left the Legation, he has just told me that the Germans have closed the bridges over the Moselle at Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormeldange with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach over the Sûre have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow the export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars.[2]

M. Eyschen requested me—and this was the real object of his visit—to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxemburg.[3] When I asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German Government, he told

[2] [*cf.* B 147.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 128; *see also* No. 137.]

me that he was going to the German Minister to get the same declaration.

Postscript.—Up to the present no special measure has been taken by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has returned from the German Legation. He complained of the measures showing suspicion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister of State has asked the German Minister for an official declaration from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr von Buch is stated to have replied, " That is a matter of course, but it would be necessary for the French Government to give the same undertaking."

No. 112.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

THE British Ambassador has handed me a note from his Government asking the French Government to support a proposal at St. Petersburg for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Serbian conflict.

This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir E. Grey[1] of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influence on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of Belgrade and the occupation of the districts bordering on the frontier, in order to obtain a promise not to advance further,[2] while the Powers endeavoured to secure that Serbia should give sufficient satisfaction to Austria; the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she had received satisfaction.

(1) [B. 103.]

(2) [*cf.* S. 51 and note.]

Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July,[3] and expressed the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides. Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition[4] (*if Austria, recognising that her conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which endanger the principle of Serbian*

(3) [B. 88.]

(4) [No. 103.]

sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations) * cannot be modified, Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government could agree to change their formula in the following way :—[1]

[1] [*cf.* B. 103 ; O. 67.]

That the Powers would examine how Serbia should give complete satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or independence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occupying Belgrade and the neighbouring Serbian territory should declare herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to discuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, provided that the other Powers acted in the same way.

In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French Government joined in the English suggestion, and in the following terms asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburg to try to obtain, without delay, the assent of the Russian Government :—

" Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable arrangement of the Austro-Serbian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers which threaten general peace.

" The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to the Powers the duty of examining how Serbia could give full satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia

* [The wording of the Russian condition here differs slightly in form, though not in substance, from that given in despatch No. 103 (p. 369). In the original French it here runs thus :—" *Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte au principe de la souveraineté serbe, la Russie s'engage à arrêter tous préparatifs militaires.*"]

and to Austria and to provide for Serbia an acceptable means of issue from the present difficulty.

" I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence[1] without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself informed."

[1] [*See* No. 113.]

No. 113.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

THE news of the bombardment of Belgrade[2] during the night and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia. One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

[2] [*cf.* O. 77 (p. 494).]

Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to prove his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he has modified his formula,[3] as requested by the British Ambassador, in the following way :[4]

[3] [*See* No. 112.]

[4] [*cf.* B. 120; O. 67.]

" If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude."*

* [In the French original the amended formula reads :—

" *Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les grandes Puissances examinent les satisfactions que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois, sans porter atteinte à ses droits souverains et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.*"

Here also there are trifling variations of phrase from the text as given in the Russian Orange-book (O. 67), and in the British Blue-book (B. 120).]

No. 114.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

THE efforts made up till now concurrently by England and Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for every peaceful effort) with the object of a direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, or of the mediation of the four Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day; Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture [*ouverture*] made by Germany[1] since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating a formula,[2] and then modifying it[3] in accordance with the request of England; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors,[4] that English mediation will complete at London that which is being attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude,[5] caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July[6] and subsequently continued without cessation; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula, declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria before that Power had even been consulted;[7] in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war.[8]

(1) [*See* No. 112; B. 103.]

(2) [*See* No. 103.]

(3) [No. 113.]

(4) [*See* No. 104.]

(5) [*cf.* Nos. 50, 85.]

(6) [*cf.* No 106.]

(7) [*cf.* No. 107.]

(8) [*cf.* No. 159 (p. 431).]

No. 115.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

GENERAL mobilisation[1] for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1 o'clock.

My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration[2] made yesterday by Count Berchtold.

(1) [*cf.* B. 127.]

(2) [*See* No. 104.]

No. 116.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

HERR VON JAGOW sent for me and has just told me that he was very sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation[3] of the Russian army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the Empire, found herself obliged to take serious precautionary measures. What is called "Kriegsgefahrzustand" (the state of danger of war)[4] has been declared, and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and to close the frontier.

At the same time a demand is being made at St. Petersburg that they should demobilise,[5] as well on the Austrian as on the German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her side. Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been instructed to inform the French Government of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt.

(3) [*cf.* No. 117; B. 108, 112.]

(4) [*cf.* No. 117, 127; B. 112, 136; O. 73.]

(5) [*cf.* No. 117; B. 117.]

No. 117.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

THE German Government decided at mid-day to take all military measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war."[1]

[1] [*See* No. 116 and note; W. exh. 24.]

In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening, Baron von Schoen added that the Government required at the same time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany will mobilise in her turn.[2]

[2] [*cf.* B. 117; O. 70; R. 54; Y. app. V. (vii.).]

I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information at all about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and navy[3] which the German Government invoked as the reason for the new military measures which they are taking to-day.

[3] [*See* No. 116 and note.]

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia.[4] He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock.[5]

[4] [*cf.* No. 125; W., vol. II., p. 135 and exh. 25; R. 54. *Also* B. 87, 105.]

I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

[5] [*cf.* No. 125.]

I ask you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis.[6]

[6] [*cf.* No. 31 and note; app. V. (vi.).]

No. 118.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

AS a result of the general mobilisation of Austria[7] and of the measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously,

[7] [No. 115.]

by Germany for the last six days,[1] the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian army has been given,[2] Russia not being able, without most serious danger, to allow herself to be further out-distanced; really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany.

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilisation[3] into a general mobilisation.[4]

[1] [*cf.* No. 106 and note.]
[2] [*cf.* R.52.]
[3] [No. 91.]
[4] [B. 113.]

No. 119.

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

L'AGÉNCE HAVAS having announced that the state "of danger of war"[5] had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I could assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect the neutrality of Belgium.[6]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of the King had always thought that this would be so, and thanked me.[7] The Russian Minister and the British Minister, whom I saw subsequently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the English Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey.

[5] [*See* No. 116.]
[6] [*cf.* No. 122; B. 125.]
[7] [G. 9, 15.]

CHAPTER VI.

DECLARATION OF WAR BY GERMANY ON RUSSIA (SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, AT 7.10 P.M.); AND ON FRANCE (MONDAY, AUGUST 3, AT 6.45 P.M.).

No. 120.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

TWO *démarches* were made yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors—the one at Paris, which was rather vague, the other at St. Petersburg, precise and conciliatory.

(1) [*cf.* No. 125; B. 137; O. 73.]

Count Szécsen came to explain[1] to me that the Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Serbia; that it also repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the war remains localised to Austria and Serbia, as a European war would open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations, gave me to understand that if his Government could not answer the questions of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would certainly answer Serbia, or any single Power asking for these conditions in the name of Serbia. He added that a step in this direction was perhaps still possible.

(2) [*cf.* Nos. 121, 125, 135; B. 131, 133; O. 73; R. 56.]

At St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Serbia.[2] The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the

pourparlers should take place in London with the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the English Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her operations in Serbia.

The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Government is ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the English proposal.

Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany. This Power has in fact presented an ultimatum[1] giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria; this time-limit expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the English proposal[2] which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the Powers.

[1] [No. 121; B. 117; O. 70; Y. app. V. (vii.).]

[2] [No. 113.]

The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war.[3] And she wishes for it against France. Yesterday when Herr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay[4] to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct dispute between France and Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used all our efforts for a peaceful solution and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the President of the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough to make arrangements as to him personally (*des dispositions pour sa propre personne*); we know also that he has already put the archives of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations[5] without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed with Russia to begin negotiations.

[3] [*cf.* B. 141 and note.]

[4] [No. 117.]

[5] [*cf.* B. 126.]

No. 121.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

MY Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had explained that his Government was ready to discuss the note to Serbia with the Russian Government even as to its basis ;[1] M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these conversations should take place in London.

[1] [*cf.* No. 120 and note ; B. 131, 133; O. 73.]

The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The question may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia.[2]

[2] [*cf.* No. 127 ; B. 134.]

My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity.[3] The latter answered that the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against Austria ; my British colleague was much astonished at this, and said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point.

[3] [B. 121.]

Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg,[4] is characteristic of her warlike policy.

[4] [*cf.* No. 125 ; B. 126.]

In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria ; in these circumstances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals were prepared for conversations,[5] it is impossible to understand why Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she desired war on her own account.

[5] [No. 120.]

No. 122.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to the French Minister at Brussels.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Government,[1] came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany.

[1] [B. 114.]

I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had repeatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect their neutrality.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 119, 126; B. 125.]

It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself brought to enter Belgian territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaranteeing Power.

No. 123.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

THE British Ambassador has been instructed by his Government[3] to make to the German Government a communication identical with that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of Belgium.

[3] [B. 114.]

Herr von Jagow answered[4] that he would take the instructions of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an answer could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military plans in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow to-morrow afternoon.

[4] [B. 122.]

No. 124.

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, August 1, 1914.

I WENT to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half-past eight, in order to get precise information from

him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the results which they may have.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform them as to their intentions ;[1] Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours.

[1] [No. 120.]

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what were the intentions of the Italian Government.

The Marquis di San Giuliano answered[2] that as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy would not be able to take part in the war.

[2] [*cf.* No. 159 (p. 431); B. 152.]

No. 125.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE German Ambassador came to see me again[3] at 11 o'clock this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the *pourparlers* which have been carried on since yesterday :—[4]

[3] [*cf.* No. 117; O. 74.]

[4] [No. 120; B. 137.]

(1) An English compromise, proposing, besides other suggestions, suspension of military preparations on the part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way ; adherence of Russia to this proposal.

(2) Communications from the Austrian Government declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement

in Serbia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were ready to discuss *even the basis*[1] of the Austro-Serbian question at London with the other Powers.

[1] [No. 120 and note.]

I drew attention to the attitude of Germany[2] who, abandoning all *pourparlers*, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment[3] when this Power had just accepted the English formula (which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the countries which have mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France.

[2] [No. 120.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 121].

Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a "glimmer of hope" for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace.

Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France[4] in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful.

[4] [No. 117 and note.]

It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her.

No. 126.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris,[1] *August* 1, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY said to me that, at a meeting this morning, the Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had asked England to give a declaration of neutrality and had not obtained it, the British Government remained masters of their action ;[2] this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses.

In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to England. France has immediately renewed her engagement to respect it.[3] Germany has explained "that she was not in a position to reply." Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession of this answer and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday[4] in the House of Commons,[5] that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.[6]

In the second place, the English fleet is mobilised,* and Sir Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues[7] that he should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet,[8] or, if the German fleet should pass through (*venaient à le passer*), will oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of intervening in time.

(1) [Clearly should be "London."]

(2) [*cf.* B. 101.]

(3) [No. 122 ; B. 125.]

(4) [Aug. 3.]

(5) [*See* vol. II., pp. 412 *sqq.*]

(6) [*cf.* B. 153.]

(7) [*cf.* No. 137.]

(8) [*See* No. 137 and note.]

No. 127.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

WE are warned through several channels that the German and the Austrian Governments are trying at this moment

* [The British Naval Reserves were called out by Royal Proclamation on Sunday, Aug. 2. *cf.* M. Viviani's speech, p. 427 ; *also* B. 47, 48.]

to influence England by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if it breaks out, will fall on Russia.[1] Efforts are being made to obtain the neutrality of England by disguising the truth.[2]

France has not ceased in co-operation with England to advise moderation at St. Petersburg; this advice has been listened to.[3]

From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Serbia[4] to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were not incompatible with her sovereignty.

He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria;[5] this was fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to allow those Powers which are less interested to seek for means of composing the dispute.[6]

In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify the first formula[7] which he had put forward, and he has drawn up a second[8] which is shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count Szécsen made yesterday to M. de Margerie.* Count Szécsen affirms[9] that Austria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Serbia. He expressly adds that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar.

It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's suggestion, M. Sazonof's formula, and the Austrian declaration could easily be reconciled.

France is determined, in co-operation with England, to work to the very end for the realisation of this.

But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in the negotiations showed a goodwill which cannot be disputed, Austria was the first to proceed to a general mobilisation.[10]

Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria,[11] so as not to be left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has continued ready to negotiate.

It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are concerned, we will, in co-operation with England, continue to work for the success of these *pourparlers*.

But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely

(1) [*cf.* No. 121; B. 134; S. 51 and note.]

(2) [*cf.* B. 85.]

(3) [*cf.* B. 55, 118.]

(4) [No. 36.]

(5) [B. 53.]

(6) [B. 78.]

(7) [No. 103.]

(8) [No. 113.]

(9) [No. 120.]

(10) [No. 115.]

(11) [No. 118.]

* [Directeur des Affaires Politiques.]

compulsory for us to make out the order for mobilisation[1] to-day.

Last Wednesday,[2] well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Schoen announced to me the impending publication of *Kriegsgefahrzustand*.[3] This measure has been taken by Germany, and under the protection of this screen, she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word.[4]

To-day M. Paléologue telegraphed that Count Pourtalès had notified the Russian Government of German mobilisation.

Information which has been received by the Ministry of War confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution.

Our decree of mobilisation[5] is then an *essential measure* of protection. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation[6] signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.

Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any act of provocation.

I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, English opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the interest of the future of the European balance of power.

(1) [*cf.* No. 136; O. 74.]

(2) [July 29.]

(3) [*cf.* No. 116 and note.]

(4) [*cf.* B. 136; O. 73.]

(5) [*See* first Military vol.]

(6) [*See* vol. II., p. 468.]

No. 128.

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, August 1, 1914.

THE Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Government an assurance of neutrality[7] similar to

(7) [*cf.* No. 111. Reply, No. 129.]

that which has been given to Belgium.[1] M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard to the Grand Duchy.

This is the reason why he has abstained from making a request direct to the Government of the Republic. As the Chamber of Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer by that date; a similar *démarche* is being made at the same time with the German Minister[2] at Luxemburg.

[1] [No. 122; *see also* No. 137.]

[2] [No. 111.]

No. 129.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

BE good enough to state to the President of the Council that in conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867,[3] the Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg,[4] as they have shown by their attitude.

The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests.

[3] [*See* vol. II., p. 489.]

[4] [*See* No. 128; *also* No. 156 (encl. I.).]

No. 130.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

SPECIAL editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and the navy has been decreed[5] and that the first day of the mobilisation is Sunday, 2nd August.

[5] [*cf.* B. 142; W., vol. II., p. 135.]

No. 131.

M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[Duplicate of B. 147.]

No. 132.

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

THE Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just received, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a telegram from Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against this country, but are solely measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army.[1] Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 131, 133, 140; B. 129.]

No. 133.

Note handed in by the German Ambassador.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not constitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely preventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, are under German administration.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 131, 132, 140; B. 129.]

No. 134.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, August 2, 1914.

YESTERDAY at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war[1] by his Government; he will leave St. Petersburg to-day.

[1] [Text, O. 76.]

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instructions from his Government as to the declaration of war.

No. 135.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Representatives of France abroad.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany has just declared war on Russia,[2] notwithstanding the negotiations which are proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary was agreeing to discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Serbia.[3]

[2] [No. 134.]

[3] [*cf.* No. 120 and note.]

No. 136.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

THIS morning, French territory was violated by German troops[4] at Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.[5]

[4] [Protest, No. 139.]

[5] [No. 131; B. 147.]

You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that the German Government is committing itself to

acts of war against France without provocation on our part, or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilometres which we have maintained,[1] even since the mobilisation, between our troops and the frontier.

[1] [*See* No. 106 and note.]

No. 137.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 2, 1914.

AFTER the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning,[2] Sir Edward Grey made the following declaration[3] to me:—

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 126, 143, 145.]

[3] [*See* B. 148; *also* Sir E. Grey, Aug. 3, vol. II., p. 407. *cf.* Nos. 143, 159 (p. 430).]

"I am authorised to give an assurance * that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that of Luxemburg,[4] the Secretary of State reminded me that the Convention of 1867,[5] referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium,[6] in that England was bound to require the observance of this latter Convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert.

[4] [*cf.* Nos. 111, 128; B. 148.]

[5] [*See* vol. II., p. 489.]

[6] [*See* vol. II., p. 487.]

* [From a comparison of the documents indicated in the margin it would seem that the assurance given to the French Government existed in two versions. The phraseology in this despatch agrees with that in Sir E. Grey's telegram of the same date to the British Ambassador at Paris (B. 148) and with that which he used in the House of Commons on August 3 (vol. II., p. 407). The other version is found in M. Paul Cambon's despatch of August 3 (Y. 143), and in M. Viviani's speech of August 4 in the Chamber of Deputies (Y. 159, p. 430). It would thus appear that, while Sir E. Grey employed one form of words in Parliament, M. Viviani supposed him to have employed the other.]

The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important that England will regard its violation by Germany as a *casus belli*.[1] It is a specially English interest and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the business world in which German influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing itself against Germany.

[1] [*cf.* B. 101, 123 and note.]

No. 138.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

I NOTE the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th,[2] 30th,[3] 31st[4] July and the 1st August,[5] and in that which you have sent to me to-day.[6]

In communicating to the Chambers[7] the declaration which Sir Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in your last telegram,[8] I will add that in it we have obtained from Great Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us.

In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be supported by the English fleet in the Atlantic[9] as well as in the North Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that English ports could not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet.

[2] [*Query*, "29th"; *see* No. 98.]
[3] [No. 108.]
[4] [No. 110.]
[5] [No. 126.]
[6] [No. 137.]
[7] [No. 159, p. 430.]
[8] [No. 137.]
[9] [No. 143.]

No. 139.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

GERMAN troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier[10] at several points I request you immediately to protest[11] in writing to the German Government. You will

[10] [No. 136.]
[11] [*See* No. 155, p. 406.]

be good enough to take as your text the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German Ambassador :—

" The French administrative and military authorities in the eastern district have just reported several acts which I have instructed the Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government.

" The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belfort ; on two occasions the French Customs station in this locality has been fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier this morning and advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron, more than ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who commanded the first has blown out the brains of a French soldier. The German cavalry carried off some horses which the French mayor of Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants of the commune to lead the said horses.

" The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been instructed to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government against acts which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by German troops in arms, and which are not justified by anything in the present situation. The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility for these acts."

No. 140.

M. Marcelin Pellet, French Minister at the Hague, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, August 3, 1914.

THE German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Germany was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg,[1] adding that he would have a fresh communication to make to him to-day. He has now this morning announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an occupation of that country by France.

[1] [*cf.* No. 132 and note.]

No. 141.

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

YESTERDAY evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian Government an ultimatum[1] stating that his Government, having learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the districts of Givet and of Namur, were compelled to take steps, the first of which was to invite the Belgian Government to inform them, within seven hours,* if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in Belgium against France. In case of refusal the fortune of war would decide.

(1) [G. 20.]

The Government of the King answered[2] that the information as to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been given by France, and were still quite recent ; that Belgium, which since the establishment of her Kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of her territory from whatever quarter it may come : and that, supposing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the Powers, and notably by the King of Prussia.[3]

(2) [G. 22.]

(3) [*See* vol. II., p. 487.]

No. 142.

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

TO the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the guarantee of the Powers against the violation

* [This should be " twelve hours." The authority of G. 23 and G. 24 is conclusive. It is confirmed by B. 153 and by the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons on August 3 and 4 ; *see* vol. II., p. 418.]

of her neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered :—[1]

[1] [*cf.* G. 24 ; B. 151.]

" It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. At a later date[2] the Government of the King will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take."

[2] [*See* G. 40.]

No. 143.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 3, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has authorised me to inform you that you could state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations would be as follows :—[3]

[3] [*See* No. 137 and footnote.]

" In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the English fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way that from that moment England and Germany would be in a state of war."

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.[4]

[4] [*cf.* No. 138.]

The declaration concerning the intervention of the English fleet must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French Government were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of this.

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic communication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium.[5] I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey.

[5] [*cf.* Nos. 141, 142.]

No. 144.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 3, 1914.

JUST as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of England did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.

The German Ambassador has sent to the Press a *communiqué* * saying that if England remained neutral Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a *point d'appui*. My answer is that respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality.

No. 145.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 3, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has made the statement[1] regarding the intervention of the English fleet. He has explained, in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality;[2] and the reading of a letter[3] from King Albert asking for the support of England has deeply stirred the House.[4]

[1] [Vol. II., p 407.]

[2] [*id.*, pp. 412 *sqq.*]

[3] [Text, G. 25.]

[4] [Vol. II., p. 411.]

* [This *communiqué* appeared in *The Times* of August 4 in the following form:—

"The German Embassy in London yesterday authorised the statement that the ultimatum to Belgium contained a declaration that if for strategical reasons German troops marched through Belgian territory this should not be considered by the Belgian Government in any way as a warlike measure directed against themselves. It must be considered only as a necessity imposed by French initiative. In the event of German troops invading the country Belgian territory would be safeguarded and full compensation given for any damage done. There was no intention whatever to interfere with Belgian sovereignty or with her territory unless there was an intention of using any of the Belgian ports for warlike purposes."]

The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for ; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Government, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more and more in our favour.

No. 146.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I AM told that the German Ambassador is said to have stated to the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France.

Be good enough urgently to contradict this news which is pure invention,[1] and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning.

[1] [*cf.* Nos. 148, 159 (pp. 426–7).]

No. 147.

Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his farewell audience, August 3, 1914, *at* 6.45 *p.m.*

M. LE PRÉSIDENT,

THE German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts[2] committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

[2] [Denied, Nos. 146, 148, 159 (p. 427).]

I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

At the same time I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany,[1] with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

(Signed) SCHOEN.

[1] [*See* No. 159, opening sentence.]

No. 148.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad.

Paris, August 3, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has asked for his passports[2] and is leaving this evening with the staffs of the Embassy, the German Consulate General and the Bavarian Legation. Baron von Schoen has given as his reason the establishment by the German administrative and military authorities of acts of hostility which are said to have been committed by French military aviators accused of having flown over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. "In the presence of these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von Schoen, "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power."

[2] [No. 147.]

I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations[3] of the Ambassador, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed to him a note[4] protesting against the flagrant violations of the French frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops.

[3] [*cf.* Nos. 146, 155 (p. 406), 159 (p. 427).]

[4] [No. 139.]

No. 149.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.)

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I REQUEST you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at once with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the charge of French interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador.[1] I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg;[2] against the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German Minister at Brussels[3] to force upon them the violation of Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies,[4] by which he has attempted to justify the state of war which he declares[5] henceforth exists between Germany and France.

[1] [*cf.* No. 155 (p. 408); G. 33, 34.]
[2] [No. 131.]
[3] [No. 141.]
[4] [No. 141; G. 20, 22.]
[5] [No. 147.]

No. 150.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich.

Paris, August 3, 1914.

BE good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich.

No. 151.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade.

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I LEARN from an official Belgian source that German troops have violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich[6] in the district of Verviers.

[6] [Error for "Gemmenich." *cf.* G. 30; B. 159.]

No. 152.

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

THE Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends me a letter[1] by which "the Government of the King declare that they are firmly decided to resist the aggression of Germany by all means in their power. Belgium appeals[2] to England, France and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of her territory.

"There would be a concerted and common action having as its object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future."

"Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the defence of her fortified places."

[1] [*cf.* Mr. Asquith, vol. II., p. 420.]

[2] [G. 40; *also* vol. II., p. 421.]

No. 153.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 4, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has asked me to come and see him immediately in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a statement[3] in the House of Commons that Germany had been invited to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her answer to England before 12 o'clock to-night.[4]

[3] [*See* vol. II., p. 420.]

[4] [*See* B. 159.]

No. 154.

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

THIS morning the German Minister informs the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the

refusal[1] of the Belgian Government the Imperial Government find themselves compelled to carry out by force of arms[2] those measures of protection which are rendered indispensable by the French threats.

[1] [*See* No. 141.]

[2] [*cf.* G. 27; B. 154.]

No. 155.

M. Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Copenhagen, August 6, 1914.

THE French Ambassador at Berlin[3] asks me to communicate to your Excellency the following telegram :—

[3] [British Ambassador's departure, B. 160; French Minister's expulsion from Belgium, No. 156.]

" I have been sent to Denmark by the German Govern-
" ment. I have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accom-
" panied by all the staff of the Embassy and the Russian
" Chargé d'Affaires at Darmstadt with his family." The treatment which we have received is of such a nature that I have thought it desirable to make a complete report on it to your Excellency by telegram.

[4] [No. 139.]

On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, in accordance with your instructions,[4] addressed to Herr von Jagow a protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Coblenz, by French aviators, who according to his statement " had come from Belgium."[5] I answered that I had not the slightest information as to the facts to which he attached so much importance and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious ;[6] on my part I asked him if he had read the note[7] which I had addressed to him with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detachments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a French soldier whom he had met there. After having given my opinion of this act I added : " You will admit that under no circumstances could there be any comparison between this and the

[5] [*See* No. 147.]

[6] [*cf.* No. 148.]

[7] [*See* No. 139.]

flight of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons animated by that spirit of individual courage by which aviators are distinguished.

"An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbour by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an importance of quite a different nature."

Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was difficult for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled with the feelings which animated our troops found themselves face to face on either side of the frontier.

At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser Platz in front of the Embassy and whom we could see through the window of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts against France.[1] I asked the Secretary of State when all this would come to an end.

[1] [*cf.* B. 160 (p. 211).]

"The Government has not yet come to a decision," Herr von Jagow answered. "It is probable that Herr von Schoen will receive orders to-day to ask for his passports[2] and then you will receive yours." The Secretary of State assured me that I need not have any anxiety with regard to my departure, and that all the proprieties would be observed with regard to me as well as my staff. We were not to see one another any more and we took leave of one another after an interview which had been courteous and could not make me anticipate what was in store for me.

[2] [*See* No. 147.]

Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my wish to make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would be the last opportunity that I should have of seeing him.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to carry out this intention as this interview would serve no purpose and could not fail to be painful.

At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought me my passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to the wish which I expressed to him that I should be permitted to travel by Holland or Belgium. He suggested to me that I should go either by way of Copenhagen, although he could not assure me a free passage by sea, or through Switzerland *via* Constance.

I accepted this last route; Herr von Langwerth having asked me to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed,

in consideration of the necessity I was under of making arrangements with the Spanish Ambassador, who was undertaking the charge of our interests,[1] that I should leave on the next day, the 4th August, at 10 o'clock at night.

[1] [No. 149.]

At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, Herr von Lancken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, came from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me to request the staff of my Embassy to cease taking meals in the restaurants. This order was so strict that on the next day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse to the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to send our meals to the Embassy.

At 11 o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von Langwerth came back to tell me that his Government would not allow our return by way of Switzerland under the pretext that it would take three days and three nights to take me to Constance. He announced that I should be sent by way of Vienna. I only agreed to this alteration under reserve, and during the night I wrote the following letter to Herr von Langwerth :—

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

"M. LE BARON,

"I HAVE been thinking over the route for my return to my country about which you came to speak to me this evening. You propose that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of finding myself detained in that town, if not by the action of the Austrian Government, at least owing to the mobilisation which creates great difficulties similar to those existing in Germany as to the movements of trains.

"Under these circumstances I must ask the German Government for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian Government will send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss Government will not close its frontier either to me or to the persons by whom I am accompanied, as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed to foreigners.

"I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country.

"JULES CAMBON."

In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the 4th August, Herr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to this effect.

At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate at Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had been requested, was released after four hours.

I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a quarter to five, Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the evening, but that I should be taken to Denmark. On this new requirement I asked if I should be confined in a fortress supposing I did not comply. Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would return to receive my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give the German Government the pretext for saying that I had refused to depart from Germany. I therefore told Herr von Langwerth when he came back that I would submit to the order which had been given to me but "that I protested."

I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following is a copy :—

"*Berlin, August* 4, 1914.

"SIR,

"MORE than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesy, would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me every means of getting back to it quickly.

"Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am nothing but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Langwerth that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities

would give me all possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland would not be closed to me. Herr von Langwerth has been good enough to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was necessary.

" It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just announced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of the present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to take me to England, and it is this consideration which made me reject this proposal, with the approval of Herr von Langwerth.

" In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining that the rules of international courtesy should be observed towards me, but I hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner in which I am being treated.

" JULES CAMBON."

Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey would not be made direct but by way of Schleswig. At 10 o'clock in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of a great assembly of foot and mounted police.

At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only represented by an officer of inferior rank.

The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accompanied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alexandra Regiment of the Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut and the curtains of the carriages drawn down ; each of us had to remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage before the door of each of our compartments which were kept open, revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, the women and children and everyone were subjected to the same treatment.

At the last German station about 11 o'clock at night, Major von Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the following letter to Herr von Jagow.

" *Wednesday Evening, August* 5, 1914.

" SIR,

" YESTERDAY before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany.

" To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to the interference of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they went further.

" They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the corridors of the carriages at the door of each compartment and facing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the trigger, for nearly half an hour.

" I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence to the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, violence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yesterday I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was being treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as a dangerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey, which from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were travelling with me to the frontier.

" JULES CAMBON."

I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly afterwards Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not pay the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had not been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest Berlin banks.

This facility was refused me. With the help of my companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was required from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75 pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present rate of exchange.*

After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman that we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me, and I required that the policeman who was with us should accompany us.

In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the Danish Government had had a train made ready to take us to Copenhagen.

I am assured that my English colleague and the Belgian Minister, although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route to Holland.[1] I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Denmark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I succeed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested at sea with the officials who accompany me.

[1] [*See* B. 160; G. 45.]

I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of the Embassy has given unceasing proof during the course of this crisis. I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services which on this occasion have been rendered to the Government of the Republic, in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and by the Military and Naval Attachés.

No. 156.

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 4, 1914.

THE Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morning, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past eight o'clock, in order to notify me[2] that the German military authorities required my departure.[3] On my answering that I

[2] [Enclosure III.]

[3] [*cf.* Belgian Minister's departure, G. 66.]

* Subsequently the sum thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to the Spanish Ambassador to be repaid to the French Ambassador.

would only give way to force M. Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and it was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this communication which cost him so much, for it was just because force was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was going to bring me written proof of this.

I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which I had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked him to be good enough to undertake their protection; this he promised to do.

Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (Enclosure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the declaration which I had made the evening before, according to telegraphic instructions of M. Viviani.[1] [1] [No. 129.]

About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Legation and left me, with a short note from himself, a certified copy of the letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on the subject of my departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures II. and III.)

At the same time he told me that he had informed Herr von Buch that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the protection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my German colleague, who advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this responsibility to the Belgian Minister. I explained to the Minister of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess and as my country was not in a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances clearly indicated that it should be the Luxemburg Government which should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen did not insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to him.

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as he said, would not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German military authorities against the French. I answered that I attached too much value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it and that he had nothing to fear.

My departure, which was required to take place as soon

as possible, was fixed for two o'clock; it was at the same time understood that I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M. Eyschen told me that the German Minister was at that very moment at the German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take care that I received it in good time.

At a quarter past two the Minister of State accompanied by M. Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the Chancery.

He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Mamers and Arlon roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car.

I then left the Legation and made my way to Arlon by the road which had been determined on, but I did not meet anyone.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my post (Enclosure IV.).

ENCLOSURE I.

M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Luxemburg.

SIR, *Luxemburg, August* 4, 1914.

(1) [*cf.* No. 129.] IN an oral communication made yesterday evening,(1) your Excellency has had the goodness to bring to my know-
(2) [Vol. II., p. 489.] ledge that in accordance with the Treaty of London of 1867,(2) the Government of the Republic intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the violation of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind as to compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by the care for her defence and her interests.

You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the Government of the Republic is based solely on the
(3) [No. 131; B. 147.] act of a third Power(3) for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible.

The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact.

The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions.

I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally fulfilled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue of the Treaty of 1867.

I remain, etc.,

EYSCHEN,

Minister of State, President of the Government.

ENCLOSURE II.

Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.

SIR,

A SHORT time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in Luxemburg.

As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in writing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this matter.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment received from the German Minister.

He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be no want of the respect due to your position and person.

Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret and my deep regard.

EYSCHEN.

ENCLOSURE III.

To His Excellency the Minister of State, Dr. Eyschen.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

IN accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good

enough to request the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in the last extremity of proceeding to his arrest.

I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to receive the assurance of my deepest regard.

VON BUCH.

ENCLOSURE IV.

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government of Luxemburg.

SIR, *Luxemburg, August* 4, 1914.

I HAVE just received your communication and I submit to force.

Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the fortunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection, and to watch over the safety of their lives and goods.

At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of the Legation and the offices of the Chancery.

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess the expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having been able myself to express them to her.

In thanking you for all the marks of sympathy which you have given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard.

ARMAND MOLLARD.

No. 157.

Notification du Gouvernement français aux Représentants des Puissances à Paris.

Le Gouvernement impérial allemand, après avoir laissé ses forces armées franchir la frontière et se livrer sur le territoire

français à divers actes de meurtre et de pillage ; après avoir violé la neutralité du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, au mépris des stipulations de la Convention de Londres du 11 mai 1867 et de la Convention V de la Haye du 18 octobre 1907, *sur les droits et devoirs des puissances et des personnes en cas de guerre sur terre* (articles I et II), conventions signées de lui ; après avoir adressé un ultimatum au Gouvernement royal de Belgique tendant à exiger le passage des forces allemandes par le territoire belge, en violation des Traités du 19 avril 1839, également signés de lui et de la susdite Convention de La Haye

A déclaré la guerre à la France le 3 août 1914, à 18 heures 45.

Le Gouvernement de la République se voit, dans ces conditions, obligé, de son côté, de recourir à la force des armes.

Il a, en conséquence, l'honneur de faire savoir, par la présente, au Gouvernement de . . . que l'état de guerre existe entre la France et l'Allemagne à dater du 3 août 1914, 18 h. 45.

Le Gouvernement de la République proteste auprès de toutes les nations civilisées et spécialement auprès des Gouvernements signataires des Conventions et Traités susrappelés, contre la violation par l'Empire allemand de ses engagements internationaux ; il fait toutes réserves quant aux représailles qu'il pourrait se voir amener à exercer contre un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole donnée.

Le Gouvernement de la République qui entend observer les principes du droit des gens, se conformera, durant les hostilités et sous réserve de réciprocité, aux dispositions des Conventions internationales signées par la France, concernant le droit de la guerre sur terre et sur mer.

La présente notification, faite en conformité de l'article 2 de la III[e] Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, et remise à . . .

A Paris, le 4 août 1914, à 14 heures.

(TRANSLATION.)

Notification by the French Government to the Representatives of the Powers at Paris.

THE German Imperial Government, after having allowed its armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of murder and pillage on French territory ;[1] after [1] [No. 139.]

having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg[1] in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May, 1867,[2] and of Convention V. of the Hague, 18th October, 1907, *on the rights and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land* (Articles 1 and 2),* Conventions which have been signed by the German Government; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Government of Belgium[3] with the object of requiring passage for German troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839,[4] which had been signed by them, and in violation of the above Convention of the Hague

Have declared war on France[5] at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August, 1914.

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms.

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these presents the Government of . . . that a state of war exists between France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August, 1914.

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised nations, and especially those Governments which have signed the Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted word.

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law of war on land and sea.[6]

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2† of the Third Convention of the Hague of the 18th October, 1907, relating to the opening of hostilities and handed to . . .

Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 *p.m.*

(1) [No. 131; B. 147.]

(2) [*See* vol. II., p. 489.]

(3) [G. 20.]

(4) [*See* vol. II., p. 487.]

(5) [No. 147.]

(6) [*See* first Military and first Naval vols.]

* [Art. 1: "The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable."
Art. 2: "Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power."]

† [Art. 2: "The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay," etc.]

No. 158.

Message from M. Poincaré, President of the Republic, read at the Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914.

(*Journal Officiel of the 5th August, 1914.*)

(*The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the message.*)

"GENTLEMEN,

"FRANCE has just been the object of a violent and premeditated attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been violated.[1] The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening[2] to give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had already created.

[1] [No. 136.]

[2] [No. 147.]

"For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation.

"They have given to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity.

"Since the ultimatum of Austria[3] opened a crisis which threatened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and moderation.

[3] [B. 4.]

"To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word, which has not been peaceful and conciliatory.

"At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right, in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to the last moment, supreme efforts to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. (*Unanimous and repeated applause.*)

"On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were publicly expressing our hope[4] of seeing negotiations which had been begun under the auspices of the London

[4] [*See* Nos. 120, 121.]

Cabinet carried to a peaceful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia,[1] she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg,[2] she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation[3] (*loud and unanimous applause*), our neighbour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (*Fresh and repeated unanimous applause.*)

[1] [No. 134.]
[2] [No. 131; B. 147.]
[3] [G. 20.]

"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was prepared; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodically completed.

"Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies with her maternal thought (*loud applause*) has risen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. (*Unanimous and repeated applause.*)

"The President of the Republic interpreting the unanimous feeling of the country, expresses to our troops by land and sea the admiration and confidence of every Frenchman.[4] (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

[4] [*See* first Military vol.]

"Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthusiasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and is the best guarantee of victory. (*Applause.*)

"In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals. (*Loud and unanimous applause.*)

"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith. (*Loud and prolonged applause and cries of 'Vive la France.'*)

"She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (*loud and unanimous applause*); she is supported by the loyal friendship of England. (*Loud and unanimous applause.*)

"And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day

once again she stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason (*loud and repeated applause*) 'Haut les cœurs et vive la France!' (*Unanimous and prolonged applause.*)

No. 159.

Speech delivered by M. René Viviani, President of the Council, in the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.

(*Journel Officiel, August 5, 1914.*)

M. René Viviani, *President of the Council.*

GENTLEMEN,

THE German Ambassador yesterday[1] left Paris after notifying us[2] of the existence of a state of war.

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events[3] which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calculated unexpectedness.

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began[4] before we were notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and before the opinion of the civilised world.

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro-Hungarian Heir-Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives,[5] difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular[6] which the Press has published.

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum[7] delivered the evening before to Serbia by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous Serbian subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the official Serbian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It demanded a reply from Serbia by 6 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25th.

(1) [Monday Aug. 3.]
(2) [No. 147.]
(3) [*cf.* B., Introductory Narrative (p. 27 *sqq.*)]
(4) [No. 136.]
(5) [June 28, 1914.]
(6) [R. 8.]
(7) [B. 4.]

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them, without doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwithstanding their excessive character, Serbia, on July 25th, declared[1] that she submitted to them almost without reserve.

[1] [B. 39.]

This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary, a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not unconnected with the advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Russia and Great Britain.[2]

[2] [*See* No. 36.]

The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro-Hungarian demands had been concealed from the Chanceries of the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an assurance that their claims would be extremely moderate.[3]

[3] [Nos. 20, 55; *cf.* S. 52 (vol. II., p. 116).]

It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg and London learned on 26th July that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination, declared that the Serbian reply was inacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations.[4]

[4] [B. 23.]

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the 24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs a *note verbale*[5] asserting that the Austro-Serbian dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the great Powers, or otherwise "incalculable consequences" were to be feared. A similar *démarche* was made on Saturday, the 25th, at London[6] and at St. Petersburg.[7]

[5] [No. 28.]

[6] [On Friday, the 24th, *see* B. 9.]

[7] [*cf.* O. 8.]

Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Serbia to submit?

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the German *démarche*, we immediately, in agreement with our allies and our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to join in it.[8]

[8] [*cf.* Nos. 34, 36, 41.]

We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin.

Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling[9] to give to

[9] [No. 36.]

Austria-Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right to offer, but from this moment and still more in the following days, she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the compromises suggested by the other Powers.

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.[1] This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement of Serbia.

[1] [No. 83; B. 50.]

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the independence of a brave people, but the balance of power in the Balkans, embodied in the Treaty of Bukarest of 1913, and consecrated by the moral support of all the great Powers.

However, at the suggestion of the British Government, with its constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the peace of Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately, the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them.[2]

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 85, 86.]

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action by the four Powers,[3] England, France, Germany and Italy, which was intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring about an equitable adjustment of the dispute.

[3] [B. 36.]

On Wednesday, the 29th, the Russian Government, noting the persistent failure of these efforts and faced by the Austrian mobilisation[4] and declaration of war,[5] fearing the military destruction of Serbia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.[6]

[4] [No. 100; O. 51.]
[5] [No. 83.]
[6] [No. 95; B. 70 (1).]

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to inform the German Government that their measures, restricted as they were and without any offensive character towards Austria, were not in any degree directed against Germany.[7]

[7] [B. 93 (2).]

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this without demur.

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with the adherence of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria and Serbia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof.

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become a certainty.

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July Germany, by proclaiming "a state of danger of war,"[1] cut the communications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could justify.

[1] [No. 116.]

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain, Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace footing to a war footing.[2]

[2] [Nos. 106, 114.]

From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the expiration of the time limit given to Serbia by Austria, she had confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence. On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures preparatory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed requisitions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were distant from the frontier had been brought up to it.

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave us in doubt of Germany's intentions?

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the German Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, addressed an ultimatum[3] to the Russian Government under the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation of her armies, and demanded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours.

[3] [No. 117.]

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a

movement at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor for his mediation,[1] was put forward at a moment when, on the request of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Government was accepting a formula[2] of such a nature as to lay the foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Serbian dispute and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of military operations and of military preparations.

[1] [App. V. (II., V., VI) (pp. 438, 440).]

[2] [Nos. 112, 113.]

The same day this unfriendly *démarche* towards Russia was supplemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France; the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier.

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the sincerity of the pacific declarations which the German representative continued to shower upon us. (*Hear, hear.*)

We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the "state of danger of war."[3]

[3] [*cf.* B. 136.]

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up,[4] and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier.

[4] [*cf.* B. 136.]

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required; the general mobilisation of our forces[5] on land and sea was ordered.

[5] [No. 127.]

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting for the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of the English proposal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia.[6]

[6] [No. 134.]

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.[7]

[7] [Nos. 136, 139.]

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867,[8] which guaranteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, they invaded the territory of the Grand

[8] [*See* vol. II., p. 489.]

Duchy and so gave cause for a protest by the Luxemburg Government.[1] [B. 147.]

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented to the Belgian Government an ultimatum[2] [G. 20.] requesting facilities in Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian Government refused,[3] [G. 22.] and declared that they were resolved to defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed by treaties,[4] [*See* vol. II., p. 487.] and in particular by the King of Prussia. (*Unanimous and prolonged applause.*)

Since then, Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed, multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our frontier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and Customs officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Lunéville.

The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the great Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile acts committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eifel district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. This is the letter[5] [No. 147.] which he handed to me on the subject :—

"M. LE PRÉSIDENT,

"The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

"I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

"At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

"My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

"Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

"(Signed) SCHOEN."

Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pretexts which they would put forward as grievances? At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions.[1] (*Loud and unanimous applause.*) [1] [*cf.* Nos. 146, 148.]

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness.

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with remarkable vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm. (*Unanimous and prolonged applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.*) The Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. (*Renewed loud and unanimous applause.*)

The entire English fleet is mobilised[2] and orders have been given to mobilise the land forces.* (*Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.*) [2] [*cf.* No. 126.]

* [The British Army Reservists were called out by Royal Proclamation on Tuesday, August 4, the day on which this speech was delivered by M. Viviani.]

Since 1912 *pourparlers* had taken place between English and French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the contents of these two documents.[1]

[1] [*See* Sir E. Grey's speech, vol. II., p. 403; *also* B. 105 (encls. 1 and 2).]

Foreign Office,
November 22, 1912.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR,

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the 23rd November, 1912 :—

London, November 23, 1912.

DEAR SIR EDWARD,

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time ; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces ; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities ; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke of France amidst the applause of the members in a noble and warm-hearted manner[1] and his language has already found an echo deep in the hearts of all

[1] [*See* vol. II., pp. 405-6.]

Frenchmen. (*Loud and unanimous applause.*) I wish in the name of the Government of the Republic to thank the English Government from this tribune for their cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in this sentiment. (*Renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause.*)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the following declaration :—[1]

[1] [*See* No. 137 and footnote.]

"In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the English fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a way that from that moment England and Germany would be in a state of war."

From now onwards, the English fleet protects our northern and western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, however, to make clear the conclusion to be drawn from my story and to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France is the victim.

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of friendship (*unanimous applause*), by the intervention of Russia and of Great Britain. (*Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose upon Europe.

She has re-established the balance of power in Europe, a guarantee of the liberty and dignity of all.

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial co-operation of King Edward VII. of England and the

Government of the Crown (*applause*), this is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day[1] by one daring stroke.

[1] [*cf.* No. 114.]

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice. (*Loud and unanimous applause.*)

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since 1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911.

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis.

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formulated demands, whether against Serbia or against Greece, which still were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion.

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked by surprise. (*Prolonged applause.*)

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty to which nations, as well as individuals, are subject; Italy, with that clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that she proposes to preserve neutrality.[2] (*Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

[2] [No. 124; B. 152.]

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another. (*Renewed applause.*)

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack—it is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente has regained in the balance of power for the service of peace.[3] The object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies, and her friends, are proud to defend. (*Loud applause.*)

[3] [*cf.* No. 114.]

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between the two countries. (*Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is wholly united to defend its existence ; a democracy which knows how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour ; a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe—here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the onlookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been preparing with the greatest calmness and method. We are without reproach. We shall be without fear. (*Loud applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*) France has often proved in less favourable circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for right. (*Applause.*)

In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who are our judges, we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have done our duty. (*Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

CHAPTER VII.

No. 160.

Declaration of the Triple Entente.

(September 4, 1914.)[1]

[1] [The actual date of signature was Sept. 5. *See* vol. II., p. 506.]

Declaration.

M. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors and Ministers abroad.

Paris, September 4, 1914.

The following declaration has this morning[1] been signed at the Foreign Office at London :—

" The undersigned duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments hereby declare as follows :—

" The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies."

(Signed) PAUL CAMBON.
COUNT BENCKENDORFF.
EDWARD GREY.

This declaration will be published to-day.

Delcassé.

APPENDICES

EXTRACTS

FROM THE "BLUE-BOOK" (ENGLISH), FROM THE "GREY-BOOK" (BELGIAN), FROM THE "WHITE-BOOK" (GERMAN), FROM THE "ORANGE-BOOK" (RUSSIAN).

APPENDIX I.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "BLUE-BOOK" RELATING TO THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO RUSSIA, GERMANY, AND FRANCE, DURING THE POURPARLERS WHICH PRECEDED THE WAR.

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 6, 87, 89, 99, 119, 148, quoted in full, or so far as relevant, from the British Blue-book.]

APPENDIX II.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "BLUE-BOOK" RELATING TO THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ENGLAND'S NEUTRALITY.

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 85, 101, 123, quoted in full, or so far as relevant, from the British Blue-book.]

APPENDIX II. (*b*).

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN, ON THE PLEA OF A "MISUNDERSTANDING," A GUARANTEE BY ENGLAND OF THE NEUTRALITY OF FRANCE IN A GERMAN-RUSSIAN WAR.*

(*Semi-official publication in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," August* 20, 1914.)

* [For fuller elucidation of this matter see vol. II., pp. 360–365 and 436–439, where further documents are given.]

No. 1.

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire.

London, July 31, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has just called me to the telephone and asked me if I thought I could say that we would not attack France if she remained neutral in a German-Russian war. I said I thought I could assume responsibility for this.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 2.

Telegram from the Emperor William to King George V.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

I HAVE just received the communication from your Government offering me the neutrality of France under the guarantee of Great Britain. This offer was accompanied by the question whether, in these circumstances, Germany would not attack France. For technical reasons my mobilisation, which has been ordered for both fronts, East and West, this afternoon, must be carried out in accordance with preparations already begun.

Orders countermanding this cannot be given and unfortunately your telegram came too late. But if France offers her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English navy and army, I will refrain from attacking her and will use my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. At this moment the troops on my frontier are stopped by telegraphic and telephonic orders from continuing their advance over the French frontier.

WILLIAM.

No. 3.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of the Empire, to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

GERMANY is ready to agree to the English proposals if England will guarantee, with her military and naval forces,

the neutrality of France in the Russo-German conflict. German mobilisation took place to-day, in reply to Russian provocation, and before the receipt of the English proposals. Consequently our concentration on the French frontier cannot be modified. We guarantee, however, that between now and Monday, August 3, at 7 p.m., the French frontier shall not be crossed if England's acceptance has reached us by that time.

BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

No. 4.

Telegram from King George V. to the Emperor William.

London, August 1, 1914.

IN reply to your telegram which has just reached me, I think there has been a misunderstanding with regard to the suggestion made during the course of a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey, when they were discussing how an armed conflict between Germany and France might be delayed until a means of agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia had been found. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky to-morrow morning to make it clear that there has certainly been misunderstanding on the part of the latter.

GEORGE.

No. 5.

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire.

London, August 2, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S suggestions, founded on England's wish to remain neutral, were made without previous agreement with France, and have since been abandoned as useless.

LICHNOWSKY.

APPENDIX III.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "BLUE-BOOK" RELATING TO ENGLAND'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 153, 155, 157, 159, 160 (so far as relevant), quoted from the British Blue-book.]

APPENDIX IV.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "GREY-BOOK" POINTING OUT THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GERMANY VIOLATED BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 2 (with enclosure), 8, 9, 11, 12 (with enclosure), 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 39, 40, 41, 44, 48, 52, 60, 71, quoted in full from the Belgian Grey-book.]

APPENDIX V.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II AND THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II.

(EXTRACTS FROM THE GERMAN WHITE-BOOK.)

I.

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.

July 28, 1914, 10.45 *p.m.*

I HAVE heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia.[1] The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Serbia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those

[1] [B.4, 50.]

who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin,

WILLIAM.

II.

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.

Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1914, 1 *p.m.*

(1) [*See* Y. 50, footnote.] I AM glad that You are back in Germany.(1) In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would be (*le malheur que serait une guerre européenne*), I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far.

NICHOLAS.

III.

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.

July 29, 1914, 6.30 *p.m.*

I HAVE received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However, I cannot—as I told You in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty[1] that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain[2] at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna,[3] an understanding which—as I have already telegraphed You—my Government endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which—upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted.[4]

[1] [*cf.* No. 92; B. 93 (1).]

[2] [*cf.* B. 90 and note.]

[3] [*cf.* B. 84.]

[4] [*cf.* O. 76.]

WILLIAM.

IV.

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.

July 30, 1914, 1 *a.m.*

MY Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation.[5] I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Serbia,[6] and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders.[7] You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.[8]

[5] [*See* B. 70 (1).]

[6] [*cf.* Y. 90, 91.]

[7] [*cf.* B. 134; Y. 127.]

[8] [*cf.* Y. 56 and note.]

WILLIAM.

V.

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1.20 *p.m.*

I THANK You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago,[1] and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria.[2] I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

[1] [*cf.* Y. 38, 50.]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 104.]

NICHOLAS.

VI.

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.

July 31, 1914.

I THANK You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation.[3] It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action.[4] I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

[3] [*cf.* O. 78.]

[4] [*cf.* Y. 54, 102, 103, 117; O. 78.]

Your cordially devoted

NICHOLAS.

VII.*

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.

July 31, 1914, 2 *p.m.*

UPON Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary.[1] While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilised against my ally Austria-Hungary,[2] whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilised world. It rests in Your hand to avert it.[3] No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.[4]

WILLIAM.

[1] [*cf.* B. 84, 88, 108.]

[2] [B. 70 (1).]

[3] [*cf.* Telegram IV. above.]

[4] [*cf.* O. 70.]

VIII.

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.

August 1, 1914, 2 *p.m.*[5]

I HAVE received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue

[5] [*cf.* Narrative in W., vol. II., pp. 132–135.]

* [This telegram crossed No. VI. from the Tsar to the German Emperor. *See* W., vol. II., p. 133.]

to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply.*

NICHOLAS.

IX.

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

I THANK You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon,[1] no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.

[1] [*See* O. 70.]

WILLIAM.

[These nine telegrams were not all that passed between the two Emperors during the height of the crisis, though they are all that are disclosed in the German White-book. On January 31st, 1915, the *Official Messenger* of Petrograd published the following announcement :—

"The Russian Foreign Office has been authorised by the Emperor Nicholas to give publicity to his Majesty's telegram

* [In the French of the Yellow-book the last sentence reads : " J'attends avec confiance une réponse de toi." It would appear, however, from the statement in the *Official Messenger* of Petrograd quoted below, that this correspondence was carried on in the English language.]

despatched to the German Emperor on July 29th last in English in the following terms:

> 'Thanks for your telegram, conciliatory and friendly, whereas official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister[1] was conveyed in a very different tone. Beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague Conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship.'"

[1] [See O. Y. 58 | 100.]

A more recent German official publication ("Aktenstücke zum Kriegsausbruch"), published in the spring of 1915, includes this telegram, dating it from "Peterhof Palace, 29 July, 8.20 p.m.," and places it in its proper chronological order, between No. III. and No. IV. of the series printed above.]

APPENDIX VI.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "ORANGE-BOOK" RELATING TO GERMANY'S DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA.

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 76, 77, 78, quoted in full from the Russian Orange-book.]

DOCUMENTS

RESPECTING THE

NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE WAR

PUBLISHED BY

THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty. October 1914.

[*Official Translation Published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous. No.* 11 (1914). *Cd.* 7626.]

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DOCUMENTS RESPECTING THE NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE WAR, PUBLISHED BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

No. 1.

M. de Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Belgrade, July* 10 (23), 1914.

THE Austrian Minister, at 6 o'clock this evening, presented an ultimatum[1] from his Government to the Minister of Finance, Patchou, in the absence of Pashitch, requiring the acceptance of the demands contained therein within forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, in the event of failure to accept the note integrally within forty-eight hours, he was under instructions to leave Belgrade with the staff of the legation. Pashitch[2] and the other Ministers, who are away electioneering, have been recalled and are expected at Belgrade to-morrow, Friday, at 10 a.m. Patchou, who communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the help of Russia[3] and declares that no Serbian Government could accept the demands of Austria.[4]

(1) [Text, B. 4.]

(2) [*cf.* No. 9.]

(3) [*cf.* No. 6; S. 47.]

(4) [*cf.* No. 41; S. 33.]

No. 2.

M. de Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Belgrade, July* 10 (23), 1914.

TEXT of the note presented to the Serbian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Minister to-day.

[Here follows the text of the note, for which see B. 4.]

No. 3.

Note verbale personally presented by Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 10 *a.m. on July* 11 (24), 1914.[1]

[1] [*cf.* R. 14.]

THE Austro-Hungarian Government have found themselves obliged to present the following note to the Serbian Government through the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade on Thursday, the 10th (23rd) instant.

[1] [[Here follows the text of the note ; see B. 4.]

No. 4.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Prince Kudachef, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 11 (24), 1914.

[2] [Reply, Nos. 11, 12.]

PLEASE convey the following message[2] to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs :—

[3] [*cf.* B. 26.]

[The text of the message is given in B. 13.]

[4] [*cf.* Y. 39.]

Communicated to London,[3] Rome, Paris,[4] and Belgrade.

No. 5.

[5] [No. 4.]

[6] [*cf.* B. 13.]

[7] [Replies : Berlin No. 14 ; Paris No. 15 ; London No. 16. For Rome *see* Y. 44. *cf.* B. 6, 24.]

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Representatives at London, Berlin, Rome, and Paris.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 11 (24), 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day[5] to Kudachef we trust that the Government to which you are accredited will share the Russian point of view[6] and will at once instruct their Representative at Vienna to hold similar language.[7]

Communicated to Belgrade.

No. 6.

Telegram from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914.

LE Gouvernement austro-hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie dès les premiers jours de l'horrible crime a déclaré qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle était prête à ouvrir une enquête sur son territoire si la complicité de certains de ses sujets était prouvée au cours du procès instruit par les autorités austro-hongroises. Cependant, les demandes contenues dans la note austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignité comme État indépendant. Ainsi on nous demande sur un ton péremptoire une déclaration du Gouvernement dans l' " Officiel," et un ordre du Souverain à l'armée, où nous réprimerions l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche en nous faisant à nous-mêmes des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menées perfides. On nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en Serbie pour participer avec les nôtres à l'instruction et pour surveiller l'exécution des autres conditions indiquées dans la note. Nous avons reçu un délai de quarante-huit heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la Légation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prêts à accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d'un État indépendant, ainsi que celles dont l'acceptation nous sera conseillée par votre Majesté ; toutes les personnes dont la participation à l'attentat sera démontrée seront sévèrement punis par nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient être exécutées sans des changements de notre législation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donné un délai trop court. Nous pouvons être attaqués après l'expiration du délai par l'armée austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontière. Il nous est impossible de nous défendre et nous supplions votre

* [On June 24, 1914, it was announced from Belgrade that, in consequence of illness, King Peter of Serbia had delegated full royal authority to his son, the Crown Prince Alexander.]

Majesté de nous donner son aide le plus tôt possible. La bienveillance précieuse de votre Majesté qui s'est manifestée tant de fois à notre égard nous fait espérer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par son généreux cœur slave.

En ces moments difficiles j'interprète les sentiments du peuple serbe, qui supplie votre Majesté de vouloir bien s'intéresser au sort du Royaume de Serbie.

(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented to the Serbian Government a note[1] respecting the outrage at Serajevo. Serbia, aware of her international obligations, has declared, ever since the horrible crime was committed, that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Serbia if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon to insert a declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for an order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Serbia to take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carrying out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are required to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a

[1] [Text, B. 4.]

time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated goodwill which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal[1] to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded.

[1] [*cf.* No. 1.]

At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Serbian people in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Serbia.[2]

[2] [Tsar's Reply, No. 40. *cf.* No. 10.]

No. 7.

M. Bronewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 11 (24), 1914.

ALL the morning papers, even those few which recognise the impossibility of Serbia's accepting the prescribed conditions, warmly welcome the strong line adopted by Austria.[3] The semi-official *Lokal-Anzeiger* is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Serbia may make to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the Balkan peninsula is to be cleared up at last.

[3] [*cf.* Y. 27; also B. 20 (Vienna Press).]

No. 8.

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 11 (24), 1914.

A COPY of the note[4] officially presented at Belgrade has been communicated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador.[5] The German Ambassador later visited the Minister and read to him a communication containing the Austrian arguments,[6] and indicating that in the event of a refusal on the part of Serbia, Austria would be obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to military measures.[7] The communication ended with the observation

[4] [Text, B. 4.]

[5] [*cf.* No. 19; Y. 25; R. 11.]

[6] [*See* Y. 28; B. 9 (text); R. 13.]

[7] [*See* No. 19.]

that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled between Austria and Serbia direct, and that it was to the interest of the Powers to localise[1] the affair by leaving it to the interested parties. The Acting Head of the Political Department,[2] who was present at the interview, asked the Ambassador whether the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum—in other words, whether, in the event of Serbia not submitting entirely to the Austrian demands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions.[3]

(1) [*See* B. 9, note.]

(2) [M. Berthelot.]

(3) [*cf.* Y. 28.]

No. 9.

M. de Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Belgrade, July* 11 (24), 1914.

PASHITCH has returned to Belgrade.[4] He intends to give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time limit[5] —that is to say, to-morrow, Saturday, at 6 p.m.—showing the points which are acceptable or unacceptable. To-day an appeal will be addressed to the Powers to defend the independence of Serbia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable, we will make war.

(4) [*See* No. 1.]

(5) [*See* No. 13.]

No. 10.

Announcement by the Russian Government.[6]

St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.

RECENT events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Serbia by Austria-Hungary[7] are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.[8]

(6) [Duplicate of R. 15, but date differs.]

(7) [No. 1.]

(8) [*cf.* Nos. 23, 40, 41; B. 40, 94; S. 52 (vol. II., p. 119); W. intro., and exh. 4; R. 26.]

No. 11.

Prince Kudachef, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 12 (25), 1914.

COUNT BERCHTOLD is at Ischl. In view of the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to

him our proposal to extend the time limit[1] of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this proposal verbally to Baron Macchio.[2] The latter promised to communicate it in time to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but added that he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal.[3]

[1] [No. 4; B. 13; R. 20.]
[2] [*cf.* R. 21.]
[3] [*cf.* No. 12; Y. 45; R. 20.]

No. 12.

Prince Kudachef, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 12 (25), 1914.

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day[4] I have just heard from Macchio[5] that the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time limit of the note.[6]

[4] [No. 11.]
[5] [*cf.* Y. 45.]
[6] [R. 20; *cf.* R. 9.]

No. 13.

M. de Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Belgrade, July* 12 (25), 1914.

(Delayed in transmission,[7] received July 14 (27), 1914.)

FOLLOWING is the reply which the President of the Serbian Cabinet to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade before the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum.

[Here follows the text of the Serbian reply, for which see B. 39.]

[7] [*cf.* Nos. 36, 77 (p. 493).]

No. 14.

M. Bronewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 12 (25), 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram[8] of the 11th (24th) July and have communicated its contents to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.[9] He tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him[10] to advise Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum. He has informed Vienna telegraphically of this step,[11] and he will do the same as regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of

[8] [No. 5.]
[9] [*cf.* Y. 43.]
[10] [*cf.* B. 11.]
[11] [B. 18; Y. 41.]

Berchtold, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Serbia. I replied that a Great Power such as Austria could give way without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative.

No. 15.

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 12 (25), 1914.

[1] [No. 5.] I HAVE received your telegram[1] of the 11th (24th) July respecting the extension of the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and I have made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The French Representative at Vienna [2] [Y. 39.] has been furnished with similar instructions.[2]

No. 16.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 12 (25), 1914.

[3] [No. 5.] I HAVE received your telegram[3] of the 11th July. Grey has instructed the British Ambassador at Vienna to support [4] [B. 26.] our action[4] for the extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. At the same time he explained to me that the Austrian [5] [*See* B. 14.] Ambassador had come to see him, and had explained[5] that the Austrian note should not be regarded as an ultimatum. It should be regarded as a step, which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade; without, however, entailing

the immediate opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a result of this explanation he had told the British Ambassador at Vienna that, should it be too late to raise the question of extending the time limit of the ultimatum, the question of preventing hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis for discussion.

No. 17.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 12 (25), 1914.

IN the event of any change for the worse in the situation which might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we count upon it that England will at once side definitely with Russia and France,[1] in order to maintain the European balance of power,[2] for which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would certainly be compromised in the event of the triumph of Austria.

(1) [*cf.* B. 17.]
(2) [*cf.* No. 78.]

No. 18.

Note verbale handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.

WE learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany,[3] is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge[4] of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany.[5]

Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers justified.

Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the very beginning of the Austro-Serbian dispute, that this conflict should be localised.[6]

(3) [*cf.* No. 41.]
(4) [*cf.* Y. 15 and note.]
(5) [*cf.* No. 19; Y. 36.]
(6) [*cf.* No. 8; B. 9.]

No. 19.

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 12 (25), 1914.

(1) [No. 8.] PLEASE refer to my telegram[1] of the 11th (24th) July.

(2) [The *Echo de Paris*; *see* Y. 36.] A morning paper[2] has to-day published, in a not altogether correct form, the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador, and has added comments in which it characterises these utterances as being in the nature of threats.[3] The German Ambassador, who is much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of the Political Department, and explained to him that his words in no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He stated that Austria had presented her note to Serbia without any definite understanding with Berlin,[4] but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly "the bolt once fired"[5] (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by her duties as an ally.

(3) [*cf.* No. 18.]

(4) [*See* Y. 15 and note.]

(5) [*cf.* B. 25.]

No. 20.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 12 (25), 1914.

GREY has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him[6] that the German Government were not informed[7] of the text of the Austrian note, but that they entirely supported Austria's action. The Ambassador at the same time asked if Great Britain could see her way to bring conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburg.[8] Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long as complications existed between Austria and Serbia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilisation

(6) [*cf.* B. 25.]

(7) [*See* Y. 15 and note.]

(8) [*cf.* B. 11, 25.]

would lead to Russian mobilisation, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all the Powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 42; B. 101.]

No. 21.

M. de Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Belgrade, July* 12 (25), 1914.

IN spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just informed the Serbian Government, in a note[2] handed in at 6.30 p.m. this evening, that, not having received a satisfactory answer within the time limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the legation.[3] The Skupshtina is convoked for the 14th (27th) July at Nish.[3] The Serbian Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this evening for that town.*

[2] [S. 40.]

[3] [*cf.* B. 23; S. 41.]

No. 22.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 12 (25), 1914.

GREY has told the German Ambassador[4] that in his opinion Austrian mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisation, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilise. He has therefore, as a first step made an enquiry on this point at Berlin.

[4] [B. 10, 11.]

* [So also in B. 23. In Y. 50 the Serbian Government is said to have retired to Kragujevatz.]

No. 23.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 13 (26), 1914.

ITALY might play a part of the first importance in favour of preserving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to bear upon Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable attitude towards the dispute on the ground that it could not be localised. You should express your conviction that Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to the help of Serbia.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 10 and note.]

No. 24.

M. Kazansky, Acting Russian Consul at Prague, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Prague, July* 13 (26), 1914.

MOBILISATION has been ordered.[2]

[2] [*cf.* No. 47.]

No. 25.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Schébéko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 13 (26), 1914.

I HAD a long and friendly conversation to-day[3] with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.[4] After discussing the ten demands addressed to Serbia,[5] I drew his attention to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if the Serbian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out without recasting the Serbian Press law and associations law, and to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina. As for enforcing points 4 and 5, this might lead to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof.

[3] [*See* R. 31, where, apparently, the same conversation is assigned to July 27.]

[4] [*cf.* B. 56; Y. 54; W. exh. 5.]

[5] [B. 4.]

In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to the statements of Szápáry, is as much desired by Austria as by all the Powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised to enter into a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation with me.[1] This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Serbia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner.[2]

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany,[3] France, Great Britain,[4] and Italy.

[1] [*cf.* No. 38.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 45; B. 93 (1).]

[3] [*See* No. 26.]

[4] [*See* No. 31.]

No. 26.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 13 (26), 1914.

PLEASE communicate the contents of my telegram to Vienna of to-day[5] to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express to him the hope that he, on his part, will be able to advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.[6]

[5] [No. 25.]

[6] [*See* No. 38.]

No. 27.

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 13 (26), 1914.

THE Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador of the contents of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, Serbia's conciliatory attitude should produce the best impression in Europe.

No. 28.

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 13 (26), 1914.

THE German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the following declarations :—[1]

[1] [*cf.* Y. 56.]

" Austria has declared to Russia that she does not desire territorial acquisitions, and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet, and consequently it rests with Russia to prevent war. Germany is at one with France in her ardent desire to preserve peace, and she sincerely hopes that France will exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg."

The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Serbia. The Ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Serbian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the four Powers—Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France—could not make representations at St. Petersburg and Vienna, for that the matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to agree to the German proposal.

No. 29.

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 13 (26), 1914.

THE Director of the Political Department has expressed the personal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at Paris aim at intimidating France and at securing her intervention at St. Petersburg.[2]

[2] [*cf.* No. 35; Y. 62.]

No. 30.

M. Bronewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 13 (26), 1914.

ON the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had mobilised against Serbia, a large crowd, in which the papers report the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a series of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late in the evening the crowd several times collected before the Imperial Russian Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting occurred. Hardly any police were present and no precautions were taken.

No. 31.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 14 (27), 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of the 13th (26th) July.[1] [1] [No. 25.] Please inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your direct discussions with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with Grey's scheme for mediation by the four Governments. Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal,[2] which he [2] [B. 36.] communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome.

No. 32.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 14 (27), 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has enquired whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in summoning a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of finding a way out of the present situation.

* [B. 53 is in part a duplicate of this telegram.]

I replied to the Ambassador that I had begun conversa-
[1] [No. 25.] tions with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador[1] under conditions which, I hoped, might be favourable. I had not, however, received as yet any reply to my proposal for the revision of the note by the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet proved impossible, I was ready to fall in with the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind likely to lead to a favourable
[2] [*cf.* B. 78; Y. 86, 91.] settlement of the dispute.[2]

No. 33.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 14 (27), 1914.

I HAVE taken note of the reply returned by the Serbian
[3] [B. 39.] Government[3] to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its moderation, and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Serbia.

No. 34.

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 14 (27), 1914.

THE German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter
[4] [*cf.* No. 55; Y. 57 and note.] impossibility of any mediation or conference.[4]

No. 35.

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 14 (27), 1914.

I DISCUSSED the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after

my return to Paris. They both confirmed the information respecting the action taken by the German Ambassador, which Sevastopoulo has already telegraphed to you.[1] This morning Baron von Schoen[2] confirmed his declaration of yesterday[3] in writing, i.e. :

1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Serbia.[4] Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet.

2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia.

Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident object[5] of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes ; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France.

(1) [Nos. 19, 28, 34.]
(2) [*cf.* Y. 62.]
(3) [No. 28.]
(4) [*cf.* B. 90 and note.]
(5) [*cf.* No. 29 ; Y. 62.]

No. 36.

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 14 (27), 1914.

IT is clear from your telegrams of the 13th (26) July[6] that you were not then aware of the reply[7] of the Serbian Government. The telegram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours to reach us.[8] The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning, at the special urgent rate, which contained instructions to support our representations, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraph office.

(6) [*See* No. 25.]
(7) [B. 39.]
(8) [*cf.* Nos. 13, 77 (p. 493).]

No. 37.

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 14 (27), 1914.

ON the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Serbia's answer has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action"[1] with the object of forcing Serbia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Serbian frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war.

[1] [*cf.* B. 48, 93 (1); Y. 75.]

No. 38.

M. Bronewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 14 (27), 1914.

I BEGGED the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna[2] that Szápáry should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow answered[3] that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with Pourtalès that, as Szápáry had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way.[4]

[2] [*See* No. 25.]

[3] [*cf.* Y. 81.]

[4] [*cf.* Y. 78 and note.]

No. 39.

M. Bronewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 14 (27), 1914.

BEFORE my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day his Excellency had received the French Ambassador,[5]

[5] [*See* Y. 74.]

who endeavoured to induce him to accept the British proposal for action in favour of peace,[1] such action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested that these Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following terms: "To abstain from all action which might aggravate the existing situation." By adopting this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Serbia might be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who emphasised, as a good feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente—a matter of which Jagow himself had often complained—was avoided.

[1] [B. 36.]

No. 40.

Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia, July 14 (27), 1914.*

VOTRE Altesse Royale en s'adressant à moi dans un moment particulièrement difficile ne s'est pas trompée sur les sentiments qui m'animent à son égard et sur ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe.

Ma plus sérieuse attention est attirée par la situation actuelle et mon Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces à aplanir les présentes difficultés. Je ne doute point que votre Altesse et le Gouvernement Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tâche en ne négligeant rien pour arriver à une solution qui permette de prévenir les horreurs d'une nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignité de la Serbie.

Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'éviter une effusion de sang, tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgré notre plus sincère désir, nous ne réussissons pas, votre Altesse peut être assurée qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se désintéressera du sort de la Serbie.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

* [In No. 56 Prince Alexander thanks the Emperor for this telegram.]

(TRANSLATION.)

[1] [No. 6.] WHEN your Royal Highness applied to me[1] at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Serbian people.

The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my Government are using their utmost endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Serbian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Serbia.

So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our earnest wish we are not successful, your Highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia.[2]

[2] [*cf.* No. 10 and note.]

No. 41.

M. Schébéko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 14 (27), 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long conversation which I had with Macchio to-day, I drew his attention, in a perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable impression produced in Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Serbia, which it was quite impossible for any independent State, however small, to accept.[3] I added that this method of procedure might lead to the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis,[4] has counted on the probable localisation[5] of the dispute with Serbia, and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent[6] in the face of such conduct has caused a great sensation here.

[3] [*cf.* No. 1; S. 33.]

[4] [*cf.* B. 54; Y. 95. Denied, No. 18.]

[5] [*cf.* No. 8. *See* B. 9 and note.]

[6] [No. 10.]

No. 42.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 14 (27), 1914.

GREY has just informed the German Ambassador,[1] who came to question him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Petersburg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also pointed out that the Serbian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the Serbian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question.

In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention of crushing Serbia. Looked at in this light, the question might give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all the Powers would be involved.

Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preservation of peace was in question ; but, in the contrary event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.

(1) [*See* B. 46.]

No. 43.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London.

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914.

[Duplicate of B. 54.]

No. 44.

M. Salviati, Russian Consul-General at Fiume, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Fiume, July* 15 (28), 1914.

STATE of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have also been called up.[2]

(2) [*cf.* Y. 90, 91.]

No. 45.

M. Schébéko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

[Duplicate of B. 93 (1).]

No. 46.

M. Bronewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 15 (28), 1914.

THE Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Serbian reply, although it was communicated to them. Up to the present this note has not appeared *in extenso* in any of the local papers, which, to all appearances, do not wish to publish it in their columns, being well aware of the calming effect which it would have on German readers.

No. 47.

M. Schébéko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 15 (28), 1914.

THE order for general mobilisation has been signed.[1]

[1] [*cf.* No. 24; R. 47, 48.]

No. 48.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London.[2]

[2] [*cf.* B. 70 (2).]

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 15 (28), 1914.

IN face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action, and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against Serbia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Serbia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans.

Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

No. 49.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Bronewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

[Duplicate of B. 93 (2).]

No. 50.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris.

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

[Duplicate of B. 93 (3).]

No. 51.

M. Bronewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 16 (29), 1914.

ON my enquiry whether he had received from Vienna a reply respecting your proposal for private discussions at St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State answered in the negative.

He declares that it is very difficult for him to produce any effect at Vienna, especially openly. He even added, in speaking to Cambon, that were pressure brought to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with a *fait accompli.*[1]

The Secretary of State tells me that he received a telegram to-day from Pourtalès, stating that you seemed more inclined than you previously were to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. I replied that presumably you had been in favour of a compromise from the outset, provided always that it were acceptable, not only to Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that it appeared that Russia had begun to mobilise on the Austrian frontier, and that he feared that this would make it more difficult for Austria to come to an understanding with us, all the more so as Austria was mobilising[2] against Serbia alone,[3] and was making no preparations upon our frontier. I replied

[1] [*cf.* B. 76.]

[2] [Nos. 24, 47.]

[3] [*cf.* W. exh. 18.]

that, according to the information in my possession, Austria was mobilising upon the Russian frontier also, and that consequently we had to take similar steps.[1] I added that whatever measures we might, perhaps, have taken on our side were in no wise directed against Germany.[2]

[1] [*cf.* Y. 100.]

[2] [*cf.* Y. 102. *Also* No. 68.]

No. 52.

M. de Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Nish, July* 16 (29), 1914.

THE Bulgarian Minister to-day declared to Pashitch, in the name of his Government, that Bulgaria would remain neutral.

No. 53.

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 16 (29), 1914.

FOR the information of the President of the French Republic on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared a short summary of the present political situation,[3] approximately in the following terms: Austria, fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an occupation of Serbian military lines or even Serbian territory. Germany is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be "localised" between Austria and Serbia; that question is the punishment of Serbia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guarantees for the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavoured to induce France to adopt joint action with Germany towards Russia for the preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was given that any action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's inordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Serbia's few reservations, and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke

[3] [*See* Y. 85.]

a general war. France and England were unable to bring any moderating pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that Power has shown the greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Serbia to accept as much as was possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up the idea of pressure upon Russia only, and inclines towards mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeavouring to cause the action to drag on. Germany is opposing the conference without suggesting any other practical course of action. Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, which are manifestly of a procrastinating nature. At the same time she is taking active steps, and if these steps are tolerated, her claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should lend all her support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. In the contrary event, Austria, on the plea of "guarantees," will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern Europe.

No. 54.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 16 (29), 1914.

I HAVE communicated the contents of your telegrams of the 15th (28th) July[1] to Grey. He informed the German Ambassador to-day[2] that the direct discussions between Russia and Austria had been fruitless, and that Press correspondents were reporting from St. Petersburg that Russia was mobilising against Austria in consequence of the latter's mobilisation. Grey said that, in principle, the German Government had declared themselves in favour of mediation,[3] but that he was experiencing difficulties with regard to the form it should take. Grey has urged that the German Government should indicate the form which, in their opinion, would enable the four Powers to have recourse to mediation to prevent war; France, Italy, and Great Britain having consented, mediation could only come into play if Germany consented to range herself on the side of peace.

[1] [Nos. 43 (*see* B. 54), 48.]

[2] [B. 84; *cf.* Y. 98.]

[3] [*cf.* B. 18, 43 and note.]

No. 55.

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 16 (29), 1914.

VIVIANI has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm determination to act in concert with Russia.[1] This determination is upheld by all classes of society, and by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists, who have just addressed a resolution to the Government expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic sentiments of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has telegraphed an urgent message to London[2] that, direct discussions between St. Petersburg and Vienna having ended, the London Cabinet should again put forward their proposal for mediation by the Powers as soon as possible under one form or another. Before seeing me to-day Viviani saw the German Ambassador,[3] and the latter again assured him of the peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation, Baron von Schoen replied that the words " conference " or " arbitration " alarmed Austria.[4] Viviani retorted that it was not a question of words,[5] and that it would be easy to find some other form for mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen, it was necessary for the success of the negotiations between the Powers to know what Austria intended to demand from Serbia.[6] Viviani answered that the Berlin Cabinet could quite easily make this enquiry of Austria, but that, meanwhile, the Serbian reply might well form the basis of discussion ; he added that France sincerely desired peace, but that she was determined at the same time to act in complete harmony with her allies and friends, and that he, Baron von Schoen, might have convinced himself that this determination met with the warmest approval of the country.

(1) [*cf.* Y. 101. *See also* No. 58.]

(2) [Y. 97.]

(3) [Y. 94.]

(4) [*cf.* No. 34 ; Y. 57 and note.]

(5) [*cf.* Y. 74.]

(6) [*cf.* B. 84 ; Y. 94 ; W. exh. 14.]

No. 56.

Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

PROFONDÉMENT touché par le télégramme que votre Majesté a bien voulu m'adresser hier, je m'empresse de la remercier de tout mon cœur. Je prie votre Majesté d'être persuadée que la cordiale sympathie dont votre Majesté est animée envers mon pays nous est particulièrement précieuse, et remplit notre âme de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est assuré, étant devenu l'objet de la haute sollicitude de votre Majesté. Ces moments pénibles ne peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie à la sainte Russie slave, et les sentiments de reconnaissance éternelle pour l'aide et la protection de votre Majesté seront conservés pieusement dans l'âme de tous les Serbes.

(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

(TRANSLATION.)

DEEPLY touched by the telegram[1] which your Majesty was pleased to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart. Your Majesty may rest assured that the cordial sympathy which your Majesty feels towards my country is especially valued by us, and fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Serbia is secure now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment which bind Serbia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of everlasting gratitude which we feel for the help and protection afforded to us by your Majesty will ever be cherished in the hearts of all the Serbs.

[1] [No. 40.]

No. 57.

M. de Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Nish, July* 16 (29), 1914.

I HAVE communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic reply[2] returned by His Majesty the Emperor to

[2] [No. 40.]

Prince Alexander. On reading it, Pashitch crossed himself and exclaimed: "The Tsar is great and merciful!" He then embraced me and was overcome with emotion. The heir-apparent is expected at Nish late to-night.

No. 58.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 16 (29), 1914.

THE German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilise, if Russia did not stop her military preparations.[1] Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia.

[1] [*cf.* No. 60; *also* B. 99, Y. 100; R. 46.]

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France.[2] In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable to us.

[2] [*cf.* No. 55; Y. 101.]

Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.

No. 59.

M. de Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Nish, July* 17 (30), 1914.

THE Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all the Serbian Ministers, on the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia. The manifesto ends with the following words: "Defend your homes and Serbia with all your might." At the solemn opening of the Skupshtina the Regent read the speech from the Throne, in his own name. At the beginning of his speech he pointed out that the place

of their convocation showed the importance of present events. He followed this with a summary of recent events—the Austrian ultimatum, the Serbian reply, the efforts of the Serbian Government to do their utmost to avoid war that was compatible with the dignity of the State, and, finally, the armed aggression of their most powerful neighbour against Serbia, at whose side stood Montenegro. Passing in review the attitude of the Powers towards the dispute, the Prince emphasised in the first place the sentiments which animated Russia, and the gracious communication from His Majesty the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Serbia.[1] [1] [No. 40.] At each mention of His Majesty the Tsar and of Russia the hall resounded with loud bursts of wild cheering (*un "jivio" formidable et fébrile secouait la salle des séances*). The sympathy shown by France and England was also touched upon in turn, and called forth approving plaudits from the members. The speech from the Throne ended by declaring the Skupshtina open, and by expressing the hope that everything possible would be done to lighten the task before the Government.

No. 60.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 17 (30), 1914.

THE German Ambassador, who has just left me,[2] has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give—that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia—and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration[3] to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action: "If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military preparations." *

[2] [*cf.* B. 97; Y. 103; *also* B. 99.]

[3] [For modified formula *see* No. 67.]

* [The text of this formula—as also of the amended formula in No. 67—appears in the British Blue-book (B. 97), the French Yellow-book (Y. 103), and here, with trifling variations in the wording, but these do not affect the sense.]

Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations.

No. 61.

M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 17 (30), 1914.

I LEARN that the order for the mobilisation of the German army and navy has just been issued.[1]

[1] [*See* No. 62; Y. 105.]

No. 62.

M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 17 (30), 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned that the news of the mobilisation of the German army and fleet, which has just been announced,[2] is false; that the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to be ready for all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated.

[2] [*See* No. 61; *cf.* Y. 105.]

No. 63.

M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 17 (30), 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of 16th (29th) July,[3] and have communicated the text of your proposal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told me that he had received an identic telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and he then declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal.

[3] [No. 49; B. 93 (2).]

No. 64.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 17 (30), 1914.

I HAVE communicated the substance of your telegrams of the 16th (29th)[1] and 17th (30th)[2] July to Grey, who looks upon the situation as most serious, but wishes to continue the discussions. I pointed out to Grey that since you agreed[3] with him to accept whatever proposal he might make in order to preserve peace, provided that Austria did not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Serbia, the situation in which you were placed had apparently been modified.* At that time our relations with Germany had not been compromised. After the declaration made by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg regarding German mobilisation,[4] those relations had changed, and you had returned the only reply to his request that was possible from a Great Power. When the German Ambassador again visited you,[5] and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I also again emphasised to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation brought about by the fault of Germany in consequence of the German Ambassador's action. Grey replied that he fully understood this, and that he would remember these arguments.

(1) [Nos. 50, 58.]
(2) [No. 60.]
(3) [*See* No. 32.]
(4) [No. 58.]
(5) [No. 60.]

No. 65.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 17 (30), 1914.

THE German Ambassador has asked Grey why Great Britain was taking military measures both on land and sea.[6] Grey replied that these measures had no aggressive character, but that the situation was such that each Power must be ready.

(6) [*cf.* Y. 108; B. 89.]

* [In the Foreign Office translation of this sentence a dash is inserted after the first "that," and another after the word "Serbia,"; but this punctuation perverts the meaning of the original, which reads: "J'ai fait observer à Grey que depuis que vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il proposerait . . . la situation dans laquelle vous vous trouviez s'était apparemment modifiée."]

No. 66.

M. Schébéko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Vienna, July* 18 (31), 1914.

[1] [Y. 115.] IN spite of the general mobilisation,[1] my exchange of [2] [*cf.* B. 110; R. 50, 53, 55.] views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues.[2] They all dwell upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatsoever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of Serbia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun and to give Serbia a serious [3] [*cf.* B. 18, 32; Y. 57.] lesson,[3] which would constitute a sure guarantee for the future.

No. 67.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 18 (31), 1914.

[4] [No. 60.] PLEASE refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July.[4] The British Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make [5] [*cf.* B. 103; Y. 112.] certain modifications[5] in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you [6] [*cf.* B. 120, 132; Y. 113. *See* footnote to No. 60.] the text of the modified formula which is as follows[6] :—

" If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops [7] [*cf.* S. 51.] on Serbian territory[7] ; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

No. 68.

M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July* 18 (31), 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discussions, which were already difficult enough on

account of the mobilisation against Austria,[1] were becoming even more so in view of the serious military measures that we were taking against Germany.[2] He said that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military measures against Russia.[3] In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts that the only step taken in Germany has been the recall of officers from leave and of the troops from manœuvres.[4]

[1] [*cf.* B. 98.]

[2] [*cf.* No. 51; Y. 102.]

[3] [*cf.* B. 97.]

[4] [*cf.* B. 98; Y. 59, 60, 89.]

No. 69.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 18 (31), 1914.

I HAVE requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present situation need not yet be abandoned.

I also requested him to inform the British Minister that in my opinion it was only in London that the discussions might still have some faint chance of success and of rendering the necessary compromise easier for Austria.

Communicated to Russian Ambassador in France.

No. 70.

Secret Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Representatives abroad.

(Telegram.) *July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

AT midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by noon [*midi*][5] on Saturday,[6] we had not begun to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation.[7] To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it.

[5] [Wrongly translated "midnight" in official version.]

[6] [Aug. 1.]

[7] [*cf.* B. 117; Y. 117 and note; W. exh. 24; *see also* R. 57.]

No. 71.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

GREY tells me that he has telegraphed to Berlin that in his opinion the last formula[1] accepted by the Russian Government offers the best prospect as a basis of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.[2] At the same time he expressed the hope that no Great Power would open hostilities before this formula had been considered.

[1] [No. 67.]
[2] [*cf.* B. 103.]

No. 72.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

THE British Government has enquired of the French and German Governments whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium.[3]

France[4] answered in the affirmative, but the German Government[5] stated that they could not give any definite answer to the question.

[3] [B. 114.]
[4] [B. 125.]
[5] [B. 122.]

No. 73.

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

THE Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia,[6] was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances[7] against Serbia with the other Powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the guise of "Kriegszustand," mobilisation is in reality being carried out.[8]

[6] [*cf.* B. 137; Y. 120.]
[7] [*cf.* B. 133; Y. 121.]
[8] [*cf.* B. 136; Y. 116, 117, 127.]

No. 74.

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

ON the receipt in Paris of the telegram from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the communication made to you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to order general mobilisation to-day,[1] the President of the French Republic signed the order for mobilisation.[2] Lists of the reservists recalled to the colours are being posted up in the streets. The German Ambassador has just visited Viviani,[3] but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobilisation issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the Powers. He added that mobilisation did not necessarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

(1) [No. 70.]
(2) [Y. 127; B. 136.]
(3) [*See* Y. 125.]

No. 75.

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Paris, July* 19 (*August* 1), 1914.

I HEAR from the President that during the last few days the Austrian Ambassador emphatically assured both the President of the Council of Ministers and him that Austria had declared to Russia that she was ready to respect both the territorial integrity of Serbia and also her sovereign rights, but that Russia had intentionally received this declaration in silence. I contradicted this flatly.

No. 76.

Note presented by Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, on July 19 (*August* 1), *at* 7.10 P.M.[4]

LE Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à

(4) [*cf.* Y. 134; W. exh. 26.]

un désir qui lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint-Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure menaçante ne motivée par aucun présage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire allemand s'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre à*) cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude *) que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à votre Excellence ce qui suit :

* [*See* footnote p. 493.]

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, relevant le défi, se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator[1] between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg ; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces[2] both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step,[3] which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid

[1] [*See* Y. app. V. (iii.).]
[2] [B. 113 ; Y. 118.]
[3] [*cf.* W., vol. II., p. 134.]

military acts.[1] Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer*) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude *) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows :— [1] [No. 70.]

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

No. 77.

Announcement by M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, respecting Recent Events.

July 20 (*August* 2), 1914.

A GARBLED version of the events of the last few days having appeared in the foreign Press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review :—

On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Serbia,[2] in which the Serbian Government were accused of having fostered the pan-Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Serbian Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Serbian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time limit of forty-eight hours was given to the Serbian Government within which to reply to this note. [2] [No. 1; for text, *see* B. 4.]

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade,[3] having taken note of the demands contained therein, could [3] [*cf.* Nos. 13, 36.]

* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note.

not but perceive that some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Serbia, involved in these demands, and equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony (*sa prépondérance*) in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine
(1) [No. 25.] the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note.(1) The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to
(2) [B. 93 (1) (3).] agree to a discussion of the note.(2) The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that Serbia had reprobated the crime, and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond the expectations, not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers—despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Serbian
(3) [B. 39.] reply(3) insufficient and left the town.(4)
(4) [No. 21.] Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Austria, Russia had previously declared that she
(5) [No. 10.] could not remain indifferent,(5) while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peaceful issue which might prove acceptable to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation (*diminu-*
(6) [*cf.* Y. 22.] *tion de la dignité*) of Serbia as an independent State.(6) Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention
(7) [B. 61.] by the Powers(7) in the Austrian dispute with Serbia, pro-
(8) [B. 50; R. 30.] ceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Serbia,(8) and the following day Belgrade was bombarded.(9) The
(9) [Y. 113.] (10) [R. 19.] manifesto(10) which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia,[1] the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan.[2] This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Serbian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia half-way in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.[3]

(1) [No. 10.]

(2) [B. 70 (1)].

(3) [*cf.* No. 47; Y. 100.]

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany.[4] Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute,[5] either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

(4) [No. 51; Y. 102.]

(5) [*cf.* B. 78; Y. 86, 91.]

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with Russia,[6] and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed conference of the Powers.[7]

(6) [B. 93 (1) (3).]

(7) [B. 61.]

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared[8] that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Serbia.

(8) [No. 60.]

Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary.[9] At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation by Austria-Hungary[10] reached St. Petersburg.

(9) [Y. 107, 114.]

(10) [Y. 115.]

All this time hostilities were continuing on Serbian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.[1]

[1] [B. 113, 134; Y. 118.]

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations[2] so as to be ready for every emergency.

[2] [*cf.* Nos. 58, 60.]

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation,[3] and she announced that she was ready to accept any proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward,[4] provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

[3] [*cf.* B. 134.]

[4] [*cf.* B. 78; Y. 86, 102.]

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on the 18th (31st) July demanded[5] of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilisation.

[5] [No. 70.]

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war[6] to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[6] [No. 76.]

No. 78.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Representatives Abroad.

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July* 20 (*August* 2), 1914.

IT is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture.[7] We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilisation.

[7] [B. 134; Y. 127; S. 51.]

The Emperor of Russia had promised[8] the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful

[8] [Y. app. V. (vi.).]

settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Serbia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power[1] by securing the hegemony (*l'hégémonie*) of Germany. The European—nay, the world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

[1] [No. 17.]

No. 79.

Note presented by Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 24 (*August* 6), 1914, *at* 6 *p.m.*

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, le soussigné Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie ce qui suit :

" Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et la Serbie et en présence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie d'après une communication du Cabinet de Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec la dite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerre avec la Russie à partir du présent moment."

(TRANSLATION.)

ON the instructions of his Government,[2] the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform his Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows :—

[2] [R. 59.]

" In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Serbia ; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany ; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia ; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment."

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